The Issue of Solipsism in the early works of Sartre and Wittgenstein by Ucan, Timur
The Issue of Solipsism  
in the Early Works 
of Sartre and Wittgenstein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timur Uçan 
 
PhD Thesis for Doctorate of Philosophy 
University of East Anglia 
School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies 
August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it 
is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of 
any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK 
Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. 
2 
 
 
Abstract 
Solipsism was conceived as a preliminary to grounding knowledge in the 
seventeenth century. This doctrine suggested that, in order to achieve certainty, 
one had to temporarily admit the conceivability of doubt about the existence of 
other minds and the external world as a whole. The existence of the external 
world was then taken to be established by means of proofs of the existence of a 
unique creator, or assured by means of transcendental deduction. By comparison, 
nothing seems to prove the existence of others. On the one hand, nothing seems 
to count as proof a posteriori of the existence of others, for the doubt it would 
dispel cannot be grounded in experience. On the other hand, nor can a proof 
which would dispel such doubt be produced a priori, for the empirical and 
generalized absence of others is conceivable a posteriori. Thus, nothing seems to 
exclude the possibility of an a priori discovery of one’s unicity. This thesis 
endeavours to bring out the similarity of the treatment of this difficulty by Sartre 
and Wittgenstein. Each of these philosophers confronted the illusion of 
confinement that presupposes admitting the generalized absence of others. In 
Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a conceptual means to establish that the 
theoretical problem of the existence of other minds is a pseudo-problem. In the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein proposes to dissolve the philosophical problems of the 
existence of the external world and the existence of other minds via reflexion on 
the intelligibility conditions of expression. Both cases involve dispelling the 
appearance that doubt about the world and other minds is possible and required. 
Not only that proof of the existence of other minds is impossible, it is also 
superfluous. To require such a proof therefore can lead to nothing but missing the 
obviousness of our commitments to others, and thereby to denying their 
existence. 
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The Issue of Solipsism in the Early 
Works of  
Sartre and Wittgenstein 
 
Introduction 
The present thesis examines the issue of solipsism in the early works of 
Sartre and Wittgenstein. Understood etymologically, “solipsism” would mean “I 
am the only one there could be” or “there is only one existence that is certain, 
which is my own”, and affirming it would call into question the existence of other 
minds. I will attempt to show that, beginning with their early works, both Sartre 
and Wittgenstein treat the issue of solipsism as arising from an implicit 
engagement with fiction (i.e., a product of imagination). An implicit engagement 
with fiction contrasts with an explicit one. An author who writes a novel has the 
explicit aim, possibly among others, of producing fiction. But this is not the case 
with solipsism, which was not initially presented as such. 
In this introduction, I will outline how solipsism was confronted in 
philosophy during the seventeenth century and how it passed through at least 
two stages before being addressed by Sartre and Wittgenstein. To do so, I will first 
spell out explicitly what I suggest to be the concern that solipsism was initially 
meant to answer. Then I will present an outline of two philosophical solutions that 
were provided to this concern and which shaped the way in which the issue of 
solipsism has been received, contributing to the ways in which it was dealt with 
both by Sartre and Wittgenstein. 
Am I alone in the world? When I am alone somewhere, there is no one 
other than me where I am. When I am somewhere with others, there are others 
where I am. Yet, could I not doubt this? After all, I could believe myself to be 
alone somewhere while I am not. Someone could be observing me, and I could 
remain ignorant of this and discover it only afterwards. I also could believe myself 
to be in the presence of one or several persons while there is no one there: for 
example, I could think I have seen someone when I am in the forest, only to find 
out it is a log. I could also think that there is a group of people on top of a hill at a 
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distance, then notice they are statues as I draw closer. To think that I am in the 
presence of one or several persons does not amount to being in the presence of 
one or several persons. Could I not, then, doubt their existence? The feeling of 
solitude does not always depend on whether I am in fact in the presence of 
someone. I may not feel alone while I am, for example, working in my room. But I 
could feel alone while in the presence of someone or even within a crowd. To feel 
alone does not always depend on the presence of someone in my surroundings. 
Do I not, then, have a reason to feel alone if I can think that I am alone while I am 
not, just as I may be alone while believing I am not? Am I alone in the world? 
 
The Question of the Truth of Solipsism 
Descartes’ enterprise can be understood as an attempt to dispel this 
doubt and to end gratuitous affirmations such as this through metaphysical 
meditation. If I mention Descartes, it is first of all because he is often presented as 
a contributor to the history of discussions of scepticism, notably by Clarke (1972) 
and Conant (2012). Conant presents that the sceptical problematic addressed by 
Descartes as centred on “how to distinguish between dreaming that one is 
experiencing something and actually experiencing it” (Conant, 2012, p. 4). This 
sceptical problematic is different from a solipsistic problematic that Descartes also 
addresses at various occasions:1 
If the objective reality of any one of my ideas be so great that I am certain it 
cannot be in me either formally or eminently, and that consequently I cannot 
myself be the cause of it, it necessarily follows that I am not alone in the world 
and that there is likewise existing some other thing, which is the cause of this 
idea. Were no idea of this kind to be met with in me, I should have no argument 
sufficient to render me certain of the existence of anything different from me. 
(Descartes, 1958, pp. 201-202) 
In this passage, Descartes focuses on the potential truth of solipsism and 
suggests that one needs to be certain that one is not alone in the world. In this 
context, this specifically means providing an answer to the question whether God 
exists. However, unlike Malebranche and Berkeley, Descartes does not explicitly 
raise the problem of others minds: i.e., the question of how we can know of the 
                                                          
1
 Other confrontations with a solipsistic problematic can be found in Descartes (1958, p. 
121; p. 204; p. 209; p. 220). 
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existence other minds.2 In what follows, I outline the way in which Descartes 
confronts the solipsistic problematic along the lines of the above quoted passage. 
In order to dispel doubt about whether one is alone in the world, one can 
admit the transitional conceivability of doubt about the existence of the external 
world as a whole (and thus, implicitly, that of other minds as well). I can doubt my 
senses insofar as I can commit mistakes concerning what I perceive. I can even 
admit that I can pretend to be situated nowhere or not have a body. That I can do 
this nevertheless involves that I can think, and I cannot even pretend that this is 
not the case (Descartes, 1958, p. 119). That I can think myself to be alone in the 
world means that there is something that thinks this. This something is the one 
that thinks when it thinks in the first person: I am, I exist. But can I not then 
imagine that this is not the case when I do not think this? I could, for instance, 
imagine an evil genius who could systematically delude me into mistakenly 
thinking that I exist. Yet to imagine this requires that such an evil genius could 
itself have a model: i.e., to imagine a being that could delude me systematically 
requires the ability to think of a perfect being who would not do so. I may thus 
establish that the “thinking thing” could not think of itself without finding in itself 
the mark of its creator: i.e., the idea of a perfect being able to produce it, which it 
could not have received from experience. And it is then proven that there is a 
world. The sufficient reason for my existence is the existence of God whose 
existence can be proven a posteriori, as emphasized by Spinoza (2002, p. 134). 
Notably, the very term “solipsism” appears at this epoch with the publication of 
Monarchia Solipsorum  (Scotti, 1651), in which Melchior Inchofer, under a 
                                                          
2
 Both Malebranche and Berkeley question the manner in which we can know about other 
minds. Berkeley (1996, p. 89) suggests that this knowledge is inherently mediate: 
145. From what hath been said, it is plain that we cannot know the 
existence of other spirits, otherwise than by their operations, or the 
ideas by them excited in us. *…+ Hence the knowledge I have of other 
spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas *…+.  
In this approach: 
A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea. 
*…+ Hence it is plain, we do not see a man, if by man is meant that which 
lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do: but only such a certain 
collection of ideas *…+. (Berkeley, 1996, pp. 90-91) 
Malebranche (1980, p. 89) on his side, proposes a conjectural conception of the existence 
of other minds:  
Clearly we know them only through conjecture. At present we do not know them 
either in themselves or through their ideas, and as they are different from 
ourselves, we cannot know them through consciousness. We conjecture that the 
souls of other mean are of the same sort as our own. 
10 
 
pseudonym intends to denounce what he calls “the realm of solipsists”. A 
circumstantial element of explanation can be given: if one admits that solipsism is 
conceivable under its own terms and can be overcome only through recognition 
of the existence of a creator, it can then seem pertinent, independent of 
experience, to suspect that others either do not recognize the existence of a 
creator or do not live according to what this recognition is assumed to imply. In 
this case, it would then seem required and pertinent to anonymously denounce 
solipsism. 
However, in overcoming solipsism via proving the existence of a unique 
creator, the existence of the world seems to depend on arbitrariness. How could 
one then exclude that things are at their worst? Is there no reason that one is not 
alone in the world? 
I can then attempt to show that solipsism can be overcome by starting 
from the world as a whole: it is not simply the idea of the creator that I can 
discover as proof that I am not alone in the world. If there is any proof of his 
existence, one must be the existence of the world in all its contingency. The 
reason I am not alone in the world is that the creator could not have arbitrarily 
realized any possible world: his perfection implies that he has realized the best 
possible world. One can thus recognize the necessity of a pre-established 
harmony between those who may represent the world to themselves and their 
representations. Monads are without doors or windows, but I cannot be the only 
person that there is. The sufficient reason for this choice by the creator is to be 
found in the internal “convenience” of worlds (Leibniz, 1989, p. 54). This is 
nothing but a question of point of view. If the representations that we have of 
each other agree with each other, it is due to the establishment of their harmony 
by the creator. 
However, I can still interrogate myself: is it possible to prove in this way 
that I am not alone in the world? On the one hand, I have to admit that it would a 
priori be possible for me not to occupy any place in the world. On the other hand, 
to surmount the problem of the gratuitous affirmation of solitude in this way 
involves my ability to prove the existence of the creator. Is this not a dead end, 
insofar as the question of the existence of the creator belongs to faith rather than 
science? Can I not answer the issue raised by solipsism without making the first 
depend on the latter? 
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The Question of the Legitimacy of Solipsism 
Kant suggests that it is conceivable to put metaphysics back on the secure 
path of science by means of a critique. If I mention Kant, it is first insofar as he 
contributes to the history of scepticism in the First Critique and questions the 
legitimacy of solipsism in the Second Critique. In what follows, I outline the way in 
which he addresses a sceptical problematic in the First Critique and solipsism in 
the Second Critique, as this will help showing the background against which both 
Sartre and Wittgenstein received the question of solipsism. 
On Kant’s approach, one can provide to oneself the means to judge the 
controversies among those who enter the arena of metaphysics (Kampfplatz). 
That I can think that I am alone in the world already involves that I can think that I 
can occupy a place. I cannot simply establish a posteriori that I occupy one, as 
mistakes are conceivable with respect to what experience can deliver to me. 
Nevertheless, if I can commit mistakes with respect to experience, even ones that 
concern my occupation of a place in particular, then I can represent to myself that 
something occupies a place in space. Yet, while I can represent to myself an 
empty space, I cannot represent to myself an object without a space (Kant, 1998, 
pp. 157; A24-B38). Space, as a condition of possibility of any representation I can 
have of an object, does not come from experience. It is, along with time, a 
necessary a priori representation and thus belongs to the conditions of possibility 
of the intuition of objects. The difficulty stemmed from that one presenting 
oneself to nature “like a pupil” instead of “an appointed judge who compels 
witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them” (Kant, 1998, p. 109; BXIII). By 
means of reflexion on the conditions of possibility of knowledge, one can thus 
avoid a double difficulty: “without sensibility no object would be given to us, 
without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant, 1998, pp. 193-194; A51-B75). 
In this sense, a transcendental logic can be implemented which could apply, by 
comparison with general logic, to the form of thinking in its relation to the object 
(Kant, 1998, pp. 195-196; A55-B80). 
A priori doubt with respect to one’s own existence, which makes it 
seemingly necessarily to prove the existence of a unique creator, can be left aside: 
“the I think must be able to accompany all my representations” (Kant, 1998, p. 
246; B131). Material idealism, understood as “the theory that declares the 
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existence of objects in space outside us either to be either merely doubtful and 
indemonstrable or else false and impossible” (Kant, 1998, p. 326; B274), can be 
refuted. To be conscious of one’s own existence suffices to prove the existence of 
objects in space outside me (Kant, 1998, p. 327; B275). In Kant’s own words, if one 
considers the “Refutation of Idealism”, then “one will realize that in the preceding 
proof the game that idealism plays has with greater justice been turned against it” 
(Kant, 1998, p. 327; B276). By means of this proof, Kant (1998, p. 326; B275) 
explicitly targets Descartes’ conception of the distinction between the inner and 
the outer. Conant (2012, p. 46) suggests that “Kant wants to show that without 
what the idealist wants to infer to there would be nothing to infer from”. In his 
reading of Kant’s approach, which I follow here, the argument of the “Refutation 
of Idealism” presupposes the results of the Transcendental Analytic (ibid.). 
Indeed, on this reading, the aim of the Transcendental Analytic is to cast and 
dispel a paradox. This paradox is tied to the previously mentioned sceptical 
problematic addressed by Descartes regarding “how to distinguish between 
dreaming that one is experiencing something and actually experiencing it?” To 
answer this requires, on Kant’s approach, answering another, more radical, 
sceptical problematic: “what does it take to be able to dream that one is 
experiencing something?” (Conant, 2012, p. 4). As evidence of such a problematic 
in Kant, Conant quotes the following passage from the second section of the 
Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, which precedes the 
“Refutation of Idealism”: 
The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time 
conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. Now I maintain that the 
categories […] are nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible experience 
[…] [A]nd without such unity […] no thoroughgoing, universal, and therefore 
necessary, unity of consciousness would be met with in the manifold of 
perceptions. These perceptions would not then belong to any experience, 
consequently would be without an object, merely a blind play of representations, 
less even than a dream. (1998, pp. 234-235; A111) (Kant, 1998, A111) 
Inasmuch as the “Refutation of Idealism” is aimed at the Cartesian 
problematic of scepticism, Kant’s treatment of it presupposes his own treatment 
of the sceptical problematic (Conant, 2012, p. 46). On Kant’s approach, the 
“Refutation of Idealism” would remain ungrounded if the means to provide the 
refutation had not previously been deduced. If it is not established that we have 
those means a priori, then the proof could not suffice to turn the game of idealism 
against itself. Conant suggests that the decisive step of the Transcendental 
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Deduction that enables Kant to address a sceptical problematic “lies in showing 
that a play of representations, for it to have an objective purport, must be in 
accord with the unity that the categories prescribe” (ibid.). The conception of 
harmony in Kant’s approach is distinct from that of Leibniz, which I mentioned in 
the preceding section. As we shall see, the former counts the latter as one of its 
targets. While Leibniz proposes a conception of pre-established harmony between 
those who represent the world to themselves and their representations, Kant 
seeks to account for a harmony that holds between representations and reality in 
order to show that the grounds of knowledge are secured a priori and thereby to 
legitimize the structuring concepts of a discursive understanding. 
What distinguishes the transcendental approach from the earlier one is 
that it dispenses with the prejudice of a restriction internal to human reason, 
which would condemn it to unavoidable ignorance: “a question about the 
constitution of this something, which cannot be thought through any determinate 
predicate because it is posited entirely outside the sphere of objects that can be 
given to us – is entirely nugatory and empty” (Kant, 1998, pp. 505; A479-B507). 
Even the “absolute whole” of all phenomena taken together would not involve 
any uncertainty whatsoever with respect to knowledge: 
[F]or your object is merely in your brain and cannot be given at all outside it; 
hence all you have to worry about is agreeing with yourself, and avoiding the 
amphiboly that would make your idea into a putative representation of 
something given empirically and thus of an object to be cognized in accordance 
with the laws of experience. (Kant, 1998, pp. 507; A484-B512) 
In this sense, one can introduce the principle of thoroughgoing 
determination. This involves “a transcendental substratum, which contains as it 
were the entire storehouse of material from which all possible predicates of 
things can be taken” (Kant, 1998, pp. 555; A576-B604). But the whole of all 
predicates required to determine an object by comparison with the whole is 
obviously not given prior to experience. The transcendental substrate or idea of a 
whole of reality (omnitudo realitatis) involved in this principle thus needs to be 
distinguished from its hypostasis: the idea of a most real being (ens realissimum) 
(Kant, 1998, pp. 555-557; A578-B606). Conceiving the idea of reality as a whole 
requires nothing but the possibility of obtaining all predicates in order to show 
that realities can in principle be determined without exception. By contrast, 
conceiving the most real being would require the givenness of all predicates. 
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Kant’s (1998, pp. 558; A580 - B608) criticism of the presumption to 
conceive a being corresponding to the concept of all reality is radical: “[Such a 
thing] is a mere fiction, through which we encompass and realize the manifold of 
our idea in an ideal, as a particular being; for this we have no warrant, nor even 
for directly assuming the possibility of such a hypothesis”. Kant (1998, pp. 559; 
A582-B610) also proposes an account for the origin of this fiction in the 
surreptitious taking of the distributive unity of the empirical employment of the 
understanding as the collective unity of experience as a whole. Accordingly, if it is 
granted that the principle of thoroughgoing determination does not involve any 
existence claim, it can be understood as stating that every thing can be located 
within a unique space of real possibilities or logical space. Thus one can know that 
there is an external world independently of proof of the existence of a unique 
creator. On the contrary, such proof cannot be provided. This does not require 
renouncing the idea of God. But it does amount to distinguishing a dogmatic form 
of anthropocentrism from its symbolic form. Kant develops this distinction in the 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Here, he says that if properties are not 
taken to be ascribed to “the unknown”, we can understand the idea of a supreme 
being standing in the same relation to the world as an artisan to a watch, a ship to 
a builder or a commander to a regiment (Kant, 2004, pp. 108; §57-4:357). Thus, 
such a being would not be cognized as it is in itself, but “only according to what it 
is for me, that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part” (ibid.). This is 
“cognition according to analogy” (ibid.).  
By the time of the Second Critique, Kant confronts the difficulties raised by 
selfishness, characterized as solipsism, independently of a theological 
condemnation. He characterizes solipsism as an attitude which would authorize 
self-love, regardless of its conformity to moral law (Kant, 2002, p. 96; §73). Thus, 
it would constitute a form of unreasonable self-love. Practically speaking, the 
solipsist would act in order to satisfy all of his inclinations, aiming to realize his 
happiness as a whole, irrespective of the conformity of his attitude to the moral 
law. The solipsist would act as if he were exempt from following moral law. 
However, is one not now in an untenable situation? If it is a priori 
established that it is inconceivable for me not to have occupied a place in space in 
space, it nevertheless remains a posteriori true that I can deceive or delude myself 
with respect to the world that I represent to myself. Is this not the final clue that I 
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can realize that the cognizing subject is a priori constrained to his representations 
without conceivably being able to remedy such a situation? 
Schopenhauer (2010, p. 3) draws this conclusion. He suggests considering 
the proposition “the world is my representation” as the first maximally general a 
priori valid truth with respect to any living and knowing being. One has first 
attempted to prove the falsity of solipsism and then its illegitimacy. But from what 
position could this proof come if not from the one described as impossible? In this 
case, it is not solipsism but theoretical egoism that one would need to reject, a 
position that would consist of pretending to be able to adopt exclusively, not the 
point of view of an instance, but the theoretical point of view of the unique 
knowing subject. In this sense, admitting that we could adopt the point of view of 
a judge, external as much to life as to a dream, would amount to renouncing any 
distinction between them. To distinguish them involves doing it from the inside. 
The “ancient wisdom” according to which life is but an extended dream would 
then be the only remaining basis for marking their distinction  (Schopenhauer, 
2010, p. 40). In order to realize this, one would need to start from the unique 
reflexive point of view of the cognizing subject. Indeed, even if the world is 
reduced to my representation, it nevertheless remains certain that my 
representations deliver to me content that I can consider by means of reflexion: 
an eye sees the sun, a hand feels the earth  (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 3). The 
extent of my certainties would then coincide with the knowledge acquired by 
reflexion upon what my senses deliver. In the first person, my body would be the 
evidence that would suffice for me to prove to myself that external things exist. 
As an individual, I must have had to be able to encounter this body that is mine in 
the world as an object among others  (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 124; 199). As an 
instance of the unique knowing subject, it is my body that furnishes the starting 
point from which the understanding can reach the world. I am thus conscious of 
myself in a twofold manner, either as a will or as a representation: “the will is a 
priori cognition of the body, and the body is a posteriori cognition of the will”  
(Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 125). This would also apply exactly to the world  
(Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 40). Thus, the only remaining task for philosophers 
would be to recapitulate “the world” by means of abstract concepts. There would 
be the genius and “the ordinary person, a factory product of nature that is made 
each day by the thousand”  (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 210). 
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The Question of the Intelligibility of Solipsism 
 In the accounts described here, solipsism has been assumed as a 
preliminary in order to ground knowledge. This amounts to granting the 
conceivability of doubting the reality of the external world, and thereby other 
minds, in order to dispel this same doubt. However, the difficulty involved in 
granting such doubt with respect to the external world is that nothing seems to be 
able to dispel it with respect to other minds. The reality of the external world has 
been taken as shown via diverse proofs of the existence of a unique creator or as 
assured on the basis of transcendental deduction. By contrast, nothing seems able 
to prove the existence of other minds. On the one hand, nothing seems to count 
as an a posteriori proof of the existence of others, since such doubt cannot be 
based on experience. On the other hand, proof that would dispel this doubt 
cannot be produced a priori as the generalized absence of others is conceivable a 
posteriori. A counterfactual scenario that comes close to this, where someone 
could envisage being the only one who remains, can be envisaged. Some 
philosophers, such as Nietzsche and C. I. Lewis, have imagined this counterfactual 
scenario in order to suggest that assuming its relevance implies the devaluation of 
the present. 
However, does this imply that it could and should be granted to solipsism 
that one can establish that one is essentially alone in the world? As Russell 
suggested in The Problems of Philosophy in 1912, before both the Tractatus and 
Being and Nothingness, the solipsist hypothesis, at first sight, is characterized by 
its gratuitousness: “it may be that the whole outer world is nothing but a dream, 
and that we alone exist. This is an uncomfortable possibility; but although it 
cannot be strictly proved to be false, there is not the slightest reason to suppose 
that it is true” (Russell, 2011, p. 14). This formulation testifies to the way in which, 
at least until the beginning of the twentieth century, solipsism was conceived: it 
both raised an issue central to philosophy, namely that of the foundations of 
knowledge, and it was assumed as an ineluctable preliminary in order to solve this 
issue. 
Rather than the philosophical problem of grounding knowledge, both 
Sartre and Wittgenstein question the intelligibility of solipsism: i.e., whether and 
to what extent solipsism is a truth. The present thesis does not assume that there 
is an alternative way of grounding knowledge to be searched for once the threat 
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of solipsism has been dispelled. Rather, if it can be shown that solipsism could not 
be possibility, in the sense that it could not belong to someone’s situated space of 
possibilities, and thus that it could not threaten knowledge to begin with, then the 
very appeal of relying on solipsism as a method to attempt to positively establish 
the grounded character of knowledge can be dispensed with. To do so, it is useful 
to consider the way in which the relation between the problem of the existence of 
the external world and the problem of the existence of others has traditionally 
been conceived. It is, I suggest, this relation that both Sartre and Wittgenstein 
invite us to question. 
If one admits that it is conceivable to doubt the reality of the external 
world as a whole and thereby of the existence of others, it seems conceivable to 
discover one’s solitude independently from experience. To the extent that one 
admits that it could be either possible or impossible for one to “notice” one’s 
existence independently from the external world, it seems equally conceivable to 
succeed or fail to “discover” one’s isolation. On the same move, one admits that it 
could be possible for us to have only representations of each other. Insofar as 
there is no conceivable proof of the existence of others, it seems necessary to 
admit that we can be certain that there really is an external world, while still only 
having representations of each other. Grounding knowledge can then seem 
necessary. The question of the existence of others arises only then, because it 
seems that if we can disagree on the existence of the world, that we need 
insurance in this respect, then nothing prevents us from considering that others 
could be absent as well. 
However, is such a scenario decisive in any sense? To what extent can it 
be assumed? Could one ever discover that one is essentially alone in the world? 
One surely can occasionally feel alone. And one can pronounce or write the words 
“I am essentially alone in the world” and “I am the only one who exists”. We 
encounter such affirmations in fiction. But were a question of this style 
encountered elsewhere on another occasion, one could wonder about what their 
utterer meant.  Against the background of one’s questioning whether he or she is 
essentially alone, the words “I am alone in the world” or “I alone exist” could 
seem to express a metaphysical discovery. Yet this question is at odds with the 
possibility of situating oneself in light of particular circumstances. 
For, if it had to be granted that someone could mean such question in a 
way which would be meant to call into question the existence of others, then the 
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answer would be, as Russell suggests, gratuitous. So, how to address the tension 
which the tension between the question “am I essentially all alone in the world?”, 
which can at least seem to beg an answer, and the gratuitousness of the answers 
meant to answer it?  
There are at least two manners of addressing this tension. The first is to 
admit that the problem is only theoretical, in order to establish that it is a pseudo-
problem. This is, I suggest, Sartre’s approach in Being and Nothingness. The 
peculiarity of the resolution of the theoretical problem of the existence of others 
that he proposes is that it is not meant to prove or establish the existence of 
others. On the contrary, it is intended to render explicit our certainty of the 
existence of others and thereby to retrospectively bring out the counterpart of 
remaining uncertain with respect to the theoretical problem of the existence of 
other minds. This is not the only achievement of Sartre with respect to the issue 
of solipsism in Being and Nothingness. Sartre seeks to establish that the ways in 
which the issue of solipsism are traditionally posed are enmeshed in various 
difficulties, including the undue privileging of external relations and the primacy 
of knowledge, as brought out by Morris (2008, pp. 43-46; 48-50). By the primacy 
of knowledge, I here mean the requirement that reflexive consciousness could 
and should unconditionally precede consciousness.3 By the undue privileging of 
external relations, I mean taking external relations (i.e., those whose relata subsist 
independently, as, for example, flowers in a vase) as necessarily prevailing over 
internal relations (i.e., those whose relata are not meant to subsist independently, 
for example, consciousness and body) in order to account for the intelligibility of 
action.4 In this introduction, I just underscore that Sartre’s primary concern is with 
rendering explicit certainty of the existence of others, because he purports to 
provide a conceptual means to address the asymmetry between the certainty of 
an individual with respect to his or her own existence, and that he or she has of 
others, which is explicit in approaches such as that of Berkeley and Malebranche. 
On Sartre’s approach, one can show how the affirmation of the existence of 
others is not gratuitous, inasmuch as there are contexts where it is called into 
question. It would thus be anyone’s responsibility to affirm its pertinence in 
circumstances where the existence of others is called into question. 
                                                          
3
 I account for Sartre’s criticism of the privileging of external relations in section 2.1. 
4
 I account for Sartre’s criticism of the primacy of knowledge in section 1.2.2. 
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Another approach to the issue of solipsism is to show that the theoretical 
problem can be dissolved by providing means to settle the question, that is, by 
showing that there is no such thing as a theoretical problem of the existence of 
others. This is the reading I propose of Wittgenstein’s approach in the Tractatus. 
To suggest that one cannot say what solipsism means, although it is entirely 
correct, would be an invitation to consider the outcome of not assessing what our 
affirmations mean or of attempting to disprove an unassessed affirmation. Could 
one not effectively find oneself showing the contrary of what one thinks one is 
saying, while saying the contrary of what one thinks one is showing with the 
words “I am essentially alone in the world”, “only I exist”, or “there is only me”? 
Could someone else not effectively reproduce the difficulty by attempting to 
disprove the one who affirms these statements? In this approach, it could be 
helpful not to exclude either solipsism, or that the solipsist could exclude him or 
herself, almost in an unbeknownst way, from the space of his or her own 
possibilities. It could be superfluous, pace Frege and Russell, to try to exclude 
solipsism: quite the contrary if we do not mean to exclude anyone. This does not 
imply making an undue concession to solipsism. In the present thesis, I attempt to 
show that the core of truth in solipsism best appears if considered in its 
fluctuating opposition to the traditional conception of the a priori. As Floyd (1998, 
pp. 81-83) suggests: 
The Tractatus is a deeply reflective rejection of the traditional a priori, every one 
of philosophy’s attempts to lay down necessary conditions for thinking and for 
speaking. But Wittgenstein does not pursue the self-undermining project of trying 
to frame a priori arguments against the possibility of a priori knowledge; thinking 
and understanding are not to be pinned down by any investigation of logic, 
meaning, or the world, even Wittgenstein’s own. *…+ The book is a deeply 
reflective rejection of every one of philosophy’s attempts to lay down a priori or 
necessary conditions for living. *…+ Solipsism is one of the most persistent refuges 
of the a priori, a limiting attempt to impose a limit upon thinking and living. 
In the reading I propose, the very need that Kant wished to satisfy for 
grounding knowledge is called into question by Wittgenstein. This does not imply 
that Wittgenstein considered knowledge to be ungrounded, or that he disagreed 
with Kant under every description. Wittgenstein agrees with Kant when he writes 
in the first person that “every thing is, as it were, in a space of possible *states of 
affairs+. I can think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space” 
(translation modified, TLP, 2.013). But Wittgenstein rejects that we could evaluate 
a priori the truth of propositions. He suggests that wishing to delimit a priori the 
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sense of propositions lead us to nonsense (TLP, 5.5571). But how should we 
understand this rejection, and how does Wittgenstein avoid what Floyd calls “the 
self-undermining project of trying to frame a priori arguments against the 
possibility of a priori knowledge” (Floyd, 1998, p. 81)? 
A distinction introduced by Lewis (1929, p. 196) between two senses of 
“necessary” can be helpful here: “‘Necessary’ is an ambiguous word; its 
contradictory is, in one meaning, ‘contingent,’ in another ‘voluntary’”. Lewis 
himself argues for a new conception of the a priori according to which its 
necessity consists in “its character as a legislative act” which represents “a 
constraint imposed by the mind” (Lewis, 1929, p. 197). He designed his own 
conception of the a priori against conceptions which equate necessity with 
involuntary compliance, and, furthermore, he advocated a conception of a priori 
truth based on the legislative character of definitions. That the conception of 
necessity as an a priori sort of involuntary compliance targeted by Lewis belongs 
to Wittgenstein’s targets in the Tractatus is plain: “A necessity for one thing to 
happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only logical 
necessity” (TLP, 6.37). However, Wittgenstein further adds: “At the basis of the 
whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature 
are the explanations of natural phenomena” (TLP, 6.371). What he questions is, I 
suggest, not only the conception of necessity as involuntary compliance, but also 
the motives for needing to reply to the alleged defects of such a view on the basis 
of a priori conceptions of voluntary compliance. Arguably, the notion which 
generates this difficulty is the one of “laws of nature”: the idiom makes it look as 
if natural regularities could and would need to be transgressed. That is to say, 
Wittgenstein questions the status of the personification of nature in philosophical 
argumentation. I will try to show that Wittgenstein underscores that solipsism 
contains a core of truth in its opposition to traditional conceptions of the a priori, 
arguably manifest in the unrestricted contingency of the visible and the 
describable. I follow Sullivan’s suggestion that Kant’s attempt to legitimize the 
structuring concepts of a discursive understanding implies construing the limits of 
the world as limitations (2013, p. 258) and that, in response, Wittgenstein denies 
the need for any restrictive or contrastive limitation: “Only so can the self of 
solipsism shrink to an extensionless point, leaving the whole of reality coordinate 
with it. […+ [W]hatever room Wittgenstein wanted to make for faith cannot have 
been anything like the room Kant intended” (2013, p. 265). There is a rupture in 
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the way Wittgenstein addresses the issue of solipsism in comparison with Kant. If 
wishing to delimit a priori the sense of propositions lead us to nonsense (TLP, 
5.5571), it would then not only be a priori inconceivable not to occupy any place 
in space, but also inconceivable to discover oneself a posteriori as missing from 
the register of conceivable discoveries. Furthermore, if it is not necessary to admit 
that someone could have been missing from the register of conceivable 
discoveries, and that the available means to express that someone occupies a 
space could not come from oneself, then there never has been an 
unsurmountable solitude which could be expressed linguistically in the first place. 
In this approach, the Tractatus does not attempt to exclude any manner of 
answering an epistemological problem raised by solipsism. Rather, it establishes 
that it suffices to show that strictures imposed on the expressions of our thought 
unavoidably manifest themselves as such. In this approach, if falls to solipsism to 
establish how it does not amount to an attempt to impose stricture on the 
expression of our thoughts.   
It is therefore enough to address the issue of solipsism through both 
Sartre and Wittgenstein. Not only do they share the philosophical background 
outlined previously, but both show that one cannot discover one’s essential 
loneliness or informatively remark one’s existence. This is not to say that one 
cannot realize that one is alone or that one cannot feel alone. The goal, rather, is 
to dissipate the fiction of a confinement that could not be overcome. 
In the present thesis, I suggest their approaches should be distinguished in 
the following manner. Sartre suggests that the pitfall or “reef” of solipsism can be 
avoided and that absence of an answer to the metaphysical question “why are 
there other consciousnesses?” can be taken as an answer to the philosophical 
problem of the existence of others: “so it is” (BN, 325). Sartre does not, thereby, 
mean to reach a restrictive verdict about human nature. Nevertheless, Sartre 
stages attempts to construe the limits of language as limitations at various stages 
in order to develop a concept of finitude which is adequate to distinguish internal 
from external finitude. That is to say, Sartre seeks to introduce a distinction 
between a concept of external finitude which implies that the construal of the 
limits of language as limitations cannot be achieved and a concept of internal 
finitude which does not imply such construal in order to argue for the superfluity 
and misleadingness of the former. Wittgenstein, on his side, does not construe 
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the limits of language as limitations in the Tractatus. There, the issue raised by 
solipsism in philosophy is shown to be the construal of the limits of language as 
limitations. Wittgenstein seeks to render clear the importance of not excluding 
the core of truth in solipsism, which cannot be excluded without eo ipso being 
rendered manifest. 
I earlier suggested that the modern problem of the existence of other 
minds stems from the manner in which the problem of the reality of the external 
word has been treated. To interrogate oneself on the a priori conditions bearing 
on representational activity sufficed to exclude that it could be impossible to 
acquire objective knowledge from the external world. But the privilege granted to 
the question of grounding knowledge that one can acquire of phenomena has had 
for a counterpart to accredit the idea that it could always be a posteriori possible 
to pertinently conceive the generalized absence of others. The question of the 
existence of other minds collapses into the question of the reality of the external 
world. It has consequently been assumed that these problems are identical 
(except with respect to one categorical difference). Against this background, the 
problems of the reality of the external world and that of other minds are rooted, I 
suggest, in a single way of accounting for the relation of the world to thought. It 
seems that if it cannot be shown that the external world is real, then thinking 
about it could be an illusion. Similarly, it seems that if it cannot be shown that 
there are other minds, then thinking about them could be an illusion. In both 
cases, the requisite of existence is granted: if what I can think about does not exist 
first as a representation, I could not even think about it. The representation which 
was meant to assure, by introducing an objective mediation, the knowledge we 
acquire from objects seems finally in the case of other minds to constitute that 
which could render their existence uncertain. This uncertainty could in turn testify 
to the private character of the decision that ought to be taken with respect to the 
words: saying “I am the only one there could be” or “I am essentially alone in the 
world”. 
Sartre’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches converge insofar as they proceed 
from inside the limits of sense in order as much to dissipate the illusion of an 
undetectable confinement as the one of the restriction of the thinkable that is its 
corollary. They do not attempt to delimit and thereby ground a priori the 
possibility of knowledge of objects, but rather to render explicit some conditions 
of the intelligibility of expression and action. For both, it can be shown that there 
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is no such thing as generalized doubt about the world and other minds. 
Furthermore, for both, that which cannot and need not be done to do so is the 
construal of the limits of language for sake of legitimation. A counterfactual 
scenario that comes close to solipsism, according to which one could be the only 
remaining being, can surely be imagined; nevertheless, this does not render it 
relevant. To consider such a scenario could even put into relief that to exclude our 
certainty about having been in contact with others, as implied by solipsism is 
arbitrary. Does the very formulation of the fiction of a doubt about the existence 
of others not imply the appropriation of language? I will suggest that it is not 
necessary, and furthermore misleading, to grant that an essential sort of solitude 
could be the object of a discovery. I will use these last terms of criticism 
recurrently throughout the present thesis when talking about a specific 
philosophical move: namely, the construal of the limits of language as limitations, 
which, as suggested previously, is central to the ways in which Sartre and 
Wittgenstein address the issue of solipsism. By using these terms I suggest that 
the limits of language cannot and need not be construed as limitations. As 
Wittgenstein (1993, p. 185) suggests: 
Language contains the same traps for everyone; the immense network 
of well-kept // passable // false paths. And thus we see one person after 
another walking the same paths and we know already where he will 
make a turn, where he will keep on going straight ahead without 
noticing the turn, etc., etc. Therefore wherever false paths branch off I 
should put up signs which help one get by the dangerous places.  
 I assume that authors who proposed resolute readings of Wittgenstein, 
but also authors such as Sullivan who question resolute readings, have helped 
many of us to recognize some of these false paths. I also assume that the activity 
of putting up signs to help others pass false paths presents a therapeutic 
dimension. I assume that Read has contributed to making this clear in the works 
of Wittgenstein, as has Morris in relation to Sartre. In this thesis, I focus on 
clarifying the signs put both by Sartre and Wittgenstein concerning solipsism.  
The present thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first, I try to 
establish that Sartre and Wittgenstein locate the difficulty raised by solipsism at 
the intersection of transcendental solipsism and metaphysical realism. The aim of 
this is to establish that solipsism manifests itself through the pretence to take an 
exclusive perspective on the world: i.e., a perspective that could own and be 
owned by one and only one individual. The second chapter focuses on Sartre’s 
treatment of the issue of solipsism. The aim of this is to establish that, in Sartre’s 
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approach, the theoretical problem of the existence of others is a pseudo-problem. 
The third chapter focuses on Wittgenstein’s treatment of the issue of solipsism. 
The aim of this is to establish that Wittgenstein proposes a way to settle the issue 
of solipsism. The fourth chapter focuses on two objections to Sartre’s and 
Wittgenstein’s treatments of the issue of solipsism. The aim of this is to show that 
Sartre and Wittgenstein establish both the superfluity and the misleading nature 
of the ideas of self-discovery (i.e., a discovery that is essentially made by and 
essentially makes one and only one individual) and self-inheritance (i.e., an 
inheritance that is essentially given and received by one and only one individual) 
that are implied by solipsism. 
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1. The Issue of Solipsism 
The aim of this chapter is to establish that solipsism, the doctrine 
according to which “I am the only one there could be”, presupposes that an 
individual could take an exclusive perspective on the world as a whole. An 
“exclusive perspective” on the world, as I use this phrase, means a perspective 
that (1) is necessarily occupied by its occupant (it cannot be taken by another 
occupant); and that (2) its occupant necessarily occupies (its occupant cannot take 
up another perspective). Thus, an “exclusive perspective”, in this use, at once (2) 
essentially owns its occupant; and (1) is essentially owned by that very same 
occupant. From such a perspective, the solipsist could as much expose as impose 
limitations applying to all other individuals. To admit that he could do so would 
require admitting that, although he would not be confined to his representations, 
we would be confined to ours, inasmuch as we would be reduced to being 
representations of the only mind that there could be. 
When we usually use “perspective”, we do not need to mention that a 
perspective is not meant to depend on someone at the exclusion of someone 
else. Indeed, someone can produce a drawing of how an object or a room would 
look from a different perspective, as an artist or an architect can, without having 
ever occupied this perspective. In such cases, anyone who occupied this 
perspective would also perceive the object or the room or the landscape under 
the same (visual) modality. The concept of perspective developed and involved in 
the practice of the artists of the Renaissance implies that any individual could take 
any conceivable perspective on any object or room or landscape. This concept of 
perspective involves abstraction and imagination, inasmuch as an artist who 
produces a drawing of an object or a room from a perspective he did not occupy 
needs to project how the object or the room would look from a different position. 
We do not ordinarily need to do this in order to perceive our surroundings. 
However, if we attempt to account for our standpoints in a similar manner in 
order to account for the public character of language and knowledge (e.g., Russell, 
2011, p. 17), then we tend to reach some difficulties: it can seem, for example, 
necessary to grant that two individuals cannot simultaneously occupy the same 
perspective, as if two distinct standpoints of the individuals had to be secured. 
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The notion of an “exclusive perspective”, as I use it, is designed to disentangle 
such difficulties, which are confronted by both by Sartre and Wittgenstein. 
I will argue in section 1.1. that Sartre and Wittgenstein agree on situating 
the solipsist doctrine at the intersection of (transcendental) idealism and 
(metaphysical) realism. Indeed, that an individual can suppose he is the only one 
there could be, from an exclusive perspective on the world as a whole, 
presupposes admitting that one could take an exclusive perspective on the world 
as a whole. Transcendental idealism is the approach according to which several 
individuals can take an exclusive perspective on the world. Facing the solipsist 
threat, one could then be tempted to admit that it would be impossible for all of 
us to take an exclusive perspective on the world as a whole. Metaphysical realism 
is the approach according to which it is impossible for everyone to take an 
exclusive perspective on the world as a whole. Such an approach to realism, 
confronted both by Sartre and Wittgenstein, is explicitly committed to our 
eventual confinement to our representations of reality. This immediately raises 
the question of whether such realism suffices to ratify a posteriori our respective 
confinement to representations. 
I will confront this question in section 1.2. by arguing that Sartre and 
Wittgenstein agree on a diagnosis according to which the three doctrines 
(transcendental idealism, solipsism and metaphysical realism) are to be rejected, 
insofar as they all presuppose that an exclusive perspective could be taken on the 
world as a whole. To presuppose that one could take such a perspective implies a 
misleading analogy, i.e., the comparison of the relation of the eye to the visual 
field with the relation of an individual to the world. However, admitting that an 
individual can take an exclusive perspective on the world presupposes admitting 
that the visual field could be assimilated to a perspective. The difficulty here is 
that one would need to have seen oneself from an outer perspective on the world 
in order to establish that the visual field could be reduced to a perspective. From 
this perspective, nothing would distinguish seeing someone from seeing an 
object. In the final part of the present chapter, I will question this aspect of 
solipsism. To ratify our respective confinement to representations a posteriori 
would imply that there could be a perspective from which someone could not be 
distinguished from something. Is this conceivable at all? 
27 
 
1.1. Idealism, Solipsism and Realism 
In this section, I argue that Sartre and Wittgenstein agree on situating the 
solipsist doctrine at the intersection of (transcendental) idealism and 
(metaphysical) realism. I argue in section 1.1.1. that, in Sartre’s approach, 
solipsism presupposes the possibility of discovering oneself from an impersonal 
perspective which would be incompatible with first-person judgement. Solipsism 
can thus be characterized as an inchoate attempt to dispense with the concept of 
the other in order to account for the constitution of experience. In section 1.1.2., I 
argue that, in Wittgenstein’s approach, solipsism presupposes that my character 
is expressed only in the constitution of my body or brain. Solipsism can thus be 
characterized as an inchoate attempt to distinguish oneself from all other humans 
by presupposing that one can infer one’s character from one’s physiognomy. 
Finally, in section 1.1.3. I argue that, for Sartre and Wittgenstein, solipsism can be 
characterized as the rejection by an individual of a collective epistemic privilege 
(i.e., infallible access to one’s representations) in order to claim a private 
epistemic privilege. The solipsist thereby claims that only he can infallibly access 
his representations. 
1.1.1. The Reef of Solipsism 
The section of Being and Nothingness entitled “The Reef of Solipsism” 
begins by stressing the awkwardness of the problem of the existence of others 
according to metaphysical realism (BN, 247). According to the form of 
metaphysical realism target by Sartre, acknowledging the reality of the external 
world (i.e., the whole of what there is) suffices in order to assure the reality of 
others. Another mind could be understood as “a thinking substance, who may not 
vanish into secondary and primary qualities and whose essential structures I 
would find in me” (BN, 247). Sartre diagnoses such conceptions as stemming from 
an attempt “to account for knowledge through an action of world on the thinking 
substance” (BN, 247). If the dimension of passivity involved in perception is taken 
to require a substantial counterpart, the world is conceived as a medium through 
which separated “thinking substances” have to pass in order to communicate: 
The soul of the other is thus separated from mine by the whole distance 
which separates first my soul from my body, then my body from an 
other’s body, finally an other’s body from his soul. (BN, 247) 
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On the basis of this approach, one can be certain that a spatio-temporal 
“thing” is immediately present to one “in person”. Nevertheless, one could not 
obtain similar certainty with respect to the soul of someone else: “this soul does 
not give itself in person to mine. It is an absence, a meaning; the body points to it 
without delivering it” (BN, 247). Although, as a philosophical doctrine, realism is 
based on intuition, there would be no such thing as intuiting someone else. The 
only clue given through intuition of the mediate presence of another mind would 
be an impersonal intuition of a body: “it is not someone else’s body which is 
present to the realist intuition but a body” (BN, 248). 
Sartre diagnoses theories which assume such an approach to be adequate 
as follows. The realist and positivist psychology of the nineteenth century, the 
theories of empathy, sympathy, forms (in Gestalt psychology) and behaviourism, 
all assume the conjectural or hypothetical character of the existence of others 
(BN, 248-249). The existence of one’s fellow is taken to be intelligible as a thing or 
object. Accordingly, the only thing that would require an explanation would be 
the manner in which one could make such hypotheses and “decipher on the body 
of others the shades of a consciousness which is alien to mine” (BN, 248). 
Consequently, such theories depend on an oscillating recourse to either analogy 
or experience in order to explain in probable terms that one can only conjecture 
about other minds without knowing them. 
The analogical approach can be characterized as follows: one can know 
only in conjectural terms (or solely in terms of probabilities) what is done and 
meant by someone else through a comparison with “oneself”. Insofar as I assume 
that others would probably conceive themselves in the same way that I do, I can 
only make conjectures about other minds. The difficulty raised by such an 
approach is that our knowledge of others would only be probable. For example, 
the sudden coloration of a face could be interpreted as anger, for I would “know” 
that this is what I do in similar circumstances (ibid.). So the analogical approach 
admits, on its own terms, either to be grounded in or grounding only conjectural 
or uncertain knowledge about others. While the existence of others is certain, 
one’s knowledge of them would only be conjectural (ibid.). Sartre suggests that 
this affirmation is a sophism, one, as we shall see, used by behaviourism, for it 
consists in mere affirmation that the knowledge of other minds is conjectural. 
Thus, realism lapses into idealism when confronted with the theoretical 
question of the existence of other minds. Insofar as the reality of the external 
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world has been posited, everything is as if the knowledge of other minds could, by 
contrast, be out of reach. To this extent, such realism cannot confront the 
difficulty raised by solipsism. However, if such realism thus indexes the very use of 
“we” to idealism, would it not be better to start from the critical idealist 
perspective (ibid.)? 
Sartre suggests that, just as with the realist perspective, the 
(transcendental) idealist alternative cannot solve the theoretical question of the 
existence of other minds. In an idealist approach, one can only obtain 
representations of others, to the extent that someone else could abstractly be 
assimilated to one’s representation (BN, 249). One could investigate one’s 
representations of others from within a system which reduces all objects to a 
linked group of representations (ibid.). It would then be certain that I can 
represent someone else to myself as being given as an object of my experience. 
Nevertheless, the central difficulty raised by such an approach is that, to the 
extent that I must posit the other as a subject to whom I am an object of 
experience, it seems that I cannot conceive his real relation to me. 
This difficulty does not stem from the assimilation of the problem of the 
existence of other minds to the one of noumenal realities (BN, 249). On the 
idealist approach, anyone can pose to themselves the question of their noumenal 
existence. However, its opposite is that when I focus on someone else in everyday 
experience, they are nothing but a phenomenon which points to other 
phenomena. For example, someone’s anger towards me would be a phenomenon 
which points to “a series of thoughts which appear to one as phenomena of my 
intimate sense” (BN, 250). Someone else’s anger would not be available to my 
apperception and would point to an organizing activity which exceeds my 
experience in the first person. These phenomena would belong to a system which 
I could not access. 
 Furthermore, insofar as it is a condition of the possibility of any 
experience that “the subject” organizes one’s impressions in a connected system, 
another mind cannot appear to one as organizing one’s experience without 
contradiction: “the phenomenon would be over-determined” (BN, 250). 
Considering causality cannot resolve the difficulty, for it can link phenomena and 
the experience of one subject at a time. If we consider anew the example of 
anger, one’s perception of someone else’s anger (e.g., witnessing a furious 
expression) and the anger felt by someone else would be two externally related 
30 
 
phenomena. If I grant that causality could bridge the gap between two radically 
separated experiences, the difficulty would be resolved. But I cannot, because 
doing so would involve renouncing to the ideal nature of causality, which is meant 
to unify the phenomena of one and the same experience under the form of 
irreversibility. 
Sartre underlines that, in Kant’s approach, there is no such thing as a pre-
established harmony which could pre-empt this difficulty (BN, 251). He 
nevertheless counterfactually considers whether such harmony would leave two 
distinct “times” unrelated anyway (each individual having its “own” time in such 
an approach): one at which someone else would feel anger; and another at which 
I would perceive the expression of that anger. This counterfactual indicates the 
impossibility of accounting for communication between consciousnesses in the 
idealist approach. The concept of others (autrui) or other minds would not 
contribute to the constitution of first-person experience, and thus it would need 
to be classified with teleological concepts among regulatory concepts: “*Others+ 
therefore belong to the category of ‘as if.’ *Others are+ an a priori hypothesis 
which does not have any other justification save the unity it permits to operate in 
our experience, a hypothesis which cannot be thought without contradiction” 
(translation modified, BN, 251). 
Nevertheless, the concept of other minds is only regulatory on this 
approach, and, as underlined earlier, one’s perception of someone else seems to 
be bounded: “*one’s perception of another mind] points by principle to 
phenomena situated outside of any experience possible to me” (translation 
modified, BN, 251). Nevertheless, according to this approach, the concept of 
someone else is not reduced to a purely instrumental function. On the contrary, 
the intelligibility of someone else’s autonomy is acknowledged: “categories of 
phenomena seem to exist only for him” (BN, 252). Nevertheless, the concept of 
other minds seems to function as a fixed frame of experience, a system of 
meanings and experiences which are radically distinct from mine. Everything is as 
if this fixed frame could be gradually filled in, inasmuch as my experience of 
someone else would provide me with concrete content, exactly as with concrete 
objects. 
Nevertheless, with such an approach I can still aim, through my 
experience, to comprehend the feelings, ideas, will and character of others. I 
acknowledge that someone else can see me as I can see that person. Thus, the 
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concept of other minds cannot be a regulatory concept, but is rather implicitly 
assimilated to “the radical negation of my existence, for he is the one whom for I 
am not subject but object” (ibid.). 
Idealism therefore does no more than realism to confront the difficulty 
posed by solipsism. From the idealist perspective, one is caught between 
conflicting demands with respect to the reality, objectivity and subjectivity of 
other minds (BN, 252-253). One may grant that someone else is real, yet the 
reality of someone else seems to remain inconceivable. One may grant that 
someone else can be construed as an object, yet one’s intuition of someone else 
seems not to be delivered in the same way as other objects. One may grant that 
someone else can be posited as a subject, yet it is solely as the object of one’s 
thought that someone else can be considered. 
Sartre suggests at this stage that solipsism stems, to some extent, from 
idealism. Facing the previously considered difficulties, there would be only two 
solutions for the idealist: either to affirm the reality of others by positing “a real 
and extra-empirical communication between consciousnesses” (BN, 253); or “to 
entirely get rid of the concept of [the other] (l’autre) and prove that it is useless to 
the constitution of my experience” (translation modified, BN, 253). This second 
option is solipsism.  
On the basis of this approach, solipsism should be distinguished from its 
gratuitous (i.e., neither justified nor caused) affirmation. To affirm one’s 
ontological solitude is a purely metaphysical hypothesis, unjustified and 
gratuitous (ibid.). It is not compatible with idealism, insofar as affirming that 
nothing exists outside me exceeds “the strict field of my experience” (ibid.). While 
this affirmation could eventually be understood as a symptom of solipsism, it 
should not be equated with it. Rather, Sartre suggests that it is characteristic of 
the solipsist solution not to be presented as such. That is to say, the impersonality 
involved in the mode of presentation of solipsism is not accidental: 
But if [the solipsistic solution presents itself] more modestly as a refusal 
to leave the solid ground of experience and as a positive attempt not to 
make use of the concept of [an other mind], it is perfectly logical; it 
remains on the level of critical positivism, and although it is opposed to 
the deepest inclinations of our being, it derives its justification from the 
contradictions of the notion of [others] considered in the idealist 
perspective to provide its justification. (Translation modified, BN, 253) 
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Sartre provides an example of such a “perfectly logical” approach: the 
works of Watson, the self-ascribed “discoverer” of behaviourism. His initial 
criticism is that the pretence of producing an “exact” and “objective” psychology 
is tantamount to endorsing solipsism as a working (or methodological) hypothesis. 
Sartre confronts the assumption that knowing someone’s mind as one can know 
the properties of an object is intelligible. 
Furthermore, Sartre uses Husserlian terms in order to further characterize 
the issue raised by this approach. The behaviourist approach does not involve 
denying the presence of objects that could be named “psychical beings” in 
someone’s field of experience. But it does involve practicing “a sort of έποχή 
bearing on the existence of representational systems organized by a subject and 
situated outside someone’s experience” (ibid.).5 Importantly, when the “έποχή” is 
taken to operate in the first person, all judgments bearing upon spatio-temporal 
existence would be forbidden  (Husserl, 1983, p. 61). This seems at least 
superficially similar, although diametrically opposed, to Watson’s (1998, p. 6) 
suggestion that, in order to formulate laws with respect to “those things” that 
may be observed, “we can observe behavior – what the organism does or says”. In 
both cases, everything is as if experience, and a fortiori others, could be described 
purely from an impersonal standpoint, which, in principle, would not be 
compatible with judgments made in the first person. 
Sartre then suggests that, although Kant and the majority of post-Kantians 
affirm the existence of the other in order to oppose solipsism, they may only refer 
to common sense (bon sens) or to deeper tendencies in order to justify their 
affirmation: 
We know that Schopenhauer speaks of the solipsist as “a madman shut 
up in an impregnable blockhaus”.
6
 What a confession of impotence! It is 
                                                          
5
 Sartre’s use of the Husserlian term “έποχή” to characterize Watson’s approach is unclear 
at this stage of Being and Nothingness. I will return to this question at the end of the 
second chapter, after having considered the treatment of the theoretical problem of the 
existence of others. 
6
 Obviously, Sartre knew that concrete blockhouses did not exist in Schopenhauer’s time, 
when they were built from wood. The German word used by Schopenhauer to 
characterize the sort of structure in which the “theoretical egoist” would fortify himself is 
“feste” (both “form” and “stronghold”). I suggest that Sartre is pointing analogically to an 
aspect of solipsism by using the architectural metaphor, since concrete blockhouses do 
not have foundations. This is both their strength and their weakness: they are better at 
resisting military attacks than any other sort of building, but they tend to overturn and 
sink whenever the ground beneath them moves (tides, earthquakes, landslides, etc.). 
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in fact by this position with regard to the existence of the other that we 
suddenly explode the structure of idealism and fall back into a 
metaphysical realism. (BN, 253) 
Thus, like realism, idealism would also revert to its opposite when 
confronted by solipsism, lapsing into metaphysical realism. Schopenhauer’s (2010, 
p. 104) argument against the allegedly irrefutable “theoretical egoism” was that it 
would amount to denying the meaning of the question of the reality of the 
external world. Sartre’s characterization of his rejection of “theoretical egoism” as 
a confession of impotence means that the idealist approach cannot address the 
issue raised by solipsism. It may be that the multiplicity of systems of 
representations posited by idealism is not substantial. Nevertheless, the 
reciprocal exteriority of such systems involves implicitly reinstating the notion of 
substance, insofar as they would communicate only from without (BN, 253-254). 
In the idealist approach, the problem of the existence of other minds thus 
remains one of the adequacy of the representations one can have of others, 
“since there is a real and a mode of apprehension of this real” (BN, 254). For 
example, the question remains whether the relation of the phenomenon of felt 
anger to perceptible anger is the same as that of the objective real to its image 
(ibid.). Insofar as felt and perceptible anger manifest two objectively noticeable 
series of effects resulting from a similar cause, if one series is situated in someone 
else and the other series in myself, then the first would function as the reality of 
the other. Inasmuch as I can judge that the perceived anger could share the same 
cause as the anger I feel despite being somehow prevented from accessing 
someone else’s representations, I could not know whether someone else is angry. 
Thus, facing the solipsist hypothesis, idealism turns into a “dogmatic and totally 
unjustified realism” (ibid.). 
1.1.2. From Idealism to Realism via Solipsism 
In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein similarly suggests that realism is reached 
from idealism through solipsism. This is manifest in the entry from October 15th 
1916, which ends as follows: 
This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world 
as unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too 
belong with the rest to the world, and so on the one side nothing is left 
over, and on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way idealism 
leads to realism if it is strictly thought out. 
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 The continuous progression from idealism to realism envisaged by 
Wittgenstein contrasts with the sudden reversals involved in Sartre’s account. 
One could start from the perspective that all humans could be singled out from 
the world as unique. Wittgenstein shares with Kant, to some extent, the idea that 
“what cannot be imagined cannot even be talked about” (NB, 15.10.16). One 
would delude oneself by thinking oneself to be talking about what one cannot 
imagine. Nevertheless, to limit oneself to talking about what one can imagine 
does not mean granting that one could be limited to talking only about what one 
can imagine. Taking the second option to be relevant could make it seem that 
“things acquire ‘significance’ only through their relation to my will” (ibid.). On the 
basis of this approach, the things to which one could relate through one’s will 
would be divided into two exhaustive categories: things that could be imagined 
and thereby meaningfully willed; and things that could not be imagined and 
thereby cannot be willed (i.e., “everything is what it is and not another thing” 
[ibid.]). Determinacy would solely belong to things. One conception, which 
Wittgenstein later calls the “psycho-physical conception”, may then seem 
relevant: “as I can infer my spirit (character, will) from my physiognomy, so I can 
infer the spirit (will) of each thing from its physiognomy” (ibid.). 
 Based on this, one can produce empty schemata such as, “if my angry 
appearance implies that I am angry, then I can infer someone else’s anger from 
the angry look on their face” or “if my smile implies that I am happy, then 
someone else’s smile implies that they are happy”. The difficulty with this 
approach is that it presupposes that an inference is implicitly required in order to 
see that someone is angry or happy (which does not preclude that one can 
question oneself on the reasons that someone else is happy or angry). The 
oddness of this conception further appears if one considers its first-person 
application: “can I infer my spirit from my physiognomy?” (ibid.). 
 If one conceives determinacy as a property internal to things, one could 
grant that one can learn about oneself on the sole basis of an “inference”. For 
example, one could grant that one can learn whether one is happy or angry by 
looking at one’s reflection in a mirror. Such an approach amounts to granting that 
one could also learn one’s will in such a way. Wittgenstein questions whether 
such approach can be envisaged: “isn’t this relationship purely empirical?” (ibid.). 
Such an approach could also lead to dissatisfaction with respect to the 
expressivity of one’s body: “does my body really express anything?” (ibid.). If I 
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make facial expressions before a mirror voluntarily, I could think that I could 
“infer” that my angry look or smile depends on my maintaining them voluntarily 
(as an actor can). Considering my body as an experienced “thing”, it would then 
seem either an easily manipulated shell or a difficult-to-activate mechanism. If I 
assume it is possible to learn how I am feeling only on the basis of my appearance, 
I could wonder: “is it itself an internal expression of something?” (ibid.), as if 
something could and would need to activate it, irrespective of what one wills and 
does. 
As a counterpart to the reliance on the inferential conception, coupled to 
the treatment of determinacy as a property internal to things, the difficulty is then 
that a disjunction seems relevant: “is, e.g., an angry face angry in itself or merely 
because it is empirically connected with bad temper?” (ibid.). Either how one 
appears (e.g., angry) belongs to who one is as an internal property to a thing 
irrespective of what one does and wills, in which case angry faces would be 
expressive of anger “itself”; or, how one looks is not one’s internal property as a 
thing and is connected to one’s temper only empirically. However, both 
alternatives involve the application of an apparently causal reasoning to one’s 
physiognomy: if I were to look this or that way and do this and this, then I should 
be such and such. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that causality could explain the 
relations between physiognomy and character: “it is clear that the causal nexus is 
not a nexus at all” (ibid.). This way, one is brought to solipsism: 
Now is it true (following the psycho-physical conception) that my 
character is expressed only in the build of my body or brain and not 
equally in the build of the rest of the world? (ibid.) 
Applying the psycho-physical concept to oneself may lead to a further 
assumption. If one grants that one can learn one’s spirit or will solely through 
empirical inferences, then one could also grant that one can also learn one’s 
character this way. This would involve one’s character being expressed in one’s 
body or brain, first to the exclusion of others and second in a way that would be 
beyond one’s reach. I would be such and such irrespective of how I appear or 
what I do, for “it” would be expressed only in the build (or constitution) of my 
body or brain. This would amount to rejecting the relevance of awareness: i.e., 
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the dimension of existence in which one can question the modalities of one’s 
actions amongst others who can do the same.7 
Wittgenstein neither passes judgment on such a scenario nor grants its 
intelligibility. He nevertheless suggests that this interrogation “contains a salient 
point” (ibid.), which is that somehow the correspondence between my spirit and 
the world really holds. One is then led to realism. If it is recalled that “solipsism 
singles me alone out”, it is not only against the background of the alleged 
application of the whole-part distinction to all that is the case that one is singled 
out. It is also against the background of the alleged application of the whole-part 
distinction to all humans that one could single oneself out as alone (thereby 
conceiving solitude as a property of an individual irrespective of circumstances). 
By comparison, the distinction between the world as a whole and all individuals is 
not internalized in Schopenhauer’s account of will. On his approach, one’s 
intuition of the world involves a disjunction: one intuits the world either as will or 
as representation. The difficulty is that, as will, the world cannot coincide with 
that of the individual who intuits it as representation. This difficulty stems from 
the requirement of an a priori reference to a unique knowing subject, which 
generates a tension when taken together with the unicity (i.e., the property of an 
object of which there is one and only one exemplary under a description) of 
individuals. The meaning of the world (as the whole of being) and all humans (all 
those who exist) are thereby a priori dissociated from each other. To mark a 
posteriori the distinction between the world and humans suffices to disarm this 
difficulty (as we shall see in the last part of this chapter, this question is tied to the 
difficulty of an alleged “reflexive identity”). As such, the “salient point” considered 
by Wittgenstein may simply amount to saying that if I appeared in such a way and 
acted in such a way, then I should be such and such: 
Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is your spirit. For 
it is only from yourself that you know [kennst] spirit at all. (Translation 
modified, ibid.) 
Wittgenstein does not use the term “acquaintance” to characterize one’s 
relation to spirit or will. This would straightforwardly amount to treating this 
                                                          
7
 Sartre’s critical approach to ipseity will be studied in Chapter 2. See “The Question of 
Human Individuality” in Le parler de soi (Descombes, 2014, pp. 144-181) for a 
contemporary and critical approach to the relation between self-awareness and ipseity in 
phenomenology. 
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relationship as empirical, or at least univocally dependent on passive experience. 
Self-knowledge could then be accountable in terms of content acquired through 
perception.8 Instead, Wittgenstein suggests that the spirit of a lion or snake stems 
from the projection of one’s implicit understanding of one’s own will on an 
animal. This immediately raises the question of why a spirit characterized in such 
and such a way is ascribed to one animal rather than another: “now of course, the 
question is why I have given a snake just this spirit” (ibid.). Due to its cultural over-
determination, that Wittgenstein considers the example of the snake is of 
particular interest (for it could embody the archetype of “an evil spirit”). 
Wittgenstein provides a clue to answer questions on such imagery (not on 
animals): 
[T]he answer to this can only lie in the psycho-physical parallelism: If I 
were to look like the snake and to do what it does, then I should be 
such-and-such. 
The same with the elephant, with the fly, with the wasp.  
But the question arises whether even here, my body is not on the same 
level with that of the wasp and of the snake (and surely it is so), so that I 
have neither inferred from that of the wasp to mine nor from mine to 
that of the wasp. (ibid.) 
 The psycho-physical parallelism considered by Wittgenstein involves the 
reciprocal ordering of independent psyches distinguished from bodies. This can be 
expressed by means of an analogy: this body is to “itself” in a similar, parallel 
psychic relation as mine is to “myself”. But this analogy involves bodies being 
perceived by each other on a similar level, where no inference between one’s 
body and those of animals is required, that is, realism. However, at this stage, 
realism can be understood in two ways: either independent from or committed to 
the psycho-physical parallelism (and thus to the analogic approach). Realism 
committed to psycho-physical parallelism (which Sartre calls “metaphysical 
realism”) is called into question by Wittgenstein: “is this the solution of the puzzle 
why men have always believed that there was one spirit common to the whole 
world?” (ibid.).9 The “solution” considered at this stage is the implicit counterpart 
of acknowledging that one’s will could not have created all there is (thereby 
                                                          
8
 I will return to this question in the second part of the fourth chapter, when I will consider 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore’s and Russell’s approaches to the notion of subject. 
9
 I will return at the end of the fourth chapter to Wittgenstein’s concern with this view and 
its importance in accounting for his way of addressing the issue of solipsism in the 
Tractatus. 
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remaining unresolved with respect to the would-be opposite possibility). One’s 
will or spirit would need to be distinguished from that which produced the 
reciprocal ordering of independent spirited bodies. There should, accordingly, be 
one spirit common to the whole world, which could infuse all its parts and 
account for its unicity: “and in that case it would, of course, also be common to 
lifeless things too”. Everything would be part of a unique spirit common to the 
whole world. Wittgenstein does not specify whether he endorses this conception. 
Nevertheless, it can be emphasized that realism understood as involving psycho-
physical parallelism presupposes that one could be confined to representations. 
 We may thus note that, for Wittgenstein, as for Sartre, reaching realism 
that is committed to the psycho-physical parallelism from idealism via solipsism 
implies one’s acknowledgement that everyone is confined to representations. Can 
this be granted at all? Before turning to how each author confronts this difficulty, I 
will attempt to formulate one central convergence of their approaches to the 
issue of solipsism. 
1.1.3. Could any Individual be the Only One to be Unique? 
Sartre and Wittgenstein agree on the following: understanding how 
realism leads to solipsism implies understanding the difficulty it raises for 
idealism. This difficulty is not the threat of a confinement to representations, but 
rather a threat of impersonality. Such idealism (e.g., Schopenhauer’s) 
presupposes that each of us could discover our uniqueness (i.e., the property of 
each and every individual) by recognizing ourselves as instances of a unique 
“cognizing subject” from an a priori perspective. Such idealism does not claim 
exclusivity of its perspective, for acknowledging that one has discovered oneself 
as a “finite” instance of a unique “cognizing subject” does not involve reserving 
the possibility of such a discovery for anyone in particular. Such an approach 
would rather presuppose that no one could possibly discover themselves as an 
instance of a unique “cognizing subject” in a way that could not be shared with 
others. Nevertheless, what remains presupposed by such an approach is that one 
could a priori fail to “discover” one’s counting as a unique “cognizing subject”. 
Both Sartre and Wittgenstein criticize the idealist requirement of an a 
priori “discovery” of “oneself” (or of “a self”) from an a priori perspective. The 
difficulty solipsism raises for such idealism is that it seems that the solipsist could 
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somehow be right in acting as if he or she should not acknowledge being limited 
to representations. For idealism, it seems as if the solipsist could suggest a sort of 
redoubled unicity, something that would be forbidden to the idealist in principle 
(rather than confused). And such idealism is could be right to conclude that 
solipsism rejects any reciprocity by taking for granted the intelligibility of an 
exclusive perspective on the whole. It is the implicit rejection of both reciprocity 
and unicity by solipsism that discomforts such idealism. 
This explains why Sartre and Wittgenstein present realism as the end 
point of idealism, or maybe, more simply, how the (transcendental) idealist stance 
leads to the (metaphysical) realist one. If the threat posed by solipsism is 
assimilated to being disowned from a “knowledge” of individual unicity, then the 
thought of a shared a priori standpoint on reality which could secure such 
knowledge may be tempting. Nevertheless, having started with a representation 
of the world, considering the apparent threat raised by solipsism, one would 
finally find oneself led to acknowledge reality as it would be a priori. 
If that is the case, solipsism does not appear to require an additional 
epistemic privilege from which idealism and realism are exempted, but rather to 
reject collectively acknowledged epistemic privilege (the idea that one would 
need infallible “access” to one’s representation) in the name of a private one. 
Whether any of these ways of epistemically privileging either the collective or the 
individual is appropriate or legitimate are distinct questions. However, 
understood as a rejection of collective epistemic privilege (i.e., of infallible 
“access” to representations), solipsism points to the inanity of an opposition 
between transcendental idealism and metaphysical realism. Nevertheless, 
solipsism exposes the inanity of their opposition by rejecting them. That is to say, 
in the solipsist approach, there is the least difference between one’s affirmation 
that one can only have a representation of the world as a whole and one’s 
affirmation that the world as a whole is exactly like the representations we have. 
Solipsism rejects the distinction between the two directions of evaluation (i.e., 
evaluating reality by means an idea, in an ordinary sense, and evaluating an idea 
by inspecting). 
Thus, considering solipsism at the intersection of idealism and realism 
enables consideration of a specific difficulty that neither can solve. According to 
solipsism, the existence of others is superfluous. The approaches of Sartre and 
Wittgenstein diverge in that the former is first concerned by the aporia resulting 
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from accounting for the relationships between consciousnesses in external terms 
only, whereas Wittgenstein is concerned with the difficulties resulting from taking 
one’s knowledge of one’s will and character to depend solely on observational 
experience. However, for both, character is internally tied to one’s attitude with 
respect to others: either all three doctrines (transcendental idealism, solipsism 
and metaphysical realism) or none of them are to be dismissed. The implicit 
presupposition of each doctrine is that we can have only mere representations of 
each other. We may thus now return to the previous question of whether one 
could intelligibly ratify a posteriori that everyone is confined to representations. 
1.2. The Criticism of the Analogy with the Visual Field 
In this section, I argue that Sartre and Wittgenstein agree that the three 
doctrines (transcendental idealism, solipsism and metaphysical realism) are to be 
rejected insofar as they all presuppose that an exclusive perspective on the world 
as a whole can be taken. To presuppose that one can take such a perspective 
implies a misleading analogy between the relation of the eye with the visual field 
and the relation of an individual with the world. However, admitting that an 
individual can take an exclusive perspective on the world presupposes admitting 
that the visual field can be assimilated to a perspective. The difficulty is that one 
would need to have seen oneself from an outer perspective on the world in order 
to establish that the visual field could reduce to a perspective. 
I argue in section 1.2.1. that, on Wittgenstein’s approach, the idea of a 
“metaphysical subject” presupposes the assimilation of the visual field to an 
exclusive perspective. From this perspective, it would be conceivable to remark 
upon and establish the restrictive limits of our points of view. Indeed, noting the 
existence of a “metaphysical subject” in the world presupposes that one believes 
in seeing the world from an exclusive perspective and that all individuals could be 
identified objectively as “parts” of the world. Next, I argue in section 1.2.2. that, 
on Sartre’s approach, the idea of an objective and exclusive perspective 
presupposes that one could see oneself from a perspective outside of the world. 
From this perspective, the manner in which consciousness should treat visual 
impressions could be established. This amounts to the same move as assimilating 
the modalities under which individuals can evaluate each other for specific 
purposes with the dimensions that individuals fix in order to evaluate objects. 
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Finally, I argue in section 1.2.3. that, for both Sartre and Wittgenstein, it is 
superfluous and misleading to assimilate the modalities under which we can 
evaluate objects and the modalities under which individuals can evaluate each 
other objectively for specific purposes. 
1.2.1. Can I see “the Eye”? 
We have seen that, according to Wittgenstein’s approach in the 
Notebooks, realism relying on psycho-physical parallelism is tantamount to 
assuming that even lifeless things are parts of one spirit common to the whole 
world. That is to say, according to this view, seeing an object and seeing a living 
being amount to the same thing: to see anything, and a fortiori oneself, would be 
to see the partial manifestation of one spirit common to the whole world. 
Sartre’s diagnosis of the origin of the problem of the existence of others 
or others’ minds suffices to consider the pivot of Wittgenstein’s conception: “the 
common presupposition to idealism and realism is that the constituting negation 
is an external negation: the Other is the one who is not me and the one who I am 
not” (BN, 254). One’s relations to others and objects are taken to be accountable 
for in a uniform manner, inasmuch as space is assumed to separate us from each 
other. As someone else is perceived by someone within space, “it is a real or ideal 
space which separates us from the other” (BN, 255). The negation involved in an 
(empty) judgment bearing on the distinctness of unrelated things (for example, 
one’s noting that “the table is not the chair”) is taken to be equivalent to the 
negation involved one’s noting that one is not someone else (e.g., “I am not Paul”) 
(BN, 254). The counterpart to treating these negations as equivalent is that one’s 
relation to others is understood in terms of the indifference or unrelatedness of 
objects. Then, “the only manner in which someone else may reveal oneself to me, 
is to appear as an object to my knowledge” (BN, 255). Although there are theories 
of knowledge built against the reduction of reality to images, I would have 
nothing but representations of reality in which others are contained as objects. 
In such approaches, only a witness external to both me and the other 
could decide whether such images were true by comparing them to its “model”. 
Were such a witness not external to us, he would have only images of us. But then 
he would be in the same relation to us as we are to each other and could not 
decide whether his images of us are real. So what Sartre calls the “spatializing 
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presupposition” poses a dilemma: either one appeals to a unique creator or one 
leaves the door open to solipsism (BN, 255). One could choose the first option and 
appeal to a conception of a creator which cannot be distinguished from its 
creatures. This leads to a conception of realism similar to the one called into 
question by Wittgenstein, according to which everything is a partial manifestation 
of one spirit common to the whole world. Sartre underlines the tension that is the 
outcome of this conception: 
If God is I and if he is the other, then what guarantees my own 
existence? If creation is held to be continuous, I remain always 
suspended between a distinct existence and a pantheistic fusion with 
the Creator being. (BN, 256) 
One’s existence would be incessantly called into question by the 
metaphysical realism reached from transcendental idealism through solipsism.10 
As suggested, this tension stems from the implicit acknowledgement that seeing 
someone could be confused with seeing an object. If seeing someone cannot be 
confused with seeing an object, the question of whether one can see or be seen 
as a “part” of the world as a whole could be dismissed. But how can this be 
established? 
For both Sartre and Wittgenstein, confronting this difficulty involves 
addressing a specific analogy: that the world is to a person what the visual field is 
to the eye. One can make such an analogy, for one’s perception involves one’s 
existence and one’s visual perception involves the existence of one’s eye(s). 
However, to use this analogy to account for and allegedly establish or secure an 
epistemic relation between an individual and the world is confusing: one would 
not see in the first person, for it would be “the eye” that would see, irrespective 
of what that one does. Likewise, one would not think in the first person, as it 
would be “the subject” who would think, irrespective of who thinks. On such an 
approach, I could neither know what I mean nor what I do. Wittgenstein criticizes 
this approach in the Tractatus: 
                                                          
10
 In this passage, Sartre targets implicitly Malebranche. But an expression of a similar 
tension can be found in Memoirs of My Nervous Illness  (Schreber, 2000). Drawing 
peculiarly on Diamond’s and Conant’s reading of the Tractatus, Read has advocated 
(2001), partially in response to Sass’s (1994) comparison of Wittgenstein’s approach to 
solipsism with one to schizophrenia, resisting psychopathological approaches that propose 
treatments to such “illnesses”, to cede the very temptations that nourish the alleged 
“illnesses”, a proposition with which I agree. 
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5.633. Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted 
[merken]? 
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the visual 
field. 
 
The opening question can be interpreted in two ways: either as awaiting 
an answer comprising the specification of a place where the presence of a 
“metaphysical subject” could be noted; or, on the contrary, as questioning one’s 
ability to specify a place, possibly by pointing, where a “metaphysical subject” 
could be noted. 
Wittgenstein immediately asks his reader to consider the objection that 
he assumes would be presented to his criticism: that the relationship between the 
world and a “metaphysical subject” would be analogous to the relationship 
between the visual field and the eye. Just as the availability of a visual field to 
someone involves the existence of the eye, so too the availability of a world to 
someone would presuppose the existence of the subject as “part” of the world, as 
a “metaphysical subject”. Wittgenstein presents this analogy as a potential 
objection, and by doing so he invites his reader to question the intelligibility of 
noting the existence of a “metaphysical subject”. He argues that such an analogy 
cannot constitute an objection to his criticism, for it would then need to be 
conclusive, informative and relevant. Wittgenstein rejects this approach: 
5.633. But you really do not see the eye. 
And from nothing in the visual field can it be concluded that it is seen 
from an eye (von einem Auge). 
 The first rejection is trivial. One can see the reflections of one’s eyes in a 
mirror, on the surface of water or in someone else’s pupils. One can also see 
other people’s eyes. But, in the present, one does not see “the eye”. The analogy 
does not, therefore, establish that “the eye” sees rather than someone. The 
second rejection is more radical, for it amounts to rejecting the assimilation of, 
among other modalities, visual perception to an inference or to reasoning. In 
reasoning, a conclusion can be drawn from premises. However, it is at best 
unclear that this applies to perception (which is independent from our ability to 
infer on the basis of that which we perceive). To hold that there should be such 
premises-of-perception a priori can lead to confusion. If one supposes that 
something can be seen “from” an eye, then one assumes that one’s situation 
would be intelligible on the sole basis of one’s position at a place in (idealized) 
space. Wittgenstein also rejects this approach: 
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5.6331. For the form of the visual field has not a form like this: 
 
Suppose that one focuses one’s eyes on something unknown or 
unidentified. One can say “I see something” to report one’s experience to 
someone else. One could also report one’s experience by saying, “there is 
something in my visual field”. Both expressions could convey the same 
information: that something, although unknown or unidentified, has been seen by 
someone. The second does not involve that its utterer can see the visual field. But 
the drawing above would imply that one can “see” the visual field, “discover” its 
“limits” or “form”, and “show” it to others. However, it is striking that the schema 
occupies a place in one’s visual field. That is to say, it does not show what its 
author assumed it shows (that the visual field has a “form”). On the contrary, it 
suggests that one’s desire to show that the visual field is limited stems from a 
confusion. How to address such confusion?11 
This schema appears in the Notebooks less than a week after 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of the assimilation of the first-person pronoun to the 
designator of an object: “the I is not an object” (NB, 7.8.16) and “I objectively 
confront every object. But not the I” (NB, 11.8.16). While one can objectively think 
that one confronts objects, the same does not apply to oneself. What is at stake is 
the relevance of what Sullivan (1996, p. 204) calls the “object-centred view”. He 
characterizes this idea as follows: “a range of objects with certain possibilities 
built into their natures; and the world is limited to whatever can be cobbled 
together out of this material” (Sullivan, 1996, p. 205). He makes three remarks on 
this idea. First, it seems to suffice in order to conceive the limits of language and 
world as different from what they are inasmuch as the range of propositions is 
taken to be fixed by an alleged initial range of objects (ibid.). Second, in such an 
                                                          
11
 The reading proposed here is indebted to Sullivan  (1996, p. 198), Floyd  (1998, p. 181) 
and Friedlander  (2001, pp. 116-117). 
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approach world and language are not immediately conceived as totalities. Third, it 
leads to assigning a foundational role to acquaintance with objects with respect to 
our understanding of propositions (Sullivan, 1996, p. 206). The “object-centred 
view” is tied to an illusion called into question by Wittgenstein a few days before 
his drawing of the previously mentioned schema: “Isn’t the thinking subject in the 
last resort mere superstition?” (NB, 4.8.16). To this question, he answers that “the 
thinking subject is surely a mere illusion. But the willing subject exists” (NB, 
5.8.16). 
An exchange of places between two persons is conceivable. From each 
place that one can occupy, someone can see what is available to one’s sight from 
that place. Different places that could be taken by different persons can be 
characterized as perspectives, insofar as one can imagine what one could see 
from a place that is different from the one that one occupies. Now, could the 
visual field be considered as a perspective at all? 
The “object-centred view”, with the correlative illusion of “the 
metaphysical subject” which goes with it, as mentioned earlier, implies the 
assumption that one’s visual field could be a perspective. The schema presents 
the presumption that one could discover, from one place, a limit that everyone 
else has failed to notice and that should be presented as a limitation or restrictive 
limit. So the concept of perspective involved in the “object-centred view” involves 
its exclusivity. Thereby, the superstition considered by Wittgenstein (“the 
metaphysical subject”) is not unreal as such. If it is further recalled that “the 
metaphysical subject” is conceived as a “part” of the “world”, then it may further 
be explained that such a view involves assuming that one could see the world as a 
whole from one’s exclusive perspective, irrespective of limits that would apply to 
anyone else. To this extent, the “object-centred view” is internally tied to a 
concept of “world” which presupposes that it could be seen as a whole from an 
exclusive perspective. Accordingly, the world would not be all that is the case, but 
at best, merely all there is. Furthermore, the meaning of all that can be seen and 
thought by someone could be uniformly considered from an exclusive 
perspective. 
To call into question the superstition or illusion addressed by 
Wittgenstein, a use he introduces of the concept of object a few months later can 
be considered: 
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It is clear, so to speak, that we need a foothold for the will in the world. 
The will is an attitude of the subject to the world. *…+. 
This is clear: it is impossible to will without already performing the act of 
the will. 
The act of the will is not the cause of the action but is the action itself. 
One cannot will without acting. 
If the will has to have an object in the world, the object can be the 
intended action itself.  
And the will must have an object. (NB, 4.11.1916) 
On this approach, an “object” can be one’s action. This concept of object 
cannot be detached from its straightforward intelligibility (as much to oneself as 
to others), for it presupposes one’s situation within a logical space (i.e., a space of 
relevant possibilities that one can consider and share with others). Wittgenstein 
states of our approach to the world: “our life is endless, as our visual field is 
limitless” (TLP, 6.4311). Could one’s visual field be a perspective at all? Is the 
application of the whole-part distinction to the visual field not misleading? Before 
addressing these questions in detail, I will turn to Sartre’s approach, which also 
addresses the difficulty involved in relying on the analogy with the visual field. 
1.2.2. The Problem of “Inverted Vision” 
Sartre also addresses the confusion stemming from the analogy with the 
visual field. In Being and Nothingness, this difficulty is treated after the issue 
raised by solipsism under its theoretical form. Nevertheless, in order to compare 
the approaches of Wittgenstein and Sartre on this point, I will anticipate the 
latter’s approach by considering his elucidation of the problem of “inverted 
vision”: 
We know the question posed by the physiologists: “how can we set 
upright the objects which are painted upside down on our retina?” We 
know as well the answer of the philosophers: “There is no problem. An 
object is upright or inverted in relation to the rest of the universe. To 
perceive the whole universe inverted means nothing, for it would have 
to be inverted in relation to something.” (BN, 329) 
 Sartre sides with philosophers against physiologists in rejecting that the 
problem of “inverted vision” is meaningful. The physiologist approach assumes 
that one should invert retinal impressions of objects in order to see them upright. 
One does not perceive objects but objects-seen-through-their-retinal-impressions. 
Sartre diagnoses how this pseudo-problem arose: “one has wanted to link my 
consciousness to the body of someone else” (BN, 329). The schema he considers 
is the following: 
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The difficulty raised by this schema is similar to the one considered by 
Wittgenstein, for its author assumed it could show that one would need to 
(intentionally) set retinal impressions upright. However, as Kuhn (1970, p. 127) 
puts it, “the inverting glasses show that two men with different retinal 
impressions can see the same thing”. Kuhn refers in this passage to an experiment 
initially conduct by Stratton in 1897, and which was later reproduced several 
times, notably by Carr in 1935 and Kohler in 1964 (Stratton, 1897) aimed to 
question whether the inverted image posited by theories of upright vision is a 
necessary condition of our seeing things in an upright position. His 1887 
experiment consisted in making an individual wear inverting glasses for ten days. 
Inverting glasses can be defined as a device which allows one to see in a way in 
which one’s surroundings seem to be upside-down. Stratton noted that in less 
than a week, an individual can get used to wearing such glasses. That is to say, an 
individual can learn to do whatever he can without the inverting glasses, although 
this was initially rendered difficult by the glasses. If we consider abstractly, as 
Kuhn did, the “retinal impressions” of two individuals, only one of whom is 
wearing inverting glasses, these impressions are different although they are 
impressions of one and only one object. Concretely put, if we could see 
simultaneously any two individuals looking at the same object, only one of whom 
is wearing inverting glasses, we could see on the former’s eyes what we would see 
upside-down on the latter’s ones. Kuhn suggests that Stratton’s experiment 
establishes that it does not follow from such observable differences it does not 
follow that two individuals do not see the same object. 
This point is independent of but nevertheless supports Sartre’s approach: 
there is no such thing as an (intentional) rectification of perception (one which 
could allegedly by obtained by an abstract exercise of will). Assuming that one 
needs to rectify visual perception is the counterpart of a causal approach to 
perception, according to which objects imprint themselves on sense “organs”. 
However, as previously noted, this would also require that one’s situation is 
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intelligible on the sole basis of one’s position in (idealized) space. Here, as before, 
the distinction between perspectives and standpoints is at issue: “so far as the 
physicians have had any experience with my body, it was with my body in the 
midst of the world and as it is for others. My body as it is for me does not appear 
to me in the midst of the world” (BN, 327). Sartre argues that this conception, 
which he calls “the physical point of view – i.e., the point of view of the outside”, 
has been deliberately chosen to explain vision: “we have considered a dead eye in 
the midst of the visible world in order to account for the visibility of the world” 
(BN, 329). 
Sartre does not contest physiological knowledge as a whole, but 
emphasizes the difficulty implied in situating oneself in the world by internalizing 
an arbitrary pre-ordering of knowledge: “to start from experiments that 
physicians may have done on my body amounts to starting from my body in the 
midst of the world and such as it is for someone else” (translation mine, BN, 327). 
This point concerns idealism: “my body, for Schopenhauer is nothing but ‘the 
immediate object’” (BN, 255). For example, in seeing a radiograph or image of 
one’s bodily parts, one may see one’s body as an “entirely constituted object, as a 
this among other thises” (BN, 328). Nevertheless, taking the body “as a certain 
thing having its own laws and capable of being defined from outside” tends to 
obscure the relations of consciousness to the body (BN, 325). The upshot of this 
approach is to distinguish one’s reflexive assimilation of a body to an object of 
study (as when a physiologist studies a human body) from one’s non-thetic 
assimilation of one’s body to an object (as when someone thinks of his or her 
body as a physiologist would of a body). 
This difficulty is tied to Sartre’s earlier criticism of what he calls the 
“primacy of knowledge”. Such primacy amounts to the idea that consciousness 
could be “a knowledge turned back upon itself” (BN, 7). This idea presupposes the 
reduction of consciousness to knowledge (BN, 8). Sartre, in order to provide the 
schema of the approach to which such an idea leads, states Alain’s formula: “to 
know is to know that one knows” (BN, 8). This primacy can be characterized as the 
requirement that reflexion would necessarily precede consciousness in every 
sense. In order to surmount the difficulties such approaches raise, Sartre provides 
an account to render intelligible that some consciousnesses are irreducible to 
reflexive ones (such as affective ones). However, this account, as we shall see, 
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cannot be detached from both the intelligibility of science and the certainty of the 
existence of others. 
Sartre considers the opposite of Husserl’s affirmation of intentionality 
(BN, 7). To affirm that every consciousness is consciousness of something 
amounts to rejecting that a consciousness could not posit what Sartre calls a 
“transcendent object” (which, as we shall see, can be understood as a situated 
thought). At issue is the relevance of that which was earlier called the “object-
centred view”. Sartre suggests that attempts to account for the “contents” of 
consciousness, according to which the idea of neutral “data” acquires different 
meanings according to different referential systems, leads to reification of 
consciousness. One can imagine that the process of studying a thing in order to 
unfold and inventory its content can continue indefinitely. To require the same 
with respect to consciousness is therefore misleading: “to introduce this opacity 
[i.e., of things] into consciousness would be to refer to infinity the inventory which 
it can make of itself” (BN, 7). In order to propose an alternative account of 
consciousness which does not raise such a difficulty, Sartre suggests that it is 
necessary to re-establish the “true connection *of consciousness+ with the world, 
to know that consciousness is a positional consciousness of the world” (ibid.). In 
his approach, every consciousness is positional, which means that every knowing 
consciousness “transcends itself in order to reach an object” and “exhausts itself 
in this same positing” (BN, 7-8). To account for the intelligibility of reflexive 
consciousness, it is necessary and sufficient that any knowing consciousness has 
knowledge of one and only one object: 
The necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to 
be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being 
that knowledge. (BN, 8) 
To render intelligible the intentionality of a knowing consciousness, no 
more than one object is required, but no less than one object could suffice. The 
concept of object that Sartre introduces cannot be detached from situated 
reflexion: 
Reflexive consciousness posits the reflected consciousness as its object: I 
pass, in the act of reflexion, judgements on the reflected consciousness, 
I am ashamed of it, I am proud of it, I want it, I refuse it, etc. (Translation 
mine, BN, 9) 
According to this approach, one can posit by reflexion that which 
retrospectively appears as its object. It nevertheless remains unintelligible that my 
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perception could “know” or “posit” its objects. These two distinct aspects of 
consciousness (perceptive and reflexive) temporally coincide without getting 
mixed: “every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-
positional consciousness of itself” (BN, 9). Sartre provides an example. Suppose I 
count a group of objects and someone interrupts me to ask, “what are you 
doing?” I can answer that “I am counting” (inasmuch as I have not yet finished 
counting). To provide such an answer does not require either a thetic or a 
positional consciousness of oneself-as-counting. But in order to answer the 
question that is asked, I reflexively consider some of my past consciousnesses 
which are not thetic or positional. Such past consciousnesses are not reflexive, 
although I can consider them reflexively; rather, they are “forever not-reflected-
on in my immediate past” (BN, 9). And I can reflexively spell out the consciousness 
which answers the question that has been posed to me. 
Positional or thetical consciousness is thus characterized as positing as its 
object one consciousness, while non-positional or non-thetical consciousness 
does not posit or know an object. Every positional or thetical consciousness 
implies a non-positional or non-thetical consciousness as its object. But a non-
positional or non-thetical consciousness does not need to have a positional or 
thetical consciousness as its object. As suggested by Morris (2008, p. 67), 
“positional” and “thetical” can and should be used equivalently in order to 
distinguish the reflexive from the pre-reflexive regime of consciousness. 
The primacy of reflexion over consciousness can thus be rejected: “it is 
non-reflexive consciousness which renders reflexion possible” (translation mine, 
BN, 9). Accounting for one’s involvement in an activity requires what Sartre calls 
an “operatory intention”, which he characterizes using Heidegger’s idiom of 
“revealing-revealed” (BN, 9). The modality of one’s consciousness in action is not 
reflexive; it is unreflexive (BN, 60). However, this does not suggest that every 
action is unreflexive (i.e., to count a group of objects in order to make an 
inventory differs from counting them without a reason). Thus consciousness is 
confused with reflexive consciousness if self-consciousness is understood on the 
model of the consciousness of objects: 
It is the very nature of consciousness to exist “in a circle”. The idea can 
be expressed in these terms: every consciousness exists as conscious of 
existing. We understand now why the first consciousness of 
consciousness is not positional: it is because it is one with the 
consciousness of which it is consciousness. At one stroke it determines 
itself as consciousness of perception and as perception. The necessity of 
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syntax has compelled us hitherto to speak of the “non-positional 
consciousness of self”. But we can no longer use this expression in which 
the “of self” still evokes the idea of knowledge. (Henceforth we shall put 
the “of” inside parentheses *to point that it answers only to a 
grammatical constraint]). (Translation modified, BN, 20) 
To distinguish between “conscience (de) soi” and “conscience de soi” is a 
way for Sartre to prevent the confusion between self-consciousness and 
consciousness of objects. As suggested earlier, intentional consciousness can be 
considered in two ways: as the positional consciousness of an object involved 
while one intentionally observes something for a purpose (e.g., for a study, which 
differs from gazing at an object);12 and as the non-thetic relation of consciousness 
with itself while absorbed in an activity. Nevertheless, does the intelligibility of a 
non-thetical relation of consciousness with itself not ultimately require that 
consciousness can posit itself as object? 
To solve this issue, I follow Narboux’s (2015, p. 73) suggestion that 
accounting for Sartre’s approach requires marking the grammatical distinction 
between indirect reflexive pronouns and direct reflexive pronouns. Sartre (2003, 
p. 157) explicitly analyses the function played by the indirect reflexive pronoun 
“oneself”:  
“He bends himself” indicates well that the “myself” that we find here is 
not exactly the “he”; without which it would not be necessary to use two 
words. There is a slight gap. (Translation mine) 
The reflexive pronoun does not, in the sentence “he bends himself”, 
satisfy the function of the object of the process expressed by the verb (as “an 
iron-bar” in “he bends an iron-bar”). Sartre suggests, rather, that the indirect 
reflexive pronoun “oneself” is required to describe an action without referring. In 
the first case, “oneself” necessarily points to the subject of the process expressed 
by the verb. For example, consider a sentence which involves a direct reflexive 
pronoun such as “he heals himself” (e.g., when someone applies a basic 
treatment to a wound). In this case, the process expressed by the verb does 
contingently presuppose that a person has initiated a process of healing as an 
agent that one also undergoes as a patient. It implies a single action which 
consists in healing oneself and in which one person endorses the two roles of the 
                                                          
12
 I thank Rupert Read for drawing my attention to the importance of the distinction 
between gazing and looking in order to address the issue of solipsism (see Wittgenstein, 
PI, 2009, §411). I will stress the importance of this distinction for Sartre in Chapter 2. 
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healer and the patient. Nevertheless, the endorsement of these two roles by a 
single person during one action is contingent, for it is conceivable that someone 
else with the relevant knowledge could have applied the same (basic) treatment.13 
The identity of the one who endorses the role of the healer and the one who 
endorses the role of the healed is thus not necessary. Simply, an individual can 
express that he is realizing a reflexive action by means of a sentence which 
involves a reflexive diathesis (e.g., “I heal myself”). 
The same does not apply to a French sentence such as “Il s’ennuie”, which 
can be correctly translated as “he’s getting bored” and literally translated as “he’s 
boring himself” (BN, 100). Such a sentence does not involve a reflexive diathesis in 
French or in its literal translation. That is to say, someone can describe the 
situation of someone else by means of such a sentence without assuming this 
situation has been reflexively planned or results from an activity of the person 
whose situation is described. Narboux (2015, p. 73) underscores that “‘to get 
bored’ does not amount to boring someone or an aspect of someone”. Sartre 
suggests the duality that is marked by “he” and “himself” in the literal translation 
“he’s boring himself” points to a relation of “the subject with himself” involved by 
“he’s getting bored” (BN, 100). 
Sartre further rejects the idea that such a relation points to a property of 
a “self”. It is one and the same thing to take such a relation to be constitutive of 
self-consciousness and to confuse pre-reflexive consciousness with the non-thetic 
relation of consciousness with itself*14 (while intentionally absorbed in an 
activity). The thetic (yet pre-reflexive and unintentional) relation of a 
consciousness with itself is what Sartre calls “presence to self”.15 Sartre suggests 
that we took for “a plenitude of existence” what amounts to a prejudice (BN, 
101), for to assimilate “presence to self” to self-consciousness amounts to 
privileging the modality of consciousness under which “the self” is assumed: 
The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the immanence of 
the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being his own 
coincidence. (BN, 101) 
                                                          
13
 For a detailed account, see Le Parler de Soi (Descombes, 2014, pp. 130-132). 
14
 This symbol is here used after Castaneda (1999) and Narboux (2015) to mark the 
grammatical distinction between the indirect reflexive pronoun and the direct reflexive 
pronoun. 
15
 This will be studied in chapter 2. 
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The necessity for self-consciousness to not coincide with itself* is pre-
reflexively assimilated to the contingency of a consciousness that does not 
coincide with itself. The quest for the “being” of consciousness is not incidental to 
this difficulty: 
The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance 
from oneself as presence to itself and this null distance that being carries 
in its being, it is Nothingness. (BN, 102) 
The absolute distinction between “being” and “nothingness” as conceived 
by Sartre is designed to confront the (individual and collective) difficulty raised by 
one’s engagement in such a quest. Four years after Being and Nothingness, Sartre  
(Sartre J.-P. , 2003, p. 147) spells out his diagnosis of the nexus of this difficulty: 
In reflexion, a duplication operates itself such that man is object, to a 
certain extent and according to characters to elucidate, for himself. 
But then, in that case, it is evident *…+ that the “cogito” is first 
knowledge. In other words, have not we confused, at our starting point, 
consciousness and knowledge?  (Sartre J.-P. , 2003, p. 147) 
The nexus of the difficulty is a confusion between knowledge and 
consciousness on the basis of the implicit reliance on reflexive diathesis as a 
unique model for reflexion.16 Sartre draws attention to the “duplication of man as 
object” on reflexion as not being a process which could be initiated by someone. 
He further suggests that this difficulty should be taken into account: 
consciousness cannot be accounted for solely in terms of knowledge.17 
Nevertheless, this does not involve renouncing knowledge in any sense. Sartre 
intends, rather, to establish that alleged problems such as that of “inverted 
vision” stem from adopting an absolute approach to space and objectivity, which 
is the common background of transcendental idealism, solipsism and 
                                                          
16
 Three models for the reflexive diathesis can be provided. The first is the reflection of a 
light-ray in a mirror  (Narboux, 2016, p. 18). The second is the drama of the Sprinkler 
Sprinkled, in which a gardener is tricked into sprinkling himself, as suggested by 
Descombes  (2004, p. 111) and Narboux  (2016, p. 18). And the third is the transitive 
process through which a person “sees herself in a mirror” as suggested by Tesnière  (1959, 
p. 242), Descombes (2004, p. 165) and Narboux  (2016, p. 18). 
17
 Sartre’s approach is compatible, up to a point, with Cavell’s in The Claim of Reason. 
There, Cavell suggests, against the background of Clarke’s  (1972) seminal article “The 
legacy of skepticism”, a deep relationship between the works of Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger: “the truth of skepticism, or what I might call the moral of skepticism, namely, 
that the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, 
is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing” (Cavell, 1979, p. 241). On 
the “truth of skepticism”, see Mulhall  (1994, pp. 102-105), Hammer  (2002, pp. 32-39) 
and Shieh (2006). 
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metaphysical realism. Sartre suggests that such approaches assume that space 
separate us from each other. Although idealism is right to insist on “the fact that 
relation makes the world”, to assume that doing so needs to be understood 
within the paradigm of Newtonian science (thereby against the background of an 
absolute conception of space) led idealism to explicate “the limit-concept of 
absolute objectivity” (BN, 331). 
Sartre further suggests that the concept of “absolute objectivity” is 
tantamount to a “desert world” or “world without humans” and thereby to a 
contradiction (BN, 331). Someone can imagine a world without humans if this is 
understood circumstantially. The intelligibility of such a scenario does not 
presuppose rejecting the possibility that others could occupy some standpoint in 
the world. Nor does this scenario amount to the (fictive) situation faced by 
Robinson Crusoe, which is intelligible only against the background of his isolation 
from others. Instead, it would be equivalent to a counterfactual situation in which 
a survivor of a major catastrophe or war lacked any assurance of being the only 
one who remained. In this counterfactual world, one would suffer from solitude. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as such a scenario is counterfactual, it is neither 
conclusive nor informative.18 
The attempt to substitute “dogmatic truth” for “reciprocal convenience 
relation among representations” thereby leads to “its own destruction”. Such an 
approach assumes that the position of an observer is external both to one’s 
original relation to things and to one’s place in the world. Sartre underlines the 
rejection of such an approach by the scientists of his time (i.e. Broglie, Heisenberg 
and Einstein). Accounting for relativity does not amount to endorsing relativism 
(BN, 332). Rather, it is up to us to account for the intelligibility of our knowledge 
of objects in ways that are compatible both with our everyday relations to objects 
in the world and with scientific progress. The notion he uses to exemplify this 
point is speed: one can observe the movement of one body toward another with 
naked eyes and then with a microscope; in the second case, the movement will 
seem faster. Sartre expresses this idea as follows: 
                                                          
18
 In particular, granting the non-circumstantial relevance of such a scenario would 
amount to discounting the relevance of conditionality for situated reasoning. In other 
words, to rejecting the intelligibility of that which is called “conditional logic”. On this 
point, see Burgess (2012, p. 71). As we shall see both at the end of the present chapter 
and in the fourth one, Sartre proposes an account of freedom which cannot be detached 
from conditionality. 
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The notion of speed no longer means anything unless it is speed in 
relation to given dimensions of a body in motion. But it is ourselves who 
decide these dimensions by our very upsurge into the world and it is 
very necessary that we decide them, for otherwise they would not be at 
all. Thus they are relative not to the knowledge which we get of them 
but to our primary engagement at the heart of the world. (BN, 332) 
Sartre states that we decide which dimensions of bodies and objects we 
measure. This proposition does not involve creating these dimensions by an act of 
will; nor does it mean that we are condemned to arbitrariness because we need 
to decide these dimensions. Rather, it says that insofar as ones takes for granted 
some dimensions (notably registered in ordinary language), one may measure an 
object in a determinate way. This provides an additional key to understanding 
Sartre’s criticism of relying on the visual field analogy in order to understand one’s 
relation to the body. A human body can be studied as an object whose 
dimensions are decided and measured. However, this involves that the modality 
under which one reflexively considers somebody as a body, or as a professional 
who studies a corpse, is secondary with respect to the modality under which one 
is (non-thetically) conscious of one’s body. I cannot have a perspective on my 
body: “the body is the point of view on which there cannot be a point of view” 
(BN, 330). To conceive the relation between consciousness and body as a 
contingent attachment (e.g., as if consciousness were presented as “reaching” the 
world “through” the body) is the obverse of the fantasy that their detachment 
could be observed (rather than considering their distinction for specific purposes, 
such as healing). 
Sartre here confronts a difficulty similar to the one considered by 
Wittgenstein. If I were to have a point of view “on” my body, then it would need 
to be an exclusive one. Such a point of view would have to be obtained from a 
point of view on the world as a whole (for one could allegedly take a point of view 
from a point of view distinct from the one that one occupies). Furthermore, such 
a point of view could also be from side on, for one could judge that someone else 
could be deprived of one’s “own” point of view: 
The consciousness of bad faith *…+ has for ideal to judge oneself, that is 
to say to take on oneself the point of view of [the other] (l’autre). (BN, 
549) 
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This is a key aspect of Sartre’s approach: “to prejudge” is not a verb which 
can designate an intentional (thus reflexive) activity. Rather, attempts to judge 
oneself from the point of view of the other amount to prejudging oneself.19 
However, we now can formulate what is common to Sartre’s and Wittgenstein’s 
approach to the issue raised by solipsism. 
1.2.3. No one could have been Nobody 
We have seen that Sartre underscores how the dimensions according to 
which objects are evaluated are fixed by us, as well as that individuals can 
evaluate each other objectively for specific purposes, for reasons at certain 
occasions, and for certain reasons by means of public criteria (work, sport, etc.). 
Solipsism confuses these senses of evaluation by considering them independently 
from their circumstances. On Wittgenstein’s approach, this is tied to superstition; 
on Sartre’s, to prejudice. Prejudice and superstition are intertwined. The analogy 
with the visual field analogy manifests this internal relation, inasmuch as it cannot 
be conclusive, informative or relevant. Schemas based on such an analogy do not 
satisfy the explanatory role ascribed to them. They testify to attitudes with 
respect to the world and to others, according to which perceiving could be 
tantamount to seeing “parts” of “the world” from an exclusive perspective and 
acting on this basis. These attitudes lead to metaphysical realism (on Sartre’s 
terms) or realism committed to psycho-physical parallelism (on Wittgenstein’s 
terms). 
However, it is one thing to suggest that solipsism can hardly be 
acknowledged whenever its presuppositions are considered reflexively. It is quite 
another thing to establish how the problem it raises can be solved or dissolved. 
What cannot help in this, according to both Sartre and Wittgenstein, is an 
approach where categorical distinctions are taken to impose limitations on what 
can be thought and said.20 That is to say, in such an approach the correct “sorting” 
of objects and persons would have to be secured from an exclusive perspective: a 
position from where one could identify oneself or refer to oneself (as a 
                                                          
19
 This point will be explained in further detail in chapter 4. 
20
 I here rely on Narboux’s (2015, p. 53) suggestion that construing categorical distinctions 
as privations is the crucial move by which categories came to be thought of as “counts of 
indictment”. 
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“metaphysical subject”, “thinking substance”, “cognizing subject” or instance of 
“the Person”). What can be granted to such approaches is that the fantasy of an 
exclusive perspective is hardly claimed as such. As such, one can feel unsatisfied 
by criticisms of schemas drawn on the basis of the analogy with the visual field. 
Are such schemas not produced from a theoretical point of view independent of 
any schema, a perspective from which such schemas could be legitimately 
produced? That is to say, a reflexive concern that might be voiced with respect to 
these criticisms is the following: how can such criticisms be decisive? 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein envisages “a sign language” 
(Zeichensprache) which obeys the rules of “logical grammar” (logischen 
grammatik) or “logical syntax” (logischen Syntax) in order to avoid mistakes that 
would be encountered in abundance in philosophy (TLP, 3.325). His approach, on 
the reading I propose, puts into relief that the “logic of depiction” (logik der 
Abbildung) cannot be treated as a superficial aspect of language (TLP, 4.015). If it 
is true that the pretence displayed by the schema cannot be abstracted from it, 
then its rejection presents an ethical dimension. In this approach, the criticism of 
philosophy proposed by Wittgenstein is not conditional. 
The early approach of Sartre to solipsism provide additional means to 
address the issue it raises. Sartre’s concern is with the meaning of “freedom”, and 
his positive import is that he proposes a public account for interiorizing the 
conditionality of situated reasoning. Both unconditional freedom and exclusive 
freedom are fictions. Nevertheless, if it is true that solipsism stems from a 
confusion which leads to further confusion, which thereby has a collective 
dimension, then we need to be on guard against what Sartre calls “the realm of 
subjectivity”. To this end, he proposes, as we shall see, an account of freedom 
that cannot be detached from reciprocity, and which is thereby incompatible with 
neglecting the freedom of others for the sake of what he suggests is the prejudice 
toward “plenitude of existence”. 
The approaches of both authors are compatible in that they criticize the 
conceivability of the idea of self-inheritance in relation to the one of a self-
discovery.21 “Self-discovery”, as earlier introduced, means a discovery that (1) is 
necessarily made by its discoverer (it cannot be made by another discoverer) and 
                                                          
21
 The approach I propose is indebted to Narboux (Forthcoming) and Descombes (2014, 
pp. 189-192). 
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that (2) its discoverer can necessarily make (its discoverer could not fail to make 
it). A “self-discovery”, in this use, at once (2) essentially makes its discoverer and 
(1) is essentially made by that very same discoverer. Similarly, a “self-inheritance”, 
as I use this phrase, means an inheritance that (1) is necessarily legated to its 
inheritor (it cannot be inherited by another inheritor) and that (2) is necessarily 
inherited by its inheritor (it cannot be inherited from another inheritor). 
Thus, if the solipsist can discover that he is the only individual there could 
be, then no one but him could have made such discovery. And if the solipsist can 
report such a discovery to himself, then no one but him could inherit the language 
to report such discovery from him. However, could this have happened at all? 
 I will argue that, according both to Sartre and Wittgenstein, it is not 
necessary and further misleading to grant that this could have happened. To make 
a discovery implies that the object of discovery is independent from the 
discoverer. Similarly, to inherit implies that the inheritance is independent from 
the inheritor. In both cases, to be a discoverer or an inheritor is irreducible to a 
property of an individual. To discover or inherit presuppose that others can, like 
oneself, discover or inherit. 
The central aspect of solipsism confronted here is that admitting it would 
presuppose our reciprocal confinement to representations. However, although it 
can be granted that someone can affirm being called “nobody” (as Ulysses in The 
Odyssey), “nobody” could not have been a name in the first place. Consequently, 
the King’s wish to “have the eyes” of Alice in Through the Looking Glass and see 
“Nobody”, the messenger, at a distance  (Carroll, 2009, p. 199) might suggest a 
difficulty when it is admitted that its use can be accounted for as if it were a 
name. In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein  (1998, p. 69) underscores this: “Imagine a 
language in which, instead of ‘I found nobody in the room’, one said ‘I found Mr. 
Nobody in the room’. Imagine the philosophical problems which would arise out 
of such a convention”. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre confronts a similar 
approach formulated during the Second World War, that of Rougemont, who, 
under his own terms, assumed he could literally detect and identify “Nobody”. In 
his approach, “the Devil” could be portrayed as “No-body” (Rougemont, 1944, p. 
22). The difficulty here would be that “Nobody himself remains Someone”  
(Rougemont, 1944, p. 32). However, do we need to grant that such identification 
is possible and needed? 
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The register of theatricality is independent from the alleged need to 
admitting such a would-be identification. As Sartre suggests, reflexion on fiction 
allows one to represent human attitudes to oneself, thereby distinguishing what 
belongs to theatricality from what does not belong to it in ordinary situations. 
However can we grant that our language could and would need to be revised on 
the basis of a private identification from an exclusive perspective?  In order to 
address this question, in the second chapter, I will start by considering Sartre’s 
solution to the theoretical problem of the existence of others. In the third 
chapter, I will turn to Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the problem of the theoretical 
problem of the existence of other minds. In the fourth chapter, I will then focus 
on both thinkers’ criticisms of the idea of self-discovery, either from standpoint of 
the other or from one’s own standpoint.  
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2. Being and Nothingness on the Theoretical Issue of 
the Existence of Others 
The aim of this chapter is to establish that on Sartre’s approach, the 
theoretical problem of the existence of others is a pseudo-problem. This problem 
stems from the conflation of the existence of others with their presence. If we 
presuppose that the certainty of the existence of others depends on their 
presence in our surroundings, then, in their absence, it can seem conceivable to 
doubt their existence.  
Obviously, one may truly note the absence of someone else (BN, 33), 
falsely believe that one knows someone else that one sees (BN, 304) and falsely 
believe that there is someone while there is no one (BN, 304). But is it conceivable 
that a person may only believe that he sees another person in his presence? Can 
the existence of someone else be reduced to a probability in an unbeknownst way 
in every conceivable situation?  
To address this question, Sartre’s strategy is to dissipate the appearance 
that it could be a priori impossible for one to be certain that others exist. If 
solipsism cannot be refuted (insofar as the existence of others is certain), then it 
needs to be shown that someone could neither think oneself nor deny oneself 
without having beforehand acknowledged or denied the existence of others.  
To do this, I argue in section 2.1 that on Sartre’s approach, a single 
consciousness conceived as a concrete whole cannot suffice to constitute itself. 
To consider abstractly the nucleus of the immediate structures of consciousness 
on the contrary suffices to establish that in isolation, consciousness realizes itself 
as a “detotalized totality”. Then, I argue in section 2.2., that on Sartre’s approach, 
except in some circumstances (e.g., while writing fiction), calling linguistically the 
existence of others into question amounts to denying the existence of others. The 
existence of others cannot and does not require to be proved. On the contrary, 
the proof of the existence of others is inconceivable. Once the theoretical 
problem of the existence of others resolved, there remains only a “sort of de facto 
solipsism”, that is to say, the attitude of indifference with respect to others, as the 
counterpart of the pre-reflexive attempt to appropriate the freedom of others. 
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2.1. The Aporia of the Relation of Consciousness to the World 
In this section, I argue that on Sartre’s approach, a single consciousness, 
conceived as a concrete whole, cannot suffice to constitute itself. On the contrary, 
abstracting the nucleus of the immediate structures of consciousness establishes 
that, in isolation, consciousness realizes itself as a detotalized totality. 
In section 2.1.1., I argue that starting from de facto relations between 
consciousness and the world suffices to account for the intelligibility of the human 
in its relation to the world. Then, in section 2.1.2., I argue that analysis of the 
conditions of intelligibility of interrogative conduct provides an adequate leading 
thread for considering the immediate structures of consciousness. Finally, in 
section 2.1.3., I argue that analysing the nucleus of the immediate structures of 
consciousness (the absence of self or value whose absence constitutes 
consciousness as possible) shows that, in isolation, consciousness realizes itself as 
a detotalized totality. The “mineness” of the world is the counterpart of the pre-
reflexive assumption that a single consciousness could be sufficient to constitute 
itself. 
2.1.1. The Aporia of the Relation of the For-itself to the In-itself 
In Sartre’s approach, addressing the issue raised by solipsism requires 
establishing the insufficiency of a single concrete and conscious whole in its 
relation to the world (i.e., a “being-in-the-world”) to constitute itself as a self-
consciousness. This in turn requires establishing that the structures of one’s 
consciousness considered emptily (i.e., reflexively and independently from actions 
intelligible to other people) do not suffice to account for self-consciousness. To do 
this, Sartre’s first step is establishing that considering, from an abstract 
perspective, the categorical character of the distinction between consciousness 
and world as implying that they are related externally leads to an aporia. This 
aporia is that of the relation of the for-itself to the in-itself. Sartre defines the two 
notions as follows: 
Being is opaque to itself because it is filled with itself. This can be better 
expressed by saying that being is what it is. *…+ We shall see that the being of for-
itself is defined, on the contrary, as being what it is not and not being what it is. 
*…+ Furthermore, it is necessary to oppose this formula – being in itself is what it 
is – to that which designates the being of consciousness. The latter in fact, as we 
shall see, has to be what it is. (BN, 21) 
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As underscored by Morris (2008, p. 61), the distinction between being-in-
itself and being-for-itself is adequate to dispensing with the view that 
consciousness should be reified (i.e., either understood as a thing or as a 
container). At this early stage of Being and Nothingness, Sartre confronts the 
views which imply the need for, and possibly the unavoidability of, such 
reification. As he puts it, “necessity concerns the connection between ideal 
propositions but not that of existents” (BN, 22). It is unclear that there is any need 
to suppose that there is no other option than to conceive consciousness on the 
model of a thing or a container. The aporia of the for-itself and the in-itself is 
construed by Sartre, but it amounts to considering an objection that can be raised 
from any view according to which categorical distinctions would necessarily imply 
restrictive limits or limitations (BN, 23): if “being” is split into two radically 
heterogeneous “regions” or “types”, the in-itself and the for-itself, how can they 
be said to belong to the general category of “being”? If these “regions” cannot 
interact with each other, how can we conceive them as de facto related? This 
question supposes that consciousness and the world are separated in an 
unbridgeable way. The heterogeneity of consciousness and that at which it is 
aimed seems to call into question the possibility of their internal relation. As we 
shall see, the feeling of unavoidability that Sartre questions at this early stage of 
Being and Nothingness stems from the unidimensional character of the approach 
at this point. Sartre does not explicitly mention here that what he calls human-
reality presents different modes of existence that he assumes to be equally 
fundamental: “the body – our body – has for its peculiar characteristic the fact 
that it is essentially that which is known by the Other. *…+ I discover with it for 
human reality another mode of existence as fundamental as being-for-itself and 
this I shall call being-for others” (BN, 241). 
Taking into account Sartre’s belief in the availability of different modes of 
existence for human reality matters when reading Being and Nothingness as a 
whole. In his introduction to an earlier edition of the book, Barnes (1992, pp. 
xlviii-xlix) suggests that: 
The body serves as a necessary link by which Sartre sets up a cogito of the Other's 
existence. We saw that in "La Transcendence de l'Ego" Sartre believed that by 
making the Ego a part of the psychic and hence an object in the world, he could 
refute solipsism. In Being and Nothingness he states that in the earlier article he 
had been too optimistic. *…+ As far as reasons and proof are concerned, Sartre is 
convinced that we can never prove the Other's existence. 
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Having referred to the chapter entitled “The Body as Being-For-Itself: 
Facticity”,22 Barnes considers the earlier part on the existence of others (where 
solipsism is considered) as implying that the body is a “necessary link” and that 
neglecting this would explain why a cogito of the existence of others is required in 
the first place. Nevertheless, such an approach leads to overlooking the order of 
Sartre’s approach and possibly misinterpreting both the role of the “slightly 
broadened cogito” in the book and Sartre’s criticism of his own earlier attempt to 
deal with solipsism. 
First, the necessary contingency of the existence of a single consciousness 
(its facticity) is established in the second part of Being and Nothingness in the 
section entitled “The Facticity of the For-itself” where Sartre confronts Descartes’ 
second “proof of existence God” (considered in the introduction) by pushing it to 
its limits: “To found its own being it would have to exist at a distance from itself, 
and that would imply a certain nihilation of the being founded as of the being 
which founds” (BN, 104). If I could be my own foundation, my becoming such 
would involve some negations: to have become a being which is how it conceives 
itself would presuppose that I would have previously not been my own 
foundation. Thus, “[e]very effort to conceive the idea of a being which would be 
the foundation of its being leads, despite itself, to form that of a being which, 
contingent as being-in-itself, would be the foundation of its own nothingness” 
(BN, 105). The fiction of self-production cannot establish the necessity of its 
author’s existence. Notably, this reasoning does not involve the concept of the 
body. I suggest that it also calls into question the very requirement of conceiving a 
link between consciousnesses and bodies. This conception is criticized in the 
section “The Body”, to which Barnes refers:  
Consciousness of body is comparable to the consciousness of the sign. *…+ The 
consciousness of the sign exists, for otherwise we should not be able to 
understand its meaning. But the sign is that which is surpassed towards meaning, 
that which is neglected [to the benefit of sense], that which is never apprehended 
for itself, that beyond which the look perpetually [directed towards]. 
Consciousness (of) the body is a lateral and retrospective consciousness of what 
consciousness is without having to be it. (Translation modified, BN, 354)  
                                                          
22 “I know my own body not as a piece of In-itself with which I am burdened but as Being-
for-itself. Thus to say that I have entered into the world, come to the world, or that there 
is a world, or that I have a body is one and the same thing" (BN, 318). 
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In short, as with than the sense of a written proposition, the body should 
not be reified as the object that a consciousness needs to pass through to 
eventually reach the world and others. Barnes’ reading faces the same difficulty as 
Catalano (Catalano, 2010, p. 35), who suggests that “embodiment should be 
conceived as a ‘primary bond of the body to the world’”. 
Barnes and Catalano make a similar move: in the absence of a counterpart 
– the body – which could not be not lacking, consciousness could not be 
acknowledged as what it is or needs to be. Nevertheless, if there is no such thing 
as an exclusive perspective, if disembodied standpoints are fictitious, then it may 
be that there is no need to provide insurance that counsciousnesses are 
embodied, for they could not be disembodied anyway. Sartre suggests sometimes 
that there is no such thing as a conceivable alternative in this respect anyway: 
“without facticity consciousness could choose its attachements to the world in the 
same way as the souls in Plato’s Republic choose their condition” (BN, 107). In this 
light, the central import of the reassessment of facticity in the third part could be 
to bring out that, for a phenomenological account, it matters that it is not only the 
existence of the for-itself but also the structure of the body which is contingent: 
“one could easily conceive of bodies which could not take any view on 
themselves; it even appears that this is the case for certain insects which, 
although provided with a differentiated nervous system and with sense organs, 
can not employ this system and these organs to know themselves” (BN, 381). 
Therefore, the concept of body does not play a central role in the “slightly 
broadened cogito” because the contingent character of the concrete perceptions 
of one’s body by an individual (BN, 381) can be understood as the counterpart of 
the abstract reduction of the body to a unique “immediate object” available to 
reflection, as Sartre suggests concerning Schopenhauer (BN, 255). Accounting for 
the fact that Sartre specifically considers the body after addressing the question 
of solipsism is not of secondary importance in understanding the project of Being 
and Nothingness as a whole.   
Briefly put, I suggest and will attempt to show that the “slightly 
broadened cogito” establishes that the certainty of the existence of others cannot 
conceivably depend on perception. If I know that someone exists when I perceive 
that person, it is unclear that there is any need to infer that it is uncertain that the 
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same person does not exist when I do not perceive her. It is rather in determinate 
circumstances that a doubt about the existence of others is relevant (e.g., in case 
we know that someone we know was at some place when some catastrophe 
happened). To perceive somebody is not required in order to know that this 
person existed. 
Second, Barnes formulates the above quoted negative verdict that, as far 
as reasons and proof are concerned, Sartre is convinced that we can never prove 
existence of “the Other”, which would contrast with Sartre’s earlier “optimistic” 
attempt to refute solipsism. Barnes suggests that Sartre grants in Being and 
Nothingness that proof regarding the existence of others could be lacking and will 
be lacking. That is to say, not only that such proof would be conceivable, but also 
that it could not be provided, such that solipsism would be irrefutable (e.g., as 
Schopenhauer and Russell suggest). However, not only does Sartre explicitly spell 
out that such proof is not required, he also states that it is impossible, which 
seems to imply, in this case, that strictly speaking, it is inconceivable: that it 
cannot and need not be provided (BN, 273-274). As Morris suggests: 
Commentators exhibit the prejudice in favour of knowledge over certainty 
when they attempt to reconstruct Sartre’s enterprise in terms of a proof, 
and equally when they conclude that in fact he is not attempting to prove 
the existence of others, he is simply assuming it. (Morris, 2008, p. 50) 
If the reading I propose is correct, then Sartre does not suggest that he 
inferred the impossibility of refuting solipsism from the pseudo-failure of his 
refutation in the Transcendence. He rather suggests that the pseudo-need for 
refuting solipsism stems from the manner in which solutions to the so-called 
problem of the existence of other minds which rely on would-be proofs will 
reproduce the difficulty they are meant to solve. Providing an alternative is what I 
assume Sartre did at his time with “a slightly broadened cogito”, insofar as it is 
not, strictly speaking, a proof, and that its author explicitly presents it as such. 
I preserve the idiom of “mind” when commenting on Sartre due to a 
specificity of French language, which is the distinction between “autre” and 
“autrui”. “Autre” is straightforwardly translatable as “other”, but “autrui” does 
not have a straightforward translation in English. The closest is, I suggest, “an 
other mind” inasmuch as “autrui” has no plural in French and can be used as a 
generic term by which someone can claim something about anyone’s relations to 
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others while speaking about no one in particular. In French, it is not “autrui” but 
“autre” which would be used to speak about a determinate person, as in “the 
other said that the morning star is the evening star”. “Autre” does have a plural in 
French (autres), as in English (“others”). That “autrui” is used as a singular term in 
French generates some difficulties that Sartre attempts to confront by means of 
using capital letters on certain occasions, as in “if there is an other mind (Autrui) 
in general” (BN, 308). On the reading I propose, in such passages, Sartre is 
reflecting on the conditions of the intelligibility (rather than possibility) of our 
respective thoughts and relations. To this extent, it implies both discontinuities 
and continuities with respect to the philosophical tradition he confronts. Its 
central discontinuity is that Sartre criticizes the referential use of the idiom of 
“mind”, along with, as will be considered in section 2.2.3, that of “spirit”. If by 
“mind” or “spirit” one attempts to refer to one or several entities which would 
exist distinctly or in addition to “bodies”, then the so-called problem of the 
relation of mind with body would arise. However, if it is granted that bodiless 
minds (i.e., ghosts) belong to the register of fiction, it can be underscored that 
Sartre does not wish to account for the reality of other minds in the same sense. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as in virtue of human actions, entities as “bodiless minds” 
do exist as fictive ones, Sartre explicitly wants to account for them (cf. “‘Doing’ 
and ‘Having’: Possession”, BN, 596-620). In this sense, Sartre does not want to call 
into question the continuity of the intelligibility of human actions (e.g., his analysis 
of burial [BN, 597]). On this approach, someone can judge the explanations 
provided for given actions as irrelevant, yet accept that such actions have been 
done. Accordingly, the fact that some events happened is implied by the 
eventually incompatible explanations we can provide for them. I thus suggest that 
Sartre treats the question of the existence of other minds and the fictive existence 
of bodiless ones distinctly. In the tradition that Sartre criticizes there are passages 
where “mind”, “spirit” and even “consciousness” are treated as referential terms, 
as if designators of (real or non-abstract) entities, yet on the reading I propose 
Sartre does not call into question that this tradition was right in presupposing the 
existence of other minds about whom we think and have feelings, independently 
of their presence in our surroundings. Consequently, it is not only that not every 
conception of the mind-body distinction would fall under his criticisms, but also 
some conceptions of the consciousness-body distinction. Accounting for some 
distinction in this style matters if we wish to leave intact the intelligibility of some 
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situations, such as the one of someone affected by “locked-in syndrome”, which 
obviously is entirely distinct from solipsism. Rather than the idioms of “mind” and 
“spirit”, Sartre consider their use, inasmuch as they are clues to structural 
similarities belonging to distinct world-conceptions (Weltschauung), a question 
that will be studied in the first part of the fourth chapter of the present thesis. 
This connects to a second point, which regards the importance of the 
distinction between subject and object in Being and Nothingness. Descombes 
(Descombes, 2014, p. 138) recently formulated the following criticism: 
The opening mistake of the classical philosophies of the subject has precisely 
been to have assimilated the first person to the third one, taking the latter to be a 
subjective variant of the former, and to seek vainly to identify a subject, the me, 
of which the objective pronoun “me” would be the proper name. 
The classical approaches to which Descombes (2014, p. 74) refers (notably 
including those of Descartes and Schopenhauer) were mistaken in their attempts 
to locate “a third-person, a moment of objectification, within the first person”, 
inasmuch as it would be, on these approaches, necessary to grant that talking 
about oneself amounts to talking about an object that the speaker could identify. 
These approaches implicitly suggest or explicitly claim that “self-consciousness” 
should be understood as the identity of the object and the subject of a 
consciousness. One should first identify oneself as the object that contingently 
proves to be oneself; one could then, secondly, refer to oneself as such an object 
inasmuch as there could not be any other. Descombes suggests that Sartre’s early 
philosophy falls under the criticism that he addresses to the phenomenological 
school and has its roots in “the opening mistake” of the classical philosophies 
cited above. The criticism is the following: 
If there must be an alter ego for me as an ego, it is necessary that the egological 
relation to oneself carries within itself a relation of “alterity” which would make 
of me, in a sense, another me than me. This is the path which has been 
abundantly took by the phenomenological school. (Descombes, 2014, p. 186) 
Descombes could be right concerning both his diagnosis regarding the 
traditional conceptions of self-consciousness and the difficulties faced by some 
phenomenologists. However, it seems unclear that this criticism applies to 
Sartre’s early philosophy for three main reasons. As shown in section 1.2.2, Sartre 
first criticizes the classical conception of the subject-object distinction, and, 
second, he distinguishes between self-consciousness and consciousness of objects 
in a way which does not imply that the former needs to be assimilated to a 
68 
 
version of the later. Thirdly, Sartre explicitly calls into question the very need for 
the concept of alterity (BN, 638). As an alternative, I attempt to show in this thesis 
that Sartre already questions what Descombes calls “a moment of objectification” 
in Being and Nothingness. The reading I propose of the “slightly broadened 
cogito” attempts to show that Sartre’s criticism of the unavoidability of solipsism, 
as brought out by Morris (2008, p. 125), is achieved by the relativizing of the 
modality under which one can think or refer to someone else as to an object. That 
is to say, Sartre purports to show that to think to someone else to an object is one 
modality among others under which we can think of or refer to someone else. The 
example he provides when introducing the distinction between other-as-object 
and other-as-subject is that of the feelings of someone with respect to someone 
else23. That is to say, Sartre suggests that thinking of someone else as an object is 
internally related to feelings with respect to the person being thought about, 
which is not necessary and misleading if we consider objects in the empirical 
sense. If that is correct, Sartre makes some room between “objectivation” and 
“objectification”, by relativizing the modality under which one can think or refer 
to someone else.  
In this light, the aporia of the in-itself and the for-itself at which the 
introduction ends calls upon the feeling of unavoidable compliance that is the 
obverse of the assumption that consciousness and world are related externally, or 
that there could be an gap that only “philosophy of being” could bridge. However, 
if consciousness and world are in fact related, and if the abstract account seems 
to call into question the possibility of their relation, then this retrospectively 
establishes that the corresponding perspective was not necessary, and 
misleading. Sartre suggests that granting the synthetic character of the relation 
suffices to obtain a better perspective (BN, 27). If the terms of a synthetic relation 
are abstractly separated, the recovery of the relation that is analysed might seem 
impossible. From the perspective of a single concrete and conscious whole in its 
relation to the world (i.e., a “being-in-the-world”), both “consciousness” and 
“phenomena” exist abstractly. This solitary whole, which exists and of which 
“consciousness” and “phenomena” are “moments”, is nothing but “the man in the 
                                                          
23
 This distinction is studied in section 2.2.2. 
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world with this specific union of the man to the world that Heidegger calls ‘being-
in-the-world’” (BN, 28). 
To obtain a correct perspective, it thus suffices to invert the abstract 
approach by internalizing the relation of the human to the world: “the relation of 
the regions of being is a primitive burst which makes part of the structure of these 
beings themselves” (BN, 28). Any account of the human in its relation to the world 
should integrate its visibility. He appeals to a “naïve sight” (i.e., characterized by 
unreflexive trust with respect to what it is aimed at) in order to interrogate the 
human-in-the-world as a whole (ibid.). In this approach, it suffices to rely on sight 
to see a “being-in-the-world” (ibid.). If one’s aim is to account for the human in its 
relation to the world, then a human-in-the-world necessarily exists concretely as a 
self-standing whole that can be seen. 
In this manner, describing this whole opens the way to answering two 
internally related questions. The first concerns the identification of the synthetical 
relation of “being-in-the-world” (être-dans-le-monde): “which is the synthetical 
relation that we will name the being-in-the-world?” (ibid.). The second concerns 
the requirements of intelligibility that apply to our notions of “world” and 
“human”: “what must be man and world for this relation to be possible between 
them?” (ibid.). 
In order to account for the internal relation of the human with the world, 
Sartre proposes studying human attitudes. These could either be taken for 
“subjective affects”, the meaning of which would somehow only be accessible to 
the reflexion of one person, or as realities which could be objectively 
apprehended by several persons. On the condition that they are treated as 
realities, considering attitudes would suffice to account for the intelligibility of the 
relation of the human to the world and bring out the requirements which bear on 
their relation, since all human conduct involves the interplay of man and world. 
2.1.2. The Interrogative Attitude as a Leading Thread 
To address the issue raised by solipsism, Sartre’s first step was to show 
that granting that the categorical character of the distinction between 
consciousness and world implies that they are related externally, leads to an 
aporia. Sartre then proposes that reflexion on the intelligibility of attitudes is 
sufficient to resolve this aporia. The question which immediately arises from this 
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is whether there is one particular attitude or conduct whose analysis would 
enable such a resolution. 
For Sartre, the interrogative attitude or interrogative conduct is an 
adequate “leading thread” (Fil conducteur) to pursue the research (BN, 28), 
insofar as it can be endorsed either voluntarily or unreflexively. To his readers, 
Sartre suggests that they have already endorsed it while reading and posing the 
question: “Is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man with 
world?” (BN, 28). First, this conduct presupposes reflexivity, in that it implies 
posing a question to oneself. Second, the objectivity of the question does not 
depend on the identity of the questioner (BN, 28). Third, this question is not 
reducible to the “objective set of the words drawn on the sheet” (BN, 28), as one 
may reflexively question the interrogative conduct by asking “what does this 
attitude reveal to us?” (ibid.). Sartre rejects the idea that the “primitive” relation 
of the questioner with that which is independent from him, or the in-itself (être-
en-soi), could be one of interrogation. Questions cannot be taken as indicative of 
a relation beyond which it would be impossible to regress, for linguistic 
interrogation – a question – supposes that one’s relation to the world holds. This 
means that the existence of that which is interrogated cannot conceivably be 
itself called into question, for the very intelligibility of interrogation involves that 
one stands before that – “the being” – which one interrogates. 
The manner in which an interrogation bears on that which is interrogated 
cannot conceivably be dependent on the questioner alone. Were that the case, 
the answer could be given by the questioner irrespective of anything else. To 
interrogate a “being” thus presupposes that the interrogation concerns either a 
“being” or its ways of being. On the basis of a “preinterrogative familiarity with 
being” (i.e., one’s relatedness to a being that precedes one’s interrogation), one 
can pose various questions: “how is …?”, “is there …?”, “what is …?”, etc. Sartre 
does not specify either a list or a hierarchy of questions. The upshot of his 
approach is to clarify that to question a “being” can only abstractly be detached 
from one’s expectations with respect to the “being” that one questions. 
Questions posed rhetorically or to test someone’s knowledge hardly count as 
counterexamples, for answers to such questions are not meant to inform the 
questioner of anything new. Posing such questions instead aims to satisfy other 
expectations (e.g., suggesting, provoking or testing). Questions may thus be 
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understood as a variety of expectation. Although not every expectation can be 
equated with a question, every question involves an expectation. To interrogate a 
“being” by means of a question amounts to expecting an answer from that 
“being” in a way that does not solely depend on the questioner. 
Sartre thus characterizes a question as the expectation of the “unveiling” 
of a “being” or a “way of being” against the background of a preinterrogative 
familiarity with being. Sartre’s use of the idiom “unveiling” can be read as 
indicating that someone posing a question often intends to dispel a concern (i.e., 
the obverse of a given expectation). A determinate “veiling” can be understood as 
a situation of relative ignorance. In some cases, obtaining the answer to my 
question is what I need, as long as the expectation it presupposes can be satisfied. 
For example, if I need food, I could express to someone else that I want to know if 
a box contains food by asking “is there some food in this box?” Obviously, unless 
that person knows whether there is any food in the box, I would have to open the 
box to answer this question. 
According to this approach, the intelligibility of interrogation as a conduct 
requires that the answers provided by determinate “unveilings” to satisfy one’s 
expectations have two opposed modalities. As Sartre puts it, “the answer will 
either be a yes or a no” (BN, 29). This does not involve taking “yes” and “no” as 
the only possible answers to questions. Sartre rather provides a way to distinguish 
the symbol of a question from an affirmation or a negation. For, in the absence of 
a conceivable distinction between what Sartre characterizes as “two equally 
objective and contradictory possibilities”, everything would be as if the distinction 
between a question and its eventual answer was arbitrary. 
Conversely, it is inconceivable for a question not to admit an alternative 
between at least two contradictory and objective answers which could be given. 
These answers must be objective to count as answers to a question concerning a 
“being”, since they depend on its existence or modes of existence. And the 
answers must exclude or contradict each other, since they cannot simultaneously 
be correct answers to the same question. An indeterminate question, the answers 
to which could not conceivably be foreseen in advance, is not a question at all. 
Sartre affirms that it only appears as though some questions, including his 
earlier one (i.e., “what does this attitude reveal to us?”), do not admit a negative 
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answer. It is always possible to answer such questions with “nothing”, “nobody” 
or “never” (ibid.). Conceptions such as Bergson’s,24 according to which it is a mere 
illusion to grant that the word “nothing” has any meaning apart from satisfying 
practical utilitarian expectations, are misleading. On such an account, the idea 
that a determinate lack could be revealed by endorsing interrogative conduct is 
nothing but an illusion which arises from confusing the practical utility of a fiction 
with an alleged metaphysical truth. Sartre’s answer to any such conception is 
radical: “to call such a conduct a pure fiction, is to hide the negation without 
removing it” (ibid.). In other words, calling any conduct “a pure fiction” amounts 
to treating it as nothing but a fiction. However, getting rid of negation leads to 
rejecting the reality of the negative answer that can be obtained by endorsing the 
interrogative conduct. It is the interrogated “being” which unveils a true negation 
to the one that interrogates, not the opposite (ibid.). Whether, for example, there 
is food in a box that I think might contain some cannot conceivably result from a 
decision on my part. 
The permanent and objective possibility of a negative answer is a 
requisite for the intelligibility of interrogative conduct. This is presupposed, as we 
shall see, by ordinary deceptions. To grant this does not involve granting any 
restrictive limit (i.e., a limitation) with respect to knowledge. On the contrary, it 
amounts to suggesting that there is no such thing as a position of relative 
ignorance in which one may find oneself and that a priori could not be overcome. 
Accordingly, if one means one’s question (if the question that is posed is 
not, for example, rhetorical), then posing it involves being ignorant of its answer. 
Nevertheless, this ignorance does not involve finding oneself in “a state of 
indeterminacy”, but rather it means having put oneself in a state of “non-
determinacy” (non-détermination) (ibid.). Sartre calls this “the non-being of 
knowledge in man”. Being ignorant of the answer to a question, whatever it might 
be, means that the answer could be objectively negative in a way that does not 
depend on its being asked by someone, which Sartre calls “the possibility of non-
being in transcendent being”. Whoever poses a question would be ignorant of its 
answer. Finally, the questioner is not ignorant with respect to any specific answer. 
Rather, whatever the correct answer to the question, obtaining it would make a 
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 See Bergson’s “Le possible et le reel” (La Pensée et le Mouvant, 2013) for an overview of 
his approach on this point and L’évolution créatrice (2013, p. 22) for its exemplification. 
73 
 
difference with respect to that which is the case, for obtaining the correct answer 
introduces a limit: it can only falsely be denied by whoever obtained it. That one 
found a correct answer is the case if such an event happened, which thereby 
makes a difference. Sartre calls this “the non-being of limitation,” required by the 
conceivability of a true answer to a question: to answer a question correctly 
enables saying “this is thus and not otherwise” (ibid.). 
Sartre states that this “triple non-being” (i.e., the questioner’s ignorance 
of an answer, the objectivity of negative answers, and the limits introduced by 
true answers) belongs to the conditions of intelligibility of any interrogation, 
including “metaphysical” interrogation (BN, 29). His approach is inspired by, but 
also directed against, Heidegger.25 While Heidegger’s (1996, p. 143) contention is 
that “what is decisive is not to get out of the circle *of understanding+, but to get 
in it in the right way”, Sartre suggests that accounting for the intelligibility of 
interrogation is decisive (i.e., allows one to situate oneself), which requires the 
independence of answers from questioners. 
We have seen so far that, in order to solve the aporia of relying on a single 
categorical distinction between consciousness and world, accounting for the 
intelligibility of interrogative conduct can suffice to address the issue raised by 
solipsism. However, now that “metaphysical” interrogation is considered, does 
this mean that Sartre’s approach is incompatible with the intelligibility of ordinary 
situations? 
A first element of an answer to this is that, by the end of the section on 
interrogation, the question of the relation of human beings to that which exists 
independently from consciousness has not been answered. The upshot of the 
section is, on the contrary, to establish that reflexion on the interrogative attitude 
cannot conceivably suffice to answer such a question. If it could, then the issue 
raised by solipsism could not be confronted. Nevertheless, “non-being” now 
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 The section on “interrogation” is a critical rewriting of Heidegger’s (1996, pp. 4-5) 
approach to questioning. Sartre’s approach precludes: (i) the possibility of a hierarchy of 
questions which could precede every conceivable “questioning” (such that there is no 
such thing as a unique and fundamental question); (ii) that the questioner could be guided 
by that which is questioned (inasmuch as “questioning” is an activity exercised by 
someone); (iii) the containment of the “being” that is questioned within the one that is 
questioned (for the intelligibility of inquiry requires its independence from the 
questioner); (iv) the equation of “questioning” with the character of “a being” that 
questions (for, as an attitude, it can be endorsed by anyone). 
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seems to be a “component” of the real. Does Sartre then suggest that “non-
being” should be said “to be” in any sense? 
The answer cannot be positive, since Sartre suggests that, as an attitude, 
interrogation precedes judgement. Interrogation also precedes its linguistic 
expression: questions expressed linguistically involve the intelligibility of 
interrogation as a conduct, rather than the opposite. For example, if my car 
breaks down, I can visually interrogate its engine by looking (BN, 31). If I 
interrogate a mechanic concerning the engine of my car, the mechanic will in turn 
interrogate the parts of its engine. In any case, what is expected from the 
interrogation is not a judgment, but the unveiling of a being which will eventually 
provide a basis for judgment (BN, 32). However, insofar as I do expect the 
unveiling of a being, I am thereby prepared for the unveiling of non-being. For 
example, if I am inspecting the carburettor to determine whether it had a role in 
the breakdown of my car, I am prepared to grant that it may not have had a role 
(ibid.). “Non-being” thus designates the non-holding of a possibility contextually 
considered by someone: “non-being always appears in the limits of a human 
expectation” (BN, 31). 
So conceived, “non-being” amounts to that which is presupposed by a 
negative judgment which fixes an anterior discovery (BN, 33). For example, 
suppose that I am late to a meeting with Pierre in a café. Given that Pierre is very 
punctual, I ask myself: “Will Pierre have waited for me?” At the café, I realize that 
he is not there. Sartre claims that this absence is intuited. He grants that it might 
seem absurd to speak of intuiting an absence, but he emphasises that ordinary 
statements, such as “I immediately saw that he was not there”, can be considered 
as testifying to such intuitions. To account for it, he argues that “within 
perception, there is always a constitution of a form on a background” (BN, 34). 
This means that the distinction between form and background is relative to the 
direction of one’s attention and therefore reversible: relative to one’s expectation 
and attention, a form in the foreground may coalesce with forms in the 
background that are not differentiated; conversely, that which is not 
differentiated in the background could be differentiated as a form in the 
foreground. 
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Sartre uses this distinction to establish the objectivity of negative facts.26 
If the judgment that “Pierre is not in this café” can be grounded at all, if it conveys 
any relevant truth, it must differ from ones like “Wellington is not in this café, 
neither is Paul Valéry”, etc. Thus, the intuition of absence requires its relative 
independence from the one who notices it. As such, anyone who expected to see 
Pierre in that café could have noticed his absence. Sartre’s account implies two 
“nihilations”: the two internal ontological negations involved in unveiling a 
situation to someone. 
The first nihilation is the obverse of the unveiling of a situation to 
someone. Given a determinate expectation (e.g., seeing Pierre), anything that 
could be contextually differentiated belongs to the background, which is not seen 
as a differentiated object. Rather, it is “the object of a purely marginal attention” 
(BN, 34). If they do not satisfy my expectation, forms are momentarily 
differentiated before they merge back to the undifferentiated background.  
To say that none of the forms which can be differentiated in the 
background satisfy my expectation (e.g., if Pierre is not in the café), does not 
imply that I have discovered the absence of a form (e.g., the figure of Pierre) 
which could satisfy my expectation somewhere (e.g., in any part of the café). 
Rather, given a determinate background (e.g., the café), this form is absent 
everywhere (i.e., Pierre is absent from the whole café). The background as a 
whole remains without any satisfactory and differentiated form in the foreground. 
This is the second nihilation and the obverse of the unsatisfactory unveiling – with 
respect to my expectation – of all contextually available and potentially relevant 
forms. 
Sartre affirms that this double-nihilation is the basis for the judgment that 
“Pierre is not here” and for the distinction between internal and external 
negations. That one’s judgement can be true or false presupposes that one is 
evaluating an objective fact (here: Pierre is not in the café). The absence of Pierre, 
as a discovery that I made against the yardstick of my expectation to meet him in 
the café, implies my concrete relation to the situation. In other words, insofar as a 
relevant background is unveiled to me, I can judge that someone is not 
somewhere. Without such context, conceivable negations, such as “Wellington is 
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 As we shall see in the next chapter, Wittgenstein introduces a similar notion in the 
Tractatus. 
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not in this café”, are gratuitous, groundless and inefficient. As such, negative 
judgments are “conditioned and supported by non-being”, rather than the 
opposite (BN, 35). This is required for the intelligibility of ordinary deceptions, 
which retrospectively brings out why Sartre – unlike Kant – assumed that a 
“leading thread" had to be chosen. Thus, the outcome of the analysis of 
interrogative conduct is twofold. First, accounting for the intelligibility of the 
interrogative conduct suffices to render explicit the internal character of the 
relation between consciousness and world. Second, endorsing the interrogative 
conduct suffices to note whether the fact of the presence of a given individual in a 
place holds.  
2.1.3. The Issue of the “Mineness” of the World 
We have seen that dissolving the aporia of the for-itself and the in-itself 
requires accounting for the intelligibility of one’s ability to situate oneself in the 
world by endorsing interrogative conduct. Nevertheless, to address the issue 
raised by solipsism, it is necessary to establish that reflexive consideration of the 
immediate structures of consciousness (their “empty consideration”) is not 
sufficient to account for the intelligibility of self-consciousness. In order to do so, I 
will now turn to Sartre’s analysis of the immediate structures of consciousness. 
Here, Sartre turns from reflexive description of the being-in-the-world to 
ontological description of the “instantaneous nucleus” of such a being’s 
consciousness (BN, 94). He first isolates the empty unity of immediate (and pre-
reflexive) structures of consciousness as “presence to self”, which is an ontological 
ground of consciousness. As considered in part 1.2.2., Sartre criticizes approaches 
according to which “plenitude of existence” is the aim of philosophy. To criticize 
the “quest for being” that is the obverse of such approaches, he suggests that 
“the law of being of the for-itself, *…+ is to be oneself under the form of a 
presence to self” (translation modified, BN, 101). On the conceptions criticized by 
Sartre, it would suffice to assume that reflexion involves “presence to a self” or 
being “present to oneself”. The (reflexive) “principle of identity”, formulated as “A 
is A” (BN, 98), would then immediately suffice to account for self-consciousness. 
That which Sartre calls the “instantaneous nucleus” of consciousness is 
constituted by a contingent presence aimed at value or “self” (BN, 117) whose 
absence constitutes it as a possible. This “nucleus” is not the exclusive property of 
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a consciousness. Is it thereby incompatible with the singularity of a 
consciousness? The intelligibility of the possibility that consciousness 
constitutively lacks seems to lead to a disjunction of the relation of the for-itself 
with the world. If, in one sense, nothing separates one’s “presence to self” from a 
projected “presence to self”, in another sense it is the world as the totality of 
being which separates the present from the projected “presence to self” (BN, 125-
126). To itself, the isolated “nucleus” seems to be its own obstacle, as if the public 
character of the structure of consciousness could forbid its individuality. 
Sartre then defines anew the relation of the for-itself with the possible as 
“the circuit of ipseity” and the totality of being, inasmuch as it is traversed by the 
circuit of ipseity as “world” (BN, 126). He reapplies the procedure of inversion by 
which the aporia of the introduction was solved by, this time, internalizing the 
internal relation of the for-itself with the possibility that it constitutively lacks. 
This is because the relation of the for-itself to the possible (i.e., to a situated space 
of possibilities) is not external. There is no such thing as a possible without a for-
itself, nor a for-itself without a possible: “the possible is [that which is lacked] by 
the for-itself in order to be itself” (translation modified, BN, 126). 
By developing the central conclusion of The Transcendence of the Ego, 
Sartre here suggests that the individuality of consciousness precludes it being a 
result of one’s possession of an Ego (BN, 127). As a pole which unifies experiences 
(Erlebnisse), the Ego coincides with itself. However, this coincidence of the Ego 
with itself is not compatible with the necessity that consciousness cannot coincide 
with itself. It is also incompatible with “the mode of being of the ‘I’”, for “the 
consciousness I have of the “I” never exhausts it” (BN, 127). The “I” is given to 
consciousness as “having been there before consciousness – and at the same time 
possessing depths which have to be revealed gradually” (BN, 127). If, in spite of 
everything, consciousness is conceived as a “pure reference to the Ego as to its 
self”, it means that the being of the for-itself is confused with its hypostasis, 
supposedly in order to avoid the risk that the for-itself could be pure “impersonal” 
contemplation. 
But neither the Ego nor the self is required as a possession in order to 
account for the individuation of consciousness. The strict contingency of an 
existence can be distinguished from the contingent necessity of its abstract 
ontological grounding, the “presence to self”. Concretely, it is not whatever 
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positional consciousness of the world that is pre-reflexively nihilated by whatever 
“reflexive” consciousness. Abstractly, the “presence to self” results from the 
internal ontological negation of a determinate positional consciousness of the 
world. Furthermore, the self does not “inhabit” consciousness, as it is necessarily 
lacked by the for-itself (i.e., the ideal or limit which is always absent from it). 
Finally, the very constitution of an Ego as the sign of a personality would be 
rendered unintelligible, for if it always coincided with itself, it could not be 
constituted at all. 
Sartre then distinguishes between two aspects of the concept of person: 
the pure presence to oneself of the “pre-reflexive cogito”, which is the immediate 
grasp of the existent by itself; and ipseity, or the mediate grasp of the existent by 
itself through the world. The person can then be conceived as a “free relation to 
itself”: a non-constraining relation between a (present) “presence to self” and a 
“presence to self” projected in order to coincide with itself. This relationship 
characterizes a person as much when it is assumed as when it is avoided. This is 
the sense in which ipseity is circular: the trajectory of consciousness is fixed in 
advance because, whether or not it attempts to coincide with itself, projecting 
this or that presence to oneself characterizes it solely for itself. 
To internalize the relation of the possible with consciousness requires 
determining anew the concept of world, previously defined as the totality of 
beings as traversed by the circuit of ipseity (BN, 126). The concept of world is 
characterized anew as the totality of beings insofar as they exist inside the circuit 
of ipseity (BN, 128). In reflexion, the presence to oneself in the world appears to 
be the circuit within which the world is revealed. As the necessary obstacle 
between a determinate “presence to self” and a projected one, the world is 
“mine”: “without the world, no ipseity, no person; without ipseity, without the 
person, no world” (translation modified, BN, 128). 
Sartre is notably discreet concerning what he calls “the me” in a section 
titled “The me and the circuit of ipseity” (Le moi et le circuit de l’ipséité). He only 
writes: “of the I *…+ we will say that it is the ‘me’ of consciousness, but not that 
one is its own self” (BN, 127). However, if admitting that the world is mine seems 
to exclude the possibility that consciousness can belong to no one, it now seems 
impossible to encounter anyone else in the world. The “mineness” (moiïté) of the 
world, which is never posed in unreflexive consciousness of the world, belongs to 
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the structure of the for-itself (ibid.). If the totality of beings is the circuit through 
which I discover myself, then outside of this circuit there is no one to encounter, 
for it would be paradoxical that there could be several structures if a single one 
suffices to realize oneself. To grant this would involve there being a concrete 
totality which does not belong to the totality of beings, inasmuch as the totality of 
beings is that which can “discover itself” through the circuit of ipseity. This would 
entail that the totality of beings is not a totality. The price to pay in order to 
demonstrate the public character of the structure of the human in relation to 
world seems to be that the human cannot conceivably admit a public. 
This tension is central to Sartre’s approach to the issue of solipsism in the 
third part of Being and Nothingness. Nevertheless, at this stage in the book, one 
can question whether the internalization of temporality or transcendence to the 
reflexive approach to the immediate (or unladen) structures of consciousness 
could suffice to account for self-consciousness. To establish that this cannot be 
the case is thus required. 
Sartre first considers temporality. Accounting for temporality is required, 
for as a “rejection of contingency”, or as “grounding its own nothingness”, solitary 
consciousness (“for-itself”) lasts (BN, 172). The very distinction between a present 
and projected “presence to self” requires temporality. Nevertheless, such a 
distinction does not mean that the internal ontological negation (“the nihilation”) 
of an isolated consciousness is achieved (that it is “a given”) (BN, 172). This would 
mean that a solitary consciousness could not fail to accomplish itself through the 
flight that is its non-thetic obverse. As such, if anything is demonstrated by 
considering temporality, it is that the temporalizing of consciousness is never 
achieved:  
The time of consciousness, it is human reality which temporalizes itself 
as a totality which is to itself its own incompleteness, it is nothingness 
slipping itself within a totality as a detotalizing ferment. (ibid.) 
Reflexion on psychic temporality at best provides an a priori “description” 
of the Ego (BN, 184). Attempting to resolve the tension involved in the 
“mineness” of the world by means of reflexive consciousness amounts to an 
attempt to think about oneself on the basis of one’s “shadow” (BN, 193). This is 
not to say that one’s “psychic world” cannot be real, for reflexion can provide that 
which Sartre calls “mobiles” for action (“mobiles” are similar to “motives” except 
that their significance is assumed at this stage to be intelligible only via “reflexive” 
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consciousness [BN, 458-460]). As an example, Sartre underlines that someone 
could affirm that one will not meet with someone “because” of one’s antipathy 
towards that person. To select a reflexive “mobile” which has its source in one’s 
psychic world in an attempt to avoid a lack of justification is possible. However, 
Sartre emphasizes that considering one’s reflexive “mobiles” thetically does not 
allow one to consciously consider one’s situation with respect to others: “the for-
itself sees itself almost as bestowing an outside on its own eyes, but this outside is 
purely virtual” (BN, 193). 
Thus, like reflexion on temporality, reflexion on transcendence does not 
solve the tension raised by the “mineness” of the world. Sartre returns to the 
initial problem (BN, 194) of the original relation of human reality to what he calls 
the “being of phenomena” or “being-in-itself” (BN, 28). He suggests that his 
earlier insight – “the profound meaning of the for-itself as the foundation of its 
own nothingness” (BN, 195) – can account for the internal relation between 
knowledge and being. Thus, knowledge can be understood as a type of internal 
relation between “the for-itself” and “the in-itself” which neither creates nor adds 
anything to being (i.e., which cannot transform anything that exists) (BN, 197). We 
saw that Sartre sided with Husserl’s approach to intentionality (“every 
consciousness is consciousness of something”). Sartre suggests that to account for 
the determinacy of the negation between someone and something (i.e., things 
that one can point to and know about) is sufficient to account for the intelligibility 
of knowledge of things: 
The thing, before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is 
present to consciousness as not being consciousness. The original 
relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is negative. (BN, 
197) 
One’s situated presence to something that one knows about presupposes 
that one’s epistemic relation to that thing can be reflexively considered in two 
senses. On the one hand, if one has any knowledge about that which is unveiled 
to one on a given occasion, this could mean that this knowledge depends on 
oneself to the exclusion of someone else (which would involve renouncing the 
intelligibility of knowledge). Any consciousness can learn as every other about 
some given thing. On the other hand, it is to someone that something is unveiled, 
and the determinate unveiling of something to someone thus depends on the 
presence of someone to something. Sartre suggests that accounting for the 
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determinacy of the internal relation between a consciousness and that which is 
unveiled to it when present to some given thing suffices to solve this tension. 
Sartre’s central insight is that knowing something is to realize in the twofold sense 
of “making” (e.g., when one acts to realize a project) and “gaining consciousness 
of” (e.g., when one realizes the extent of a catastrophe): “the real is realization” 
(BN, 203). Sartre calls “transcendence” the determinate internal negation, 
defining it as “that internal and realizing negation which reveals the in-itself while 
determining the being of the for-itself” (BN, 203). By non-thetically negating one’s 
immediate “presence to self” in order to answer a question that one poses to 
oneself about a thing, a consciousness can realize whatever it is that one can 
know about that thing. 
The relation of “the for-itself” and “being” may thus be interrogated 
afresh. Asking to “which” being the for-itself is “present” is misleading, for the 
intelligibility of one’s question requires that it is posed in a world (BN, 203). It is 
against the background of a given presence to being that a solitary consciousness 
can focus on this or that being. Nevertheless, this does not involve a solitary 
consciousness that is present to “all being” because the realization that beings 
belong to a whole involves the (totalizing) activity of someone: 
A totality indeed supposes an internal relation of being between the 
terms of a quasi-multiplicity in the same way that a multiplicity supposes 
– in order to be that multiplicity – an inner totalizing relation among its 
elements. In this sense, addition itself is a synthetic act. (BN, 203) 
The result of the analysis of temporality is that the for-itself constitutes 
itself as “detotalized totality” (BN, 172, 187). The detotalized character of this 
totality precludes that to be for-itself, a consciousness needs the whole of being in 
order to realize its presence to all being (BN, 203). To linguistically point to 
anything by means of “this” involves the world – “the internal ontological relation 
of thises” – as the concrete basis for each singular perception. It is thus internal to 
the world as the complete whole of being that is unveiled through particular 
things to a solitary consciousness. 
However, one’s realization that beings belong to a whole is the obverse of 
the manner in which a solitary consciousness conceives its presence to beings and 
according to which one “has to be *…+ one’s own totality as a detotalized totality” 
(translation modified, BN, 204). Being stands before a solitary consciousness as all 
that it is not: “original negation, indeed is radical negation” (BN, 204). 
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Nevertheless, this totalizing by the for-itself, by which the world is unveiled as its 
“own whole”, does not modify being any more than counting objects modifies 
what they are. All that it unveils is the manner in which “there is some being” that 
seems to escape the reach of a solitary consciousness while determining that 
consciousness in one’s being (ibid.). In this passage, Sartre criticizes Heidegger’s 
conception of “the nothing”. Although he grants that “knowledge is the world”, 
he nevertheless rejects that “the nothing” can be conceived as an “environment” 
amidst which human reality could emerge (or as the empty region into which the 
world would “hang” or “be suspended”) (ibid.).27 In order to do this, Sartre 
distinguishes “nothingness” from “the nothing”. Nothingness “frames” and 
“supports” the world while it is apprehended as a whole. The singular nothingness 
of a solitary consciousness is what determines the whole as such by leaving “the 
absolute nothing outside of the whole”. Yet the totalizing of being by a solitary 
consciousness does not add anything which could enable its grasp to exceed that 
to which the solitary consciousness is present in a situation. Sartre thus suggests 
that the apprehension of nothingness as a limit of being is the obverse of human 
reality when dealing with nothing (en commerce avec le rien). As considered 
earlier, neither nothingness nor limits can be said “to be” in any sense. This points 
to an additional aspect of the for-itself: the for-itself is not limited by “the 
nothing”, it is limited by nothing. 
Thus, on Sartre’s approach, the internalization of temporality or 
transcendence within the reflexive approach to the immediate (or unladen) 
structures of consciousness cannot suffice to account for self-consciousness. 
2.2. The Aporia of the Relation of my Consciousness to that of the 
Other 
In this section, I argue that on Sartre’s approach, except in some  
determinate circumstances (e.g., while writing fiction), linguistically calling the 
existence of others into question amounts to denying the existence of others. The 
                                                          
27
 Sartre’s criticism of Heidegger is close to that of Wittgenstein: “anyone who speaks of 
the opposition of being and the nothing, and of the nothing as something primary in 
contrast to negation, has in mind, I think, a picture of an island of being which is being 
washed by an infinite ocean of the nothing” (Wittgenstein & Friedrich Waismann, 2003, p. 
71). 
83 
 
existence of others cannot and does not require proof. On the contrary, proving 
the existence of others is inconceivable. Once the theoretical problem of the 
existence of others is resolved, there remains only a “sort of de facto solipsism”: 
that is to say, an attitude of indifference with respect to others, as a counterpart 
of the pre-reflexive attempt to appropriate the freedom of others. 
I first argue in section 2.2.1 that the theoretical problem of the existence 
of others can be resolved if its resolution is not assimilated to proving the 
existence of others. Instead, it suffices to start from contingent or factual 
necessity, to distinguish others from objects, and to account for the internal 
character of the relation between others and oneself considered in the objective 
mode (as “me”). In section 2.2.2., I argue that the “Cogito a little expanded” 
proposed by Sartre is a conceptual means to render explicit the indubitability of 
the existence of others. Then, in section 2.2.3., I argue that attempting to take a 
point of view on the unique whole where are extensionally located internally 
related consciousnesses is senseless. To this extent, it is misleading to suppose 
that a point of view on the whole can or cannot be taken. In section 2.2.4., I argue 
that once the theoretical problem of the existence of others is resolved, there 
remains only a “sort of de facto solipsism”, consisting of the appropriation of an 
attitude of indifference. As a concretely but unreflexively endorsed attitude, it is 
nobody’s attitude. Finally, in section 2.2.5., I argue that the gesture that is 
characteristic of the linguistic expression of solipsism is the pretence to draw a 
restrictive limit to our thoughts. 
2.2.1. The Conditions for a Theory of the Existence of Others 
At the end of the first two parts of Being and Nothingness, everything is as 
if the possibility that there could be several persons and a unique world would 
depend on a condition: to account for the unicity of the structure of 
consciousness involves certainty of the existence of a single detotalized totality. 
But if there is only one structure of this type, then there can be only one world 
which would belong to the only person there would be. This makes it seem as 
though the existence of other persons could not really be admitted without 
having to renounce to the unicity of the structure of consciousness. 
The second step of Sartre’s approach is to show that this tension stems 
from the assumption that a single categorical distinction between one’s 
84 
 
consciousness and the consciousnesses of others suffices to account for the 
intelligibility of self-consciousness. Indeed, according to criticized approaches, 
one’s consciousness would be related to that of others only externally. However, 
this assumption has for counterpart to render mysterious the intelligibility of 
some experiences. The consideration of this difficulty opens the third part of 
Being and Nothingness. 
At this point, Sartre draws the reader’s attention to consciousnesses 
whose intelligibility requires acknowledging existence of others by considering the 
example of shame (BN, 245). Someone else (Autrui) appears to one on some 
occasions as an indispensable mediator between “I” and “myself”: it would be 
impossible for me to be conscious of my shame (moi honteux) without 
acknowledging it before someone else. On such occasions, I am ashamed because 
I acknowledge how I appear to someone else. Sartre here rejects the idea that 
shame has a primarily reflexive origin: it is by nature acknowledgement, that is to 
say, it comprises the immediate resumption of consciousness on a given occasion 
when I am such as I appear to someone else in a way which affects me. The 
recognition of the meaning of one’s past action on such occasions (that on 
reflexion I consider retrospectively) does not involve any model or table of 
correspondence. In reflexion, the intelligibility of vulgarity implies an 
“intermonadic relation” which implies that one is internally related to someone 
else (BN, 246). One’s feeling ashamed involves one’s feeling as such before 
another person. To account for the “nucleus” of an isolated consciousness, of its 
empty immediate structures, it previously seemed sufficient to account for the 
structure of consciousness. Now it appears that “I need *another mind+ to seize 
fully the structures of my being” (translation modified, BN, 247). 
Indeed, that the existence of others is implicitly involved in consciousness 
seems inconceivable inasmuch as the abstract problem of the existence of others 
or other minds is considered secondary in contrast with consciousness of the 
existence of the world. But if it can be established that, even from a theoretical 
perspective from which the generalized absence of others could allegedly be 
noted, it is absurd that others could lack, then, the theoretical difficulty posed by 
solipsism will be solved. 
In order to dispel any abstractly conceivable doubt with respect to the 
existence of others, Sartre specifies four conditions as necessary and sufficient for 
any adequate theory of the existence of others: 
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1. A theory of the existence of others should not propose a new 
proof of the existence of others or a better argument against 
solipsism (BN, 273-274). If one should reject solipsism, it is 
because it is impossible: “[no one] is truly solipsistic” (translation 
modified, BN, 274). Abstract doubt with respect to the existence 
of someone else should not be rejected (for, in given 
circumstances, it could be relevant). Furthermore, that such 
doubt is conceivable constitutes the difference between that 
which is fictive in solipsism from that which is not: “In short, [the 
existence of another mind] can not be a probability” (translation 
modified, BN, 274). Sartre characterizes a probability as a 
possibility whose eventual truth presupposes having obtained 
means for confirmation. His example is that of life on Mars. In 
absence of means to verify such a hypothesis, it is nothing but a 
conjecture. By contrast, the existence of someone else cannot be 
a probable hypothesis. There is no such thing as an instrument 
which could reveal new facts that would induce me to affirm or 
reject it (BN, 275). To dispel the doubt with respect to the 
existence of someone else requires a cogito: that is, a conceptual 
means for interrogating oneself in order to explicate the 
grounding of the certainty regarding the existence of others or 
other minds. 
2. It is necessary to start from the Cartesian cogito: that is to say, 
from factual, contingent necessity (BN, 274). It is an indubitable 
fact that I cannot doubt that I exist, although I can write, without 
being able to think it, that “I doubt my own existence”. Similarly, 
someone else’s existence should be discovered through the 
concrete and indubitable presence of a concrete other. Therefore, 
it is not a “thinking substance”, but the “for-itself”, an interiority 
without substance, that is to be re-examined. 
3. That which the cogito must reveal is not someone else as an 
object (objet-autrui) (BN, 275). To think of someone else as 
primarily an object is to reduce their existence to a probability. 
But the probable existence of an object does not commit one to 
anything more than the congruency, the agreement or 
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convenience, of our representations. Yet, someone else is not a 
representation, a system of representations, or the necessary 
unity of our representations. Someone else is not primarily an 
object. Accordingly, the existence of someone else should not 
only concern us as a constitutive factor of our knowledge of the 
world and ourselves; it must also be able to concretely “interest” 
us. Sartre here draws attention to two senses of “interest”. On 
the one hand, an interest can be felt by someone standing before 
something else (as before a work of art, in which case one’s 
attention would be drawn to the object of interest). On the other 
hand, an interest can also compromise someone (as in business, 
where one’s interests would refer to one’s commitments). 
4. Finally, “[another mind] must appear to the cogito as not being 
me” (translation modified, BN, 276). Sartre’s aim is to address 
what Descartes attempted with the “proof through the idea of 
perfection”. To do so, he distinguishes two ways to conceive the 
negation between me and someone else: as an external negation, 
separating one substance from another; or as an internal 
negation, a “synthetic and active connection of two terms, each 
one of which constitutes itself by denying that it is the other” (BN, 
276). It needs to be shown that it is inconceivable that the 
negation between me and someone else could be external. To 
suppose the contrary would amount to renouncing the intuitive 
character of this negation and thereby the certainty it can provide 
(BN, 195). 
These are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an adequate theory 
of the existence of others that would dispel any abstractly conceivable doubt with 
respect to the existence of others. We thus may turn to the theory of the 
existence of others proposed by Sartre, explored in the section of Being and 
Nothingness entitled “The look”. 
2.2.2. A “Cogito a Little Expanded” 
As mentioned in the first chapter (part 1.1.1.), Sartre criticizes the 
approaches of both Watson and Husserl: Watson, insofar as there could be no 
87 
 
such thing as a seeing someone, only a behaving organism, from the behaviourist 
“platform”; Husserl because, although seeing someone would be conceivable, 
others’ existence could fall under “phenomenological reduction”. 
To point out the common blind spot of these doctrines, Sartre starts from 
a situation compatible with the world-seen-under-reduction as conceived by 
methodological solipsism. He grants that it is possible to see someone else as an 
object: “at least one the modalities of the presence of someone else to me is 
objectness (objectité)” (BN, 276). Imagine that one is in a park and observes 
someone reading. I see a “reading-man” as a particular object (BN, 278). This man 
looks at me. It is then undeniable that someone else sees me and that he sees a 
being which is not solely an object: “someone else would not look at me as he 
looks at the lawn” (translation modified, BN, 279). If I can see someone else as an 
object, I can be seen as an object by someone else: the one who sees can be seen. 
The relation “being-seen-by-someone-else” is, to this extent, an irreducible and 
necessary fact. It designates a concrete and everyday relation coinciding with the 
original relation of myself to someone else. Someone else is in principle “the one 
who looks at me” (BN, 280). 
This does not suggest that the look is somehow “attached” to a 
determinate place in perceptual field (ibid.). One can try to avoid being seen by 
others without knowing determinately from where one could be seen, as during a 
military operation. Conversely, one may fail to be touched by a look, as when I 
look at the eyes of someone else. Sartre puts into relief a notable disjunction 
between one’s perception of the world and one’s awareness that one is seen: 
either I perceive the world (i.e., the eyes of someone else, which then appear to 
one as “mere presentations” or “put-off-circuit”) or I am conscious of being 
looked at. Similarly, either I look at the eyes of someone else or I look at someone 
else. Conversely, to realize that a look is directed towards me is not to apprehend 
mediately an object in the world but to realize immediately that I am being looked 
at by someone. It is not the coincidence of someone within a locality which 
explains the meaning of “the look”: “what I immediately know when I hear 
branches cracking behind me, is not that there is someone, it is that I am 
vulnerable” (BN, 282). On such occasions, I realize that I am immediately present 
to someone who may reach me and eventually hurt me. 
Underlining the factual necessity of “being-seen-by-the-someone-else” 
does not suffice to establish that the reduction of the existence of someone else 
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to a probability is a fiction. What is further required is to show that the certainty 
of someone else’s existence is indubitable, and that their relation to me is 
internal. Analysing the example of the peeper will satisfy these conditions (BN, 
284). This involves imagining a situation where it is undeniable that I am the 
conscious author of my acts: “imagine that I came to, by jealousy, interest, vice, to 
put my ear against a door, to look through the whole of a lock” (ibid.). Sartre here 
uses the results of the second part of the examination of the immediate 
structures of consciousness. On such an occasion, I am not thetically conscious of 
myself: nothing troubles my consciousness due to the nihilation of my ipseity 
while I am peeping. Sartre then considers what happens when the non-thetical 
nihilation of my ipseity is interrupted by someone: “But all of a sudden I hear 
footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean?” (BN, 285). 
By comparison with the examination of consciousness in solitude, 
according to which the “me” can occupy only reflexive consciousness, one’s 
objective apprehension of oneself now haunts unreflexive consciousness. In other 
terms, Sartre now underscores that one can gain consciousness of the fact of the 
unreflexive character of one’s action, even if one’s action was not reflexively 
posited as such beforehand. Far from being conscious of “me” as an object for 
myself, I am conscious of “me” as an object for someone else. The connection of 
my pre-reflexive consciousness to my seen-Ego is not reducible to a relation of 
knowledge, but characterizes a being: “I am, beyond any knowledge that I can 
have, [that ‘me’] that [another mind] knows” (translation modified, BN, 285). 
Moreover, my Ego is not an object for me which could become unattainable (BN, 
284). Rather, reaching it is excluded in principle, in the present but also in the 
future: “I apprehend it as not being for me and since on principle it exists for the 
other” (ibid.). It will never “belong” to me, since it is not my property. It is not a 
“bad portrait” (BN, 246) or a “strange image” (BN, 284) that someone else could 
have done of me. Discovered in shame (or pride), the Ego is present to one “as a 
me that I am without knowing it” (translation mine, BN, 285). 
Shame may thus be understood as recognition. To feel ashamed on some 
occasion is the tacit recognition that I was as someone else saw me (BN, 246; 284). 
Thus, “[m]y shame is [an avowal]” (translation modified, BN, 287): on reflexion, if I 
do not acknowledge that I was as someone else saw me, I commit myself to 
denying that to which the feeling of shame testifies (which is determined 
circumstantially). Whether this avowal is expressed or not is independent of this 
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testimony. That it is possible to attempt to mask one’s shame by bad faith counts 
as an additional testimony to my implicit acknowledgement. The way in which 
someone else is given to my consciousness is not that of objectness (i.e., the 
modality of consciousness of an object). That I catch the look of someone else 
excludes that I do so as an object. Like me, someone else is in the world in one’s 
singular relation to it: the world of someone else is similar to mine. These worlds 
cannot communicate in the sense that realizing that someone else sees me in the 
world is to realize that someone sees me in the exact way in which I cannot see 
myself. The way that someone else sees me “escapes” me in the sense that, under 
reduction, it seems that there could be no such thing as a decision which could be 
taken with respect to how I relate to someone else. 
Thus, it is not initially in the mode of objectness that I see someone else, 
since they are for me the being for whom I am an object. Someone else is the 
being through which I acquire my “object-ness” and allows me to realize that I can 
be seen as an object (BN, 284). The counterpart of one’s acknowledgment of 
being seen by someone else as an object is the alienation of one’s world (i.e., 
given such acknowledgment, the world which is structurally mine ceases to be so). 
This does not mean that someone else determines me in all respects, but that he 
reveals to me the limits of my freedom (BN, 285). This implies that I can learn of 
my possibilities from the outside, as when someone forbids me to move by 
threatening me with a weapon (BN, 287). My possibilities can, accordingly, “subtly 
die”. It is not that my possibilities could prove not to be possibilities any longer, 
but that I implicitly acknowledge that any act committed against someone else 
may in principle be used by someone else as an instrument against me, such that 
not all possibilities are equally relevant (BN, 288). Parallel to this case, in the 
world-seen-under-reduction, I acknowledge that, outside of myself, my possibility 
of acting in such and such a way is nothing but a probability. 
The intelligibility of subjective reactions, such as shame (BN, 246; 284-
286), fear (BN, 286-287) and the “recognition of my slavery” understood as the 
feeling of being alienated from all of one’s possibilities (BN, 291-292), thus 
requires one’s implicit acknowledgement of the existence of someone else. The 
modification felt when someone else interrupts me is not merely epistemic (BN, 
292). Sartre describes this as the entrance of a consciousness in a new dimension 
of existence, which is non-revealed, on the occasion of a “solidification” and 
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“stratification” of itself. Via reflexion on one’s relation to oneself at the occasion 
of being seen, one’s consciousness discovers that it is engaged with itself in a 
relationship in which it constitutes two terms: on the one hand, one’s “me” (moi) 
as a for-itself which cannot coincide with itself; on the other, one’s “me” that 
cannot be unveiled to it, which is beyond its range, its action, its knowledge (BN, 
292; 306). At this moment, a consciousness apprehends itself as petrified without 
knowing its identity or place. 
We thus see that the primary modality under which someone else is given 
to me upon my being seen is not objectness: that I see the look of someone else 
excludes that I can intuit someone else as an object. Far from being an “object” of 
my attention, in the world seen-under-reduction, I do not turn my attention to 
others. As someone else comes to me through an encounter, my attention could 
not have been intentionally directed towards someone to constitute or recognize 
them beforehand (BN, 293). That someone else’s presence to me is even more 
pressing when they catch me off guard is the best testimony of the independent 
existence of others. Yet, seen-under-reduction, someone else’s individual and 
concrete presence, when I intuit that someone’s look is directed at me, is “the 
destruction of all objectivity for me”. 
At this stage, someone else is present to me as another transcendence in 
the absence of any mediation (BN, 294). The world escapes me in an absolute 
manner when I realize that I am seen by someone else: 
[Another mind] (autrui) is first the being for whom I am an object, that 
is, the being through whom I gain my object-ness. If I am able to 
conceive of even one of my properties in the objective mode, then 
[another mind] is already given. (Translation modified, BN, 294) 
“Common sense” (Bon sens) resistance to solipsistic arguments can now 
be explicated: certain forms of consciousness testify that someone else is given to 
me as a concrete and obvious presence (BN, 295). I do not bring others out of 
myself. It is impossible that someone else could fall under “phenomenological 
reduction” or be put-off-the-game at will (BN, 295-297). Were consciousness and 
the freedom of someone else given, they would be known and I would cease to be 
an object. But they are not: it is a relation of being and knowledge (BN, 297). This 
is not to say that seeing someone as an object is impossible. Returning to the 
opening example, Sartre underlines that the page of the book that is read by 
someone and that I do not see is, in principle, accessible. But if the face of the 
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person who reads the book is seen by me as the page of the book one reads, then 
the concept of others has been fixed as an “empty form” in order to relativize my 
pre-reflexive awareness of my lack of attention to others. Thus, I can see someone 
else as an object, but insofar as I do not see that someone else is looking at me, 
my avoidance escapes no one but myself: 
Just as my consciousness apprehended by the cogito bears indubitable 
witness of itself and of its own existence, so certain particular 
consciousnesses – for example, “shame-consciousness” – bear 
indubitable witness to the cogito both of themselves and of the 
existence of [an other mind]. (Translation modified, BN, 297) 
But if the fact that there is someone else is incontestable, it must still be 
granted that it is only probably that someone else looks at me (BN, 299). Sartre 
may treat anew his earlier examples: I could deceive someone else if I knew, 
unbeknownst to the other person, from where I could be seen, such as during a 
military operation when I attempt – with others – to take a group of soldiers by 
surprise. I could also deceive myself by asking myself whether someone sees me 
in a situation in which I do not see from where I would be seen(e.g., if I hear 
someone’s footsteps behind me, I could wonder whether someone is looking at 
me). I may thus be the author of my own deception with respect to someone else. 
But is there any conceivable sense in which we could not see each other while 
face to face, insofar as I could believe to be seen without being so? Could I not be 
deceiving myself systematically with respect to the existence of someone else? 
Could the “look” of someone else be only probable (BN, 299)? 
The question has nothing but heuristic value insofar as its results from a 
confusion between what Sartre calls two “distinct orders of knowledge” and two 
“incomparable types of beings” (BN, 300). On the one hand, the knowledge of 
being looked at by someone is certain: insofar as I am conscious that someone is 
looking at me, I unreflexively know that they exist. On the other, the knowledge of 
our being as objects is only probable: insofar as I am aware that we exist 
contingently, I pre-reflexively know that any other person may cease to exist. The 
alleged possibility that our respective knowledge of each other as “objects” could 
be certain can thus be dismissed: “we have always known that the knowledge of 
the object-in-the-world is only probable” (BN, 300). 
However, far from reducing one’s possibility of being-seen to a 
probability, its independence from the body of someone else renders clear that 
the appearance of certain objects in the field of my experience, particularly the 
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eyes of someone else, is the “pure occasion” of realizing one’s being-seen (ibid.). 
It is thus misleading to reduce the possibility of a false alert, the mistaken belief 
that someone saw me, to the absence of my being as an object (être-objectif) for 
someone else (BN, 300). Although no one is in my surroundings, I can start feeling 
that someone could be anywhere. My shame can accordingly persist despite the 
fact that I note the concrete absence of anyone else. Sartre presents that which is 
unreflexively involved in a false alert as facticity of the other, the contingent 
connection of someone else to an object of my world (BN, 300). The object of 
doubt is not the facticity of others, but the being-there (l’être-là) of someone else, 
the concrete historical event of one’s presence as I become aware of someone 
else’s presence at a certain occasion. To this extent, what Sartre calls the 
“original” (originelle) presence of someone else in the world is not itself 
conceivably absent, but transcendent. But how can absence then be conceived? 
Someone’s absence requires its determination by someone else from a 
place where their presence was or could have been noted (ibid.). Absence is not a 
“nothingness of links” of someone to a place (ibid.). It is not on any occasion that 
someone is absent for any other from any place: 
I will not say that Aga-Khan or the Sultan of Morocco is absent from this 
apartment, but I say that Pierre, who ordinarily stays here, is absent 
from it for a quarter of an hour. (ibid.) 
To reflexively realize that someone is absent supposes that the relations 
of this person to the one to whom they are absent are preserved, except the one 
of facticity. Absence is not death (BN, 301). The intelligibility of absence requires 
its counting as a “concrete mode of the presence” of someone to someone else. 
As such, a distinction can be established between the empirical concept of 
presence and the fundamental presence of human realities to each other. The 
distance between two persons does not alter the fundamental fact of their 
reciprocal presence (ibid.). Our eventual position of relative ignorance regarding 
our concrete existence as objects is not to be confused with an alleged absence of 
thoughts and feelings with respect to each other. 
If one considers the presence of someone to another person from the 
perspective of one of them, either that person is present to someone else as 
another subject (sujet-autrui), or someone else is present to that person as an 
object (objet-autrui). If they are present to someone else as another subject, then 
the whole world separates them from the other person (BN, 302), as in “Pierre 
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feels himself as existing for Therese”. This does not alter the fundamental fact 
that she is “the one through whom ‘there is’ a World as a Totality” (ibid.). For a 
person to feel themselves as existing for someone else requires their existing in 
the world with an immediate union to it, without which the world would be 
inconceivable as a whole. As it is a fact that if one thinks, then one exists, so one 
can think of oneself as existing for someone else who is then thought of as a 
subject. 
Conversely, if the other person is present to the first as an object, the 
distance which separates them is a contingent fact: e.g., “Therese exists in the 
middle of the world” (ibid.). That this person thinks immediately that someone 
else exists mediately in the world requires the possibility of the existence of a 
person with an immediate presence to the world. As it is possible for one to 
encounter someone else in the world, one can think of someone else as an object. 
This fact is contingent without being fundamental: that I can think of someone 
does not require certainty of one’s existence, but only its possibility.28 
The empirical concepts of absence and presence can therefore be taken 
as a specification of the fundamental concept of presence, independent of the 
concept of distance (BN, 302). This presence operates in transcendence. As I can 
think of someone else whose presence is not given to me, a path is conceivable 
which separates me from someone if I take it as an obstacle to surmount in order 
to reach that person or which connects me to someone if I take it as a means to 
reach them (BN, 302). These “paths” do not represent anything more than 
“instrumental complexes” enabling the determinate appearance of someone else 
as an object, as a “this” against the background of all that there is. To this extent, 
one’s awareness of one’s situation requires the conceivability of an infinite 
diversity of paths that one can take to meet with others (BN, 303). 
The world remains one of a consciousness insofar as it is to a given 
consciousness that obstacles are unveiled. Nevertheless, “it is with regard *to+ 
every living human that any human-reality is present or absent on the background 
of original presence” (translation modified, 303). The world to which a 
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 Sartre will later emphasize the distinction between the inconceivability of counting as 
the author of a notice or report of one’s own inexistence, and the conceivability of 
counting as the author of a notice or report of the inexistence of someone else (BN, 531-
552). 
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consciousness makes itself present “implicitly and really” contains others, thought 
of as objects to which one could makes oneself present (BN, 303). To grant the 
conceivability of mistaking someone for an object is not an obstacle which 
prevents one from conceiving the fundamental presence of humans (BN, 302). To 
think of the apparition of a human as an object in the field of my experience as 
that which provides my knowledge of the existence of others amounts to 
confusing the contingency of an encounter with someone else with the certainty 
of one’s existence. On the contrary, independent certainty of the existence of 
others is required by the conceivability of such experiences (BN 284; 292; 304). 
Insofar as my “being-for-others” (être-pour-autrui) is a constant fact of my human 
reality, that which I could be mistaken about is whether on a given occasion a 
“this” is someone or not. I cannot possibly make a mistake with respect to 
someone else and their real connection to me (BN, 304). 
Thus, the structures of the for-itself and being-for-others cannot be 
derived from each other as a consequence of a principle (BN, 306). The for-itself 
does not result from the being-for-others: insofar as it designates one’s 
immediate presence to oneself, it is inconceivable that it is related to someone 
else and conceivable for it to be without being for someone else. Nor does being-
for-others result from the for-itself: it is inconceivable without a relation to 
someone else and also inconceivable without the for-itself. The independence of 
these structures indicates the central difficulty raised by solipsism. Sartre’s project 
in Being and Nothingness is not anthropological (ibid.). A for-itself which exists 
without suspecting the possibility of being an object is conceivable, but it would 
not be “human”: it would be united with the world in a distinct way. But, 
presently, the cogito reveals the factual necessity that absence is inconceivable 
for an existence which is conscious and human: 
It is found – and this is [indubitable] – that our being along with its 
being-for-itself is also for-others; the being which is revealed to the 
reflective consciousness is for-itself-for-others. The Cartesian cogito only 
[affirms] the absolute truth of a fact – that of my existence. In the same 
way the cogito a little expanded as we are using it here, reveals to us as 
a fact the existence of [an other mind] and my existence for [an other 
mind]. That is all we can say. (Translation modified, BN, 306) 
To this extent, what Sartre calls a “cogito a little expanded” is conceived 
as a conceptual means to dispel a confusion between doubt concerning the 
factual existence of someone else and theoretical doubt with respect to the 
95 
 
existence of other minds (ibid.). As, in reflexion, the fiction of my non-existence 
indicates the indubitability of my existence, so the fiction of the non-existence of 
others indicates the indubitability of other minds’ existence. In both cases, a 
doubt can be dispelled: that is to say, the necessity of a fact can be realized 
through determinate interrogation. There is no such thing as a reason to think 
that everyone else could be unavoidably absent from a theoretical perspective. 
2.2.3. The Gratuitousness of Solipsism 
 We have so far considered the first three necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the theory of the existence of others proposed by Sartre (in brief: 
not requiring proof of the existence of others; contingent necessity; and the 
misleadingness of the reduction of persons to objects). The fourth condition is the 
difficulty raised by accounting for an internal and intuitive negation between 
“myself” and “the other”. Sartre affirms that his earlier remarks concerning the 
internal negation of the for-itself are applicable to the relation of the for-itself 
with someone else (BN, 308): 
If there is an other mind in general (Autrui), it is required that I can be 
that one who is not the other (l’autre) and it is in this very negation 
operated by me on me that I make myself being and that an other mind 
(autrui) arises as an other mind. This negation, which constitutes my 
being and which, as Hegel puts it, makes me appear as the Same facing 
the Other (l’Autre), constitutes myself on the ground of non-thetical 
ipseity as “Myself”. (Translation mine)
29
 
The negation that ought to be thought is one that has been unreflexively 
interiorized as constitutive of self-consciousness. Here, again, Sartre emphasizes 
that a “me” is not an “inhabitant” of a consciousness. He now confronts the pre-
reflexive yet thetic assimilation of other consciousnesses to things from an 
allegedly exclusive perspective. To do so, he attempts to bring out how ipseity can 
reinforce itself by negating the ipseity of someone else. For inasmuch as ipseity 
already results from the pre-reflexive assimilation of one’s consciousness to that 
of a thing, it is prejudged that any other would reflexively relate to oneself in the 
same way (BN, 308). This time, Sartre internalizes that such a negation may be 
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 In the translation I propose of this passage, the capitalization of the words in French is 
preserved in order to bring out the distinction Sartre marks between other minds and the 
concept of other minds in the idealist approach that he confronts (see BN, 306). 
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reciprocal: another consciousness also has to make itself as the for-itself that I am 
for that one (BN, 308). On this approach, the consciousness of someone else 
would exist only at the exclusion of mine: “someone else exists for consciousness 
as oneself refused” (translation modified, ibid.). The negation that constitutes 
one’s ipseity thus cannot be direct. There is nothing it could bear on; someone 
else is originally neither me nor an object (non-moi-non-objet). What one’s 
negation bears on is the “me” refused by the other (ibid.). To this extent, one’s 
thinking of oneself as an object (moi-objet) is my “being-outside” (être-dehors) 
(BN, 309). The outlook of a being who is already assumed and acknowledged to 
be one’s outlook. 
In reflexion, the question of how one assumes one’s being-outside is 
internally related to one’s taking account of the difference between objects and 
persons. Sartre stresses that it is possible to negate someone else from oneself 
only as a subject (BN, 308). As a reminder, in Sartre’s approach the negation from 
which the “theoretical problem” of the existence of the other stems is that “the 
other is the ‘me’ that is not me”. This constitutive negation cannot bear on 
anything, for it is inconceivable to negate the existence of someone else. To 
suppose that it is conceivable amounts to immediately refusing someone else as a 
“pure object”: that is to say, as an object but not as a person, thereby putting 
oneself in a defenceless position with respect “the Other”. I would then remain 
defenceless against my assimilation to someone else. Consequently, I can only 
hold someone else at a distance by accepting a limit to my subjectivity. 
This limit is “my me-object” (ibid.). Consciousness for-itself cannot 
conceivably produce, in the first person, its differentiation from another 
consciousness for-itself. While it seemed as if consciousness could be limited only 
by itself in The Transcendence of the Ego  (Sartre J.-P. , 2004, p. 4), now, inasmuch 
as consciousness for-itself is a perpetually incomplete detotalized totality: it 
cannot be limited by itself, otherwise it would be a finite whole. The me-object 
then appears as the absolute limit accepted by a subjectivity, the limit between 
two consciousnesses, produced by a limiting consciousness and assumed by a 
limited consciousness. In the absence of any conceivable mediation between two 
beings which are identical with respect to the way in which they act and are 
immediately present to each other, this limit constitutes the separation produced 
by a consciousness and assumed by another. One’s being-for-others is thus 
initially torn between two negations of opposed origin and inverse sense: 
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someone else is not the “me” that one intuits and I do not intuit the “me” that I 
am (BN, 310). This explains why the other initially appears as that which limits me; 
by refusing to make do with me, he puts me off-the-game and strips me of my 
transcendence. This outcome opens to me the possibility of assuming my limit. 
But then, by non-thetically taking consciousness of myself as one of my free 
possibilities, I assume I should be responsible for the fact of the existence of 
someone else: 
It is I who by the very affirmation of my free spontaneity cause there to 
be an Other and not simply an infinite reference of consciousness to 
itself. (BN, 311) 
Such attitude involves ambivalence. On the one hand, someone is 
obviously responsible for the way in which one acts and lives before someone 
else. On the other, Sartre indicates that some attitudes with respect to others 
presuppose an implicit pretence towards them. To pre-reflexively assume that 
one could be responsible for the fact of the existence of an other is tantamount to 
assuming that one could have a right to it. To ward off the spell of the Hegelian 
struggle for recognition by a mere act of will does not suffice and could even 
reiterate the difficulty it stems from.30 Nevertheless, Sartre suggests at this stage 
that abstract acknowledgement of the existence of others cannot suffice in order 
to address the collective difficulty raised by solipsism. To do so, he first attempts 
to establish the absurdity of instrumental approaches to others. In this sense, he 
stresses that comparing humans with machines requires the undue exploitation of 
the fact that machines, as tools, present “the trace of a transcended-
transcendence” or past human activity. Approaches which grant the intelligibility 
of the assimilation of humans to instruments renounce the obvious intelligibility 
of some attitudes by confusing the aim of an activity with its result: 
The Behaviourist point of view must be reversed, and this reversal, 
moreover, will leave [an other mind] objectivity intact. For that which 
first of all is objective – what we shall call signification after the fashion 
of French and English Psychologists, intention according to the 
Phenomenologists, transcendence with Heidegger, or form with the 
Gestalt School – this is the fact that [an other mind] can be defined only 
by a total organization of the world and he is the key to this 
organization. If therefore I return from the world to [an other mind] in 
order to define one, this is not because the world would make me 
understand [an other mind], but because the Other-as-object is nothing 
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 This difficulty will be treated in part 4.1. 
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but a center of autonomous and intra-mundance reference in my world. 
(Translation modified, BN, 318) 
Sartre thus questions whether the philosophies of the time can meet the 
challenge raised by the behaviourist “point of view”. The difficulty is that if the 
world is taken to be seen-under-reduction, then everything is as if others would 
need to be defined “in general”. One’s seeing someone else is taken at this stage 
to be reducible to one’s seeing someone else as an object which could belong to 
one’s world at the exclusion of someone else (as the “center of autonomous and 
intra-mundane reference of my world”). It would be misleading to take Sartre as 
praising totalitarianism. Being and Nothingness was written during the Second 
World War in occupied France. Sartre calls into question his contemporary 
situation and the philosophies of his time to address the collective issue raised by 
well-known ideologies of the 1940s. In this context, his positive contribution is the 
sharing of reflexive and public means for self-defence. In particular, we shall see 
in part 4.1. that Sartre connects the prejudice that other people could lack to the 
obverse of one’s unreflexive endorsement of indifference. What is now required is 
to assess why it is behaviourism that he presents in opposition to philosophy from 
the fiction of the world seen-under-reduction. I will thus analyse the “method” of 
behaviourism (in one word: conditioning) to explain this point: 
The rule, or measuring rod, which the behaviorist puts in front of him 
always is: Can I describe this bit of behavior I see in terms of "stimulus 
and response"? (Watson, 1998, pp. 6-7) 
It is crucial to note that Watson presents a reflexive question as one 
which would need to be put in front of him in order to be posed. The direction of 
inquiry is inverted from the start. The mode of effectiveness of the behaviourist 
rule is left outside the scope of the question. And what Watson asks one to do is 
to question one’s ability to apply a mode of description. The question is rhetorical, 
for what Watson introduces is the way of applying a method of description. In his 
terminology, “stimulus” not only means “object in the general environment”, but 
also “changes in the tissues themselves due to the physiological condition of the 
animal”. Nevertheless, what he then presents as examples of stimuli are 
deprivations inflicted upon animals. As a counterpart, activities that involve 
intentional actions (e.g., building a skyscraper) are presented as “responses” 
distinct from non-intentional actions (e.g., jumping at a sudden sound) only in 
terms of their degree of organization. A behaviour is meant to be “prescribed” to 
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a human by “society” (Watson, 1998, p. 7). “Society”, he argues without further 
explanation, could somehow account for the authorship of prescriptions that the 
behaviourist could unquestionably represent: 
The behaviorist is working under the mandates of society and 
consequently it does come within his province to say to society: “If you 
decide that the human organism should behave in this way, you should 
arrange situations of such and such kinds.” (Watson, 1998, p. 7) 
Watson defends the idea that instrumental reasoning applied to humans 
is sufficient to organize collective existence. An “experimental *…+ ethics” based 
on such an approach could tell us what to do. Within Watson’s (1998, p. 9) 
approach, this practice could legitimately legislate on marriage, divorce and family 
issues, apparently without any public discussion. Watson (1998, p. 11) explains his 
interest in controlling other’s activities by use of an analogy with physics: 
The interest of the behaviorist in man’s doings is more than the interest 
of the spectator – he wants to control man’s reactions as physical 
scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is 
the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to 
control human activity. 
Surreptitiously misusing both Luke’s gospel (5.37) and the gesture 
involved in Metaphysical Meditations, Watson (1998, p. 10) challenges his reader: 
Behaviorism is new wine and it will not go into old bottles; therefore I 
am going to try to make new bottles out of you. I am going to ask you to 
put away all of your old presuppositions and to allay your natural 
antagonism and accept the behavioristic platform at least for this series 
of lectures. Before they end I hope you will find that you have 
progressed so far with behaviorism that the questions you now raise will 
answer themselves in a perfectly satisfactory natural science way. *…+ 
[I]f I were to ask you to tell me what you mean by the terms you have 
been in the habit of using, I could soon make you tongue tied with 
contradictions. I believe I could even convince you that you do not know 
what you mean by them. You have been using them uncritically as a part 
of your social and literary tradition, let us forget them until later 
lectures. 
Watson suggests that one’s questions could “answer themselves”. As 
such, although questions could be raised, posing them would suffice to obtain 
their answers. On Watson’s approach, this would not raise a difficulty. For 
“speculative” questions would be avoided and replaced with “scientific” ones by 
relying on the concept of conditioned emotional response, introduced as follows: 
Convince yourself of this by making a simple test. If you will take a 
snake, mouse or dog and show it to a baby who has never seen these 
objects or been frightened in other ways, he begins to manipulate it, 
poking at this, that or the other part. Do this for ten days until you are 
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logically certain that the child will always go towards the dog and never 
run away from it (positive reaction) and that it does not call out a fear 
response at any time. In contrast to this, pick up a steel bar and strike 
upon it loudly behind the infant's head. Immediately the fear response is 
called forth. Now try this: At the instant you show him the animal and 
just as he begins to reach for it, strike the steel bar behind his head. 
Repeat the experiment three or four times. A new and important change 
is apparent. The animal now calls out the same response as the steel 
bar, namely a fear response. We call this, in behavioristic psychology, 
the conditioned emotional response, a form of conditioned reflex. 
(Watson, 1998, p. 8) 
On the basis of this conception, we could regard any consequent of a 
conditional as a “response” to a scientific question, the antecedent truth of which 
would depend solely on one’s actions: if someone associates A to B while inflicting 
a treatment on someone else, then A will be associated to B by the one to who 
has been inflicted such treatment by someone else. Importantly, Watson is aware 
that the evaluation of such a conditional is not the object of the experiment, for 
how could one be surprised by the result of the treatment he describes? Watson’s 
approach to interrogation comes close the medieval sense of “question”. As he 
states it, he simply wants to convince us that this attitude should be endorsed, 
that we should relate to ourselves in the way described in the “test”. A notable 
blind spot of this approach to “questioning” is that it obliterates the possibility of 
a negative answer independent from the questioner’s actions. On Watson’s  
(Watson, 1998, p. 14) conception, the only thing that could indicate the failure of 
an attempted association of a stimulus with an object would be its inefficiency. 
Both Sartre’s consideration of the need for inverting the behaviourist 
point of view and the importance in his account of the independence of correct 
negative answers are now obvious. The intelligibility of active denial, of one’s 
doing the contrary to what one says by saying the contrary to what one does, is 
here at stake: does Watson’s (1998) “experiment”, presented as relevant to “the 
real field of psychology”, not amount to the active and concrete mistreatment of 
a child and an animal, as well as a misconception of psychology? Although 
presented as an “experimental attempt” to obtain an answer to why a child is 
afraid when he or she sees something rather than something else, the “test” 
seems as much intended to convince the reader that a “conditioned answer” 
could count as an answer. Conversely, is the mistreatment of the child, animal and 
psychology in such an “experiment” not the obverse of the pretence to be able to 
interrogate them in such a manner? In an interrogation where an answer is 
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claimed to be obtained via conditioning, the results of the “test” seem to be 
gained by gratuitous exclusion of other ways of answering the initial question. 
The reason that behaviourism was immediately taken as a threat to 
philosophy, reflected in Watson’s (1998, p. 17) prediction of its “gradually 
disappearing and becoming the history of science”, is plain. The reasons that 
Sartre thought both the philosophies of his time and some approaches to 
traditional philosophy were unable to meet the challenges of his time are yet to 
be clarified. 
Sartre’s strategy is to confront the “metaphysical question” (i.e., “why are 
there others?”) involved in some philosophical approaches and which grant the 
intelligibility of an exclusive perspective on the whole (BN, 321). This criticism 
concerns Watson’s behaviourism insofar as his claim to unquestionably “work 
under the mandates of society” presupposes that he could inherit his authority 
from such an exclusive perspective on the whole. 
Watson’s criticism, according to which traditional psychological concepts 
(such as introspection) are used uncritically, might have provided Sartre with a 
clue to the assumption of the conceivability of an exclusive perspective on the 
whole of all there is presupposed by the philosophies he confronted. Watson 
(1998, p. 5) considers “consciousness” as simply a conceptual substitute for 
“spirit”. As with “spirit”, the concept of consciousness would lack an observable 
counterpart. Sartre acknowledges that a concept of consciousness which presents 
no observable counterpart would, at best, remain unsatisfactory. However, he 
rejects the intelligibility of the requirement that the concept of consciousness 
would need to stand for a thing. Moreover, he does not grant that accounting for 
the whole of consciousnesses considered extensionally – the whole of those who 
are conscious somewhere – requires a unique “spirit” as its foundation (BN, 325). 
If the whole of consciousnesses is abstractly required, it is to account for the 
internal relations between consciousnesses. As considered earlier, conceiving 
oneself as an isolated self-consciousness (i.e., to think of one’s solitude) is 
inconceivable without acknowledging one’s past and concrete relations to others. 
Nevertheless, arguing against Hegel, whose failure he wants to diagnose, Sartre 
emphasizes the difficulty which arises when it is granted that a spirit would either 
require to be said “to exist” or “not to exist” for consciousnesses to count as such. 
This would mean that the synthesis of the multiplicity of consciousnesses could be 
achieved by a single consciousness, independent of anyone and of the 
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desegregation of which all consciousnesses would result (BN, 323). Following such 
an approach would mean that someone could take a point of view on the result of 
the synthesis of the whole. 
Sartre rejects the of the synthesis of the whole of other consciousnesses 
can and need to be achieved. It suffices to acknowledge as its foundation a unique 
whole in which there are extensionally located, internally related 
consciousnesses. It suffices to acknowledge that this whole cannot conceivably 
result from one’s synthesis. Sartre emphasizes that even an overarching 
consciousness could not achieve a point of view on such synthesis. Were such 
overarching consciousness related internally to other consciousnesses, it would 
have to be part of that whole and thereby without a point of view on it. 
Conversely, if one person took “spirit” to stand for one’s own self-grounded being 
beyond any of one’s consciousnesses (i.e., affective, judicative, etc.), one would 
then assume to view the whole of the extensionally located consciousnesses in 
the manner one can take a standpoint toward an object. Inasmuch as this would 
fail to acknowledge one’s internal disaggregation, obverse to one’s effort to 
recover oneself as subject, one would feel oneself without knowing oneself (ibid.). 
To grant the conceivability of taking an exclusive perspective on the whole is to 
this extent misleading. As such, it is not meaningful to ask whether one could 
obtain a point of view on that whole, for it cannot be relevantly said to be either 
attainable or unattainable (BN, 325). 
The apparent problem raised by “metaphysical interrogation” which could 
bear on the existence of others can thus be solved. Acknowledging the facticity of 
any consciousness, of the unrestricted generality of its contingency, suffices to 
obtain its de facto or necessarily a posteriori answer: “this is so”. This answer in 
turn is equivalent to saying that there is no answer (BN, 325). Sartre’s approach is 
not unlike Kant’s (1998, pp. 504-505; A478-B506) in siding with common sense 
concerning the limits of knowledge, granting that the absence of an answer can 
be taken as the solution to the question if one is ready to reconsider one’s 
expectations. As it is a priori inconceivable to take a point of view on the whole of 
extensionally located consciousnesses, it is necessary a posteriori that such a 
question cannot conceivably admit a positive answer. The negative answer it can 
obtain de facto proves to be a superfluous answer to a question raised from 
nowhere, or nonsense: “there is no conceivable point of view on the whole: the 
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whole has no ‘outside’ and the very question of the meaning of its ‘flipside’ is 
meaningless” (BN, 325). 
Conversely, the blind spot of methodological solipsism is that it 
presupposes the conceivability of doing without other persons in order to 
understand others. Sartre’s project retrospectively appears as an account of the 
unity of the diversity of structures presupposed by consciousness. In his approach, 
the intelligibility of such unity presupposes that it could not be thought and 
exteriorized independently of concrete relationships with others. It is, to this 
extent, aimed at showing how methodological solipsism, as a doctrine, consists in 
the denial of the existence of other persons. 
2.2.4. A Sort of de facto Solipsism 
We have now considered the theory of the existence of others proposed 
by Sartre. Has the issue raised by solipsism been resolved? If it has been 
established that the “theoretical” problem of the existence of others is a pseudo-
problem, can we not still consider solipsism as raising concrete difficulties that 
need to be confronted? In the second part of the first chapter, I stressed the 
importance of distinguishing between standpoints and perspectives to account for 
the abstract relation of consciousness and the body. After these analyses, Sartre 
seeks to explain concrete relationships with others. The upshot of his approach is 
that unreflexively assuming, in the first person, that one’s point of view could be 
an exclusive perspective involves assuming that one’s concrete relations with 
others are ordered by one’s expectation of appearing to others in determinate 
ways: 
I am the trial of the other: this is the original fact. But this trial of the 
other is in-itself an attitude with respect to the other, that is to say, I 
may be in presence of others without being this “in-presence” under the 
form of having to be it. (BN, 385) 
Sartre thus describes concrete relations with others from the perspective 
of conflict, inasmuch as it is the “original meaning of being-for-others” (BN, 386). 
It would be misleading to interpret Sartre as praising conflict. Rather, he attempts 
to provide a reflexive description of motives (not reasons) to endorse conflicting 
attitudes. The first attitude he considers is one where “I claim to be this being that 
I am”, where one considers “recovering” one’s “being” by freeing oneself from 
the influence of someone else (ibid.). Sartre suggests that an unreflexive attempt 
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to assimilate the freedom of the other is the obverse of an unreflexive attempt to 
free oneself from the other’s freedom. The categorical approach to others is, on 
this occasion, definitively rejected:  
It is not the pure category of the other which I project appropriating to 
myself. This category is not conceived nor even conceivable. (BN, 387) 
However, as an unreflexive attempt to act by oneself without internalizing 
the meaning of one’s concrete relations to others, attitudes corresponding to the 
project of a “self-recovery” (i.e., the “quests” for enchanted love, enchanting 
language and disenchanted acknowledgement of one’s failure through 
masochism) are the obverse of one’s unreflexive attempt to act upon the freedom 
of others. What is common to these attitudes is that they involve the ordering of 
one’s actions to the look of others. Sartre then considers a second type of 
attitude, whose endorsement involves rejecting the sense of the look of others. 
This attitude is indifference towards others, or “a sort of [de facto] 
solipsism” (translation modified, BN, 402). This characterization immediately 
raises the question of the relation between indifference and solipsism. What 
motivates Sartre’s use of the idiom of solipsism in order to characterize 
indifference? At this stage in Being and Nothingness, the pseudo-problem raised 
by solipsism has been resolved. So why introduce this idiom anew? One 
explanation is that it could yet be tempting to identify indifference as a concrete 
counterpart of solipsism that would eventually come to require a treatment along 
the lines of behaviourism. In other words, it could be tempting to turn solipsism as 
a doctrine into a method adequate for envisaging the psychology of others, as 
well as for relating with them in order to confront the concrete difficulties raised 
by indifference. However, at first sight, Sartre’s characterization of indifference as 
a “sort of de facto solipsism” suggests that he does not equate them. In this 
approach, if discussing indifference matters in a discussion of solipsism, it is first 
of all in order to distinguish them. 
My suggestion is that Sartre deals with this difficulty as an educator. As 
we shall see, he does not ascribe intentions to anyone and considers the 
possibility for indifference to be appropriated by an individual as a schema for 
one’s actions as a “primitive reaction” (i.e., the first one available to an 
individual). It might be that an individual does not even realize that they can act 
differently. This does not escape the fact that Sartre treats indifference as a bad 
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faith attitude, but he does not use “bad faith” as a term of criticism targeted 
against an individual. Indeed, as we shall see, Sartre’s portrait of the sort of de 
facto solipsist suggests the following: that he seems lost, that he seems worried 
that he seems not to be feeling well, and that he and others feel unease and 
embarrassment. If anything is to be done, on Sartre’s approach, it ought to be 
constructive. First, if indifference is the expression of one’s primitive reaction in 
respect to others, then surely someone is accountable for this or that action that 
one commits, even if one could not relevantly be taken to be accountable for 
having had this primitive reaction to others. Second, the motives of someone 
acting this way are, without communication, as opaque as the background of this 
individual. Understanding the motives of someone acting indifferently toward 
others does not amount to granting that they can and should be equated with 
reasons for acting in such ways. However, if what is wished is to be helpful in 
some way, it is surely helpful to understand the motives of this person. This in 
turn considering their situation, which seems to be precluded by Watson’s 
behaviourism. 
On my reading, Sartre’s treatment of indifference as a sort of de facto 
solipsism is accordingly aimed at avoiding a double difficulty. On the one hand, 
Sartre earlier stresses that “no one is truly solipsistic” (BN, 274). If that is the case, 
then the difficulties posed by solipsism are irreducible to the correct identification 
or ascription of intention to someone. However, on the other hand, some actions 
concretely manifest an attitude of indifference with respect to others and can be 
described as such. How, then, should we describe indifference in a way which 
does not require granting that an individual could be truly solipsistic, but which 
nevertheless does not imply granting the relevance of indifference in any sense? 
Sartre characterizes it as the felt counterpart of an attitude that he also 
calls “blindness with respect to others”. He specifies that “blindness” should not 
be taken literally. With respect to others, it does not literally involve a privation of 
ability: one is responsible for its endorsement. One may not “suffer” indifference, 
as if one were unable to act “differently” (e.g., like Melchior Inchofer in The 
Monarchy). One is thus responsible for one’s indifference towards others. This 
does not imply that such an attitude could be reflexively chosen by someone as a 
concrete way of relating to others. But one can unreflexively come to endorse it. 
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It can be one’s “originary reaction to *one’s+ being-for-others” (BN, 402). Sartre 
characterizes its “leading pattern” (schéma directeur) as follows:  
I direct my look upon [someone] who is looking at me. But a look cannot 
be looked at. As a soon as I look in the direction of the look it disappears, 
and I no longer see anything but eyes *…+ This means that in my upsurge 
into the world, I can choose myself as looking at [someone’s+ look and 
can build my subjectivity upon the collapse of the subjectivity of the 
other. (Translation modified, BN, 401-402) 
Sartre also elucidates the alleged obverse of the unreflexive endorsement 
of this pattern: 
I practice then a sort of factual solipsism; others are these forms which 
pass by the street, those magic objects which are capable of acting at a 
distance and upon which I can act by means of specific conducts. I 
scarcely notice them; I act as if I were alone in the world. I brush against 
“people” as I brush against a wall; I avoid them as I avoid obstacles *…+ 
of course they have some knowledge of me, but this knowledge does 
not touch me. *…+ Those “people” are functions. (BN, 403) 
Sartre stresses the disagreeability of endorsing indifference to everyone. 
That is to say, although he grants that this “state of blindness” may last for 
extended periods, even a lifetime, he suggests that it is no one’s character. The 
feeling of lack, uneasiness or endless dissatisfaction is described as the exact 
counterpart of one’s acting indifferently with respect to others. In such an 
approach, one’s acting as if one is the only person in other people’s presence 
exactly amounts to acting as if they could be reduced to the means of fulfilling 
one’s wishes in order to satisfy the functions to which one’s actions would imply 
that they are reduced to. Against the background of one’s endorsement of 
indifference, any attitude would be explicitly twofold. On the one hand, one 
would protect oneself from others in the following way: “it is about protecting 
myself against the danger that makes me run my being-outside-in-the-freedom-
of-the-other” (translation mine, 403). On the other hand, one would use others 
“in order finally to totalize the detotalized totality which I am, so as to close the 
open circle, and finally to be my own foundation” (BN, 403). Sartre locates the 
source of this ambivalence in the implicit levelling of persons and objects. For, if 
while acting unreflexively, one takes for granted that seeing someone does not 
differ from seeing something, one does not distinguish seeing someone from 
seeing what is designed in order to satisfy a function, a tool. One’s feeling of being 
seen doing so then involves implicit acknowledgement of eventually being seen as 
being designed to satisfy a function in return (a tool). On this approach, as an 
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endorsed human attitude, indifference is independent of any profession and can 
be characterized as the unreflexively acquired ability to act by using others as 
tools in order to satisfy one’s own desires: 
In making direct proof of [an other mind] as a look, I defend myself by 
putting [an other mind] to the test, and the possibility remains for me to 
transform [an other mind] into an object. But if [an other mind] is an 
object for me while he is looking at me, then I am in danger without 
knowing it. Thus my blindness in anxiety is because it is accompanied by 
the consciousness of a “wandering and inapprehensible” look, and I am 
in danger of its alienating me behind my back. (Translation modified, BN, 
404) 
Sartre suggests that the endorsement of indifference as an efficient 
attitude has, for a felt counterpart, an anxiety, the significance of which one 
implicitly acknowledges. To obtain others’ obedience through the practice of 
indifference suffices to satisfy one’s desires; however, adopting such an approach 
involves putting oneself in danger. The “wandering and inapprehensible” look is 
the concrete manifestation of one’s implicit understanding of this danger. 
Inasmuch as I unreflexively attempt to appropriate the freedom of others for 
myself by treating them as objects, I both irritate myself, for I cannot obtain what 
I want from others, and I nihilate my implicit understanding of what I want. Sartre 
diagnoses such an attitude as both aimless and meaningless: 
I engage in desperate research of the freedom of the other, and along 
the way, I find myself engaged in research which lost its sense; all my 
efforts to bring back sense to this research result only in making me lose 
it further and provoking my bewilderment. (Translation modified, BN, 
404) 
 Against the background of the endorsement of indifference, wherein any 
attitude allows a twofold meaning (protecting oneself from being used by others, 
and using others to protect oneself), one is led to treat the meaning of one’s 
conduct as only probable or imagined, “leaving [one] with a vague and irritating 
impression of a total knowledge but with no object” (ibid.). 
 The absurdity of taking the existence of other minds to be proven can thus 
be retrospectively reconsidered. Requiring such proof amounts to rejecting the 
meaning of one’s attitudes with respect to others. Sartre, four years after the 
publication of Being and Nothingness, further emphasised this point by inviting his 
audience to interrogate, in the first person, the implicit commitment of the 
eventual demand for proof of faithfulness to someone else: 
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If only my belief in this woman was precisely absent of jealousy, that is 
to say, if only this woman had given me absolute proofs that I can trust 
her: always this proof of the absolute which will enable me to be what I 
am. *…+ There is another consciousness which is as lacking and whose 
synthesis with the first would realize, one would believe, the in-itself-
for-itself. There is, for example, in the belief that this woman is faithful 
to me, a consciousness lacking to thought, which is the intuitive 
recognition of the faithfulness of the woman, which is that which I 
require by a proof, and that I may never have, for it is nothing but a 
belief. (Translation mine, Sartre, 2003, p. 163) 
By treating one’s trust in someone else as the mere absence of mistrust 
(here: jealousy), one might fail to acknowledge the significance of one’s demand 
for a proof of faithfulness to someone else. For what is the meaning of demanding 
an “absolute” proof of someone else’s faithfulness? Sartre suggests that it 
amounts to maintaining the appearance that such a demand is based upon doubt. 
That is to say, the motive of the conduct is precisely to deny the intuitive 
recognition of the trust which enables one’s demand of such “proof”. By treating 
one’s trust in someone else as the content of a belief that could be established 
independently of one’s actions, one presents one’s implicit understanding of 
one’s situation with respect to someone as a “mere” belief whose dubiousness 
could perhaps never be overcome (in Sartre’s example, the intuitive recognition of 
the faithfulness of a woman). 
2.2.5. The Gesture of Solipsism 
To conclude this chapter, on the basis of Sartre’s conclusions, I will 
reconsider the manifest impersonality of the gesture of solipsism in its written 
expression. We saw that, when he characterizes solipsism as “a positive attempt 
not to use the concept of the other”, Sartre uses the Husserlian term of “έποχή” 
to characterize Watson’s approach to psychology. Sartre thus notes a similarity 
between the gestures of Watson and Husserl: 
We could now let the universal έποχή, in our sharply determinate and 
novel sense of the term, take the place of the Cartesian attempt to 
doubt universally. But with good reason we limit the universality of that. 
*…+ Our purpose is to discover a new scientific domain, one that is to be 
gained by the method of parenthesizing, which, therefore, must be a 
definitely restricted one. 
The restriction can be designated in a word.  
We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence 
of the natural attitude; *…+ 
I am exercising the “phenomenological” έποχή which also completely 
shuts me off from any judgement about spatiotemporal factual being. 
(Husserl, 1983, pp. 60-61) 
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The behaviorist asks: Why don’t we make what we can observe the real 
field of psychology? Let us limit ourselves to things that can be 
observed, and formulate laws concerning only those things. Now what 
we can observe? Well, we can observe behavior – what the organism 
does or says. (Watson, 1998, p. 6) 
 
Both Husserl and Watson appeal to a restrictive limit. For Husserl, the 
limit is “determined” and can be characterized by putting it out of action: it is the 
thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude. For Watson, the limit 
is “to determine” in order to render observable the real field of psychology. We 
have seen that Sartre explicitly aims to show, in favour, among others, of Husserl 
and Heidegger, that the behaviourist point of view must be inverted in order to 
leave the objectivity of another mind intact (BN, 318). Insofar as the so-called 
method of phenomenological reduction involves renouncing any judgment on 
spatio-temporal existents, it seems to exclude that the objectivity of another mind 
could and would need to be established. The section on “the look” retrospectively 
appears as an attempt to expose, in response to the phenomenological 
philosophies of his time, the difficulty raised by taking solipsism for a method. 
Sartre (2004, p. 28) had already attempted to surmount this difficulty by providing 
“the sole possible refutation of solipsism”. This was described as follows: 
So long as the I remains a structure of consciousness, it will always 
remain possible to contrast the consciousness with its I on the one hand 
and all other existents on the other *…+ But if the I becomes a 
transcendent, it participates in all the world’s vicissitudes. It is not an 
absolute, it did not create the universe, it falls as all other existences 
under the epochē; and solipsism becomes unthinkable as soon as the I 
no longer has any privileged position. (Sartre J.-P. , 2004, p. 29) 
Solipsism could be confused with someone’s wish to attain a position 
which it would be impossible for others to access. It then seems that by negating 
the possibility that there could be only one person that can access such a position, 
it would be possible for anyone to access the position of an “absolute” and 
“impersonal” consciousness (ibid.). To accomplish the “liberation of the 
transcendental field”  (Sartre J.-P. , 2004, p. 25) thereby seems to allow for solving 
the theoretical problem by discovering its reason rather than its motive. Sartre 
then claims that “if the I of the ‘I think’ is the primary structure of consciousness”, 
the angst which would enable describing the so-called psychasthenic malady 
would be “impossible” (Sartre J.-P. , 2004, p. 28). The function of the Ego is left 
relatively undetermined: “perhaps, indeed, the essential function of the Ego is not 
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so much theoretical as practical” (Sartre J.-P. , 2004, p. 27). This “practical 
function” is taken to provide the means to mask spontaneity from consciousness. 
It thus seems that “consciousness could suddenly produce itself on the pure 
reflexive plane” and that this anguish is motivated by a “fear of oneself” which 
would be “absolute and irremediable” (Sartre J.-P. , 2004, p. 28). However, if such 
“fear,” which would be key in describing psychasthenic troubles, could also be 
constitutive of consciousness, the motives of such troubles would also count as a 
“permanent motive” for phenomenological reduction, thereby subtracting it from 
its apparent gratuity  (Sartre J.-P. , 2003, p. 130). 
Sartre explicitly rejects this approach to solipsism in Being and 
Nothingness. The difficulty is that the previously conceived “remedy” reproduces 
what it is meant to remedy. Not only does it suggest that a motive for action can 
be identified with a reason for it, for, concretely, it leads to ascribing either 
erroneous (BN, 306) or unavowable intentions (BN, 249); it also obscures the 
theoretical problem. If there were a subjectless transcendental field reducible to 
the consciousness of an Ego by itself, then nothing would exclude the affirmation 
of the existence of the other requiring a similar field, whereupon the problem of 
the undue reclamation of a privilege for one’s position would be posed anew, and 
so on (BN, 249). 
Nevertheless, at this stage, a central concern with respect to the approach 
to solipsism proposed so far can be raised. We have considered the possibility of a 
sort of de facto solipsism which presupposes an implicit pretence to an exclusive 
right with respect to others, allegedly from an exclusive perspective on the whole. 
Thus, if the theoretical problem raised by solipsism has been shown to be a 
pseudo-problem, it seems now that it could raise a deeper issue. Could the 
meaning of such pretence be relative to each individual? And if this is not the 
case, to what extent can the claim to draw the limits of thought be equated with 
the linguistic expression of solipsism? Could it not be the only way to exclude the 
possibility of the pretence of an individual concerning all others?  
At this stage of the present dissertation, these concerns may neither be 
answered nor dismissed in a satisfactory way. We have seen, in the first chapter, 
that ratifying a posteriori our eventual and respective confinement to 
representations implies admitting that one could adopt an exclusive perspective 
on the whole. In this chapter, we have seen that the “theoretical problem” of 
being eventually confined to representations is a pseudo-problem, insofar as it 
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can be established a posteriori that the existence of others is indubitable. All in all, 
it has been shown that one’s a posteriori ratification of our confinement to 
representations is meaningless. The central difficulty that remains is thus whether 
the very solipsistic decree that could imply or preclude our being eventually 
confined to mere representations could be achieved. The treatment of this 
difficulty by Sartre and Wittgenstein remains to be addressed. I will first turn in 
the following chapter to Wittgenstein, inasmuch as the criticism of an a priori 
evaluation of the truth of our propositions is a core aspect of his approach to the 
issue raised by solipsism.  
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3. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus on the Issue of 
Solipsism 
The aim of this chapter is to establish that Wittgenstein proposes a way to 
settle the issue of solipsism. At the end of chapter 2, it appears that in order to 
confront the issue of solipsism, it is not enough to address the retrospective issue 
of ratifying a posteriori the possibility of our confinement to representations. It is 
also required to call into question the conceivability of an a priori exclusive 
perspective from which sense could be legislated upon by some decree that 
would imply or preclude our eventual confinement to representations. By 
legislating on sense, I mean trying to impose strictures on the expressions of our 
thoughts, as when Schopenhauer (2010, p. 3) claims that “the world is my 
representation” is the first maximally general a priori valid truth with respect to 
any living and knowing being which should be acknowledged. This raises the 
question whether presenting Schopenhauer’s claim this way does not amount 
both to exclude the relevance of his approach and the possibility of solipsism. For 
if the way in which the issue raised by solipsism presupposes that the correctness 
of solipsism is excluded, then, this could call into question whether such way 
could count as a way to settle the question of solipsism at all and reiterate the 
difficulty. 
I thus start by emphasizing that the way in which Wittgenstein proposes 
to settle the issue of solipsism implies to grant that solipsism has a core of truth, 
manifest in “the world is my world” (TLP, 5.62). In the introduction, I suggested 
that Wittgenstein rejects the idea of the truth of propositions could be evaluated 
a priori, saying that wishing to delimit them a priori lead us to nonsense (TLP, 
5.5571), while avoiding what Floyd (1998, p. 81) calls “the self-undermining 
project of trying to frame a priori arguments against the possibility of a priori 
knowledge” by granting that solipsism contains a core of truth in its opposition to 
conceptions of the a priori. I characterized this opposition as fluctuating, following 
Floyd’s (1998, p. 81) suggestion that “solipsism is one the most persistent refuges 
of the a priori”. As previously mentioned, traditional conceptions of the a priori 
assume that solipsism must to be excluded. As suggested, Kant criticizes Leibniz’s 
conception of a pre-established harmony between those who represent the world 
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to themselves and their representations. Sullivan (2013, p. 258) characterizes 
Kant’s construal of an alternative conception of harmony as follows:  
He held that the harmony between representations and reality that is 
needed for them to amount to a mode of knowledge could be secured 
only by recognizing a role for our representations in constituting the 
reality to which they answer.  
As Sullivan suggests, on Kant’s approach, a harmony which assures that 
thinking genuinely engages with the world would be required. In its absence, our 
thought could fail to genuinely engage with the world. Wittgenstein, however, 
questions the need for such harmony:  
6.371. At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the 
illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural 
phenomena. (Italics mine) 
 Wittgenstein does not grant that “laws of nature” provides us with an 
explanation of natural phenomena. As earlier suggested, the difficulty with the 
idiom is that it makes it look as if natural regularities could and would need to be 
transgressed. This differs from Kant’s approach, who suggest in the First Critique, 
that we ought not to present ourselves to nature as pupils. Rather, in the natural 
sciences, we would instructed by nature as if by an appointed judge who compels 
witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them (Kant, 1998, p. 109; BXIII). The 
analogy between the relation of the human mind and nature and the relation of a 
judge to witnesses he compels is required according to Kant to draw a contrast 
between the approach he proposes with the one which is at play in conceptions of 
metaphysics where “reason  *…+ is supposed to be its own pupil” (1998, p. BXV) 
which would require to be put back on the sure path of science.  
Lewis, as a critic of the traditional conception of the a priori, but also as 
the author of a renewed, “pragmatic” conception of the a priori, confronted the 
difficulty implied by the idea that alternatives could and would need to be 
excluded a priori. His distinction between two senses of necessary, as opposed to 
“contingent” and as opposed to “voluntary” (Lewis, 1929, p. 197) enabled him to 
question the conception of necessity as an a priori sort of involuntary compliance. 
That this target also falls under Wittgenstein’s criticism is plain: “A necessity for 
one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only 
logical necessity” (TLP, 6.37). On his side, Lewis (1929, p. 113) rejects both 
Leibniz’s conception of pre-established harmony and Kant’s conception of 
“preëstablished amenability”: 
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The problem of the “deduction of the categories” can be met without 
any metaphysical assumption of a preëstablished amenability to 
categorial order in which is independent of the mind. (Lewis, 1929, p. 
38) 
As Conant emphasizes, Lewis assumes, after Kant, that cognition must 
involve an element of passivity which is necessary in the sense of being non-
arbitrary (Conant, 2012, p. 49). This element of passivity is what Lewis calls “the 
given” which would be required as follows: 
If there be no datum given to the mind, then knowledge must be 
contentless and arbitrary; there would be nothing which it must be true 
to. And if no interpretation or construction which the mind itself 
imposes, then thought is rendered superfluous, the possibility of error 
becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of true and false is in danger of 
becoming meaningless. (Lewis, 1929, p. 39) 
Lewis rejects the requirement for pre-established amenability; however, 
he does not question the Kantian assumption that is questioned by Wittgenstein 
and that Sullivan calls a “harmony through which thinking genuinely engages with 
the world”. In his own terms, Lewis’ conception of the a priori requires 
acknowledging the imposition of a constraint on the basis of a legislative model: 
“the a priori legislation of mind can not apply to experience unless what is given in 
experience is already limited or determined in some consonant fashion” (Lewis, 
1929, p. 198). Granting the need for such a priori legislation, is a crucial incentive 
for Lewis’s account for what he calls the pragmatic element in knowledge. On the 
other hand, from this perspective, solipsism is criticized as follows: 
To repudiate *…+ transcendence is to confine reality to the given, to land 
in solipsism, and in a solipsism which annihilates both past and future, 
and removes the distinction between real and unreal, by removing all 
distinction of veridical and illusory. (Lewis, 1929, p. 183) 
By comparison, Wittgenstein’s rejection of the a priori occurs in the book 
before he introduces his approach to necessity (TLP, 6.37). He makes a concession 
to solipsism, which is that there is no a priori order of things (TLP, 5.634), before 
this move. Granting this before engaging with the question of necessity suffices to 
question not only the conception of necessity as involuntary compliance, but also 
the need to reply to the alleged defects of such a view on the basis of an a priori 
conception of voluntary compliance. I here follow Sullivan’s (2013, p. 265) 
suggestion that:  
Wittgenstein’s response to Kant is to deny that any restrictive or contrastive 
limitation is needed. Only so can the self of solipsism shrink to an extensionless 
point, leaving the whole of reality coordinate with it. So, if Wittgenstein’s ethics 
were to require such a contrast, it would not be loosely interwoven with his 
logical thought: it would be in direct collision with it.  
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In this approach, it is not required to exclude solipsism, inasmuch as this 
would imply acknowledging that one could and should construe the limits of 
language as limitations. However, if it can be shown that the limits of language 
cannot and need to be construed as limitations, it will thereby have been shown 
that the very attempts to impose strictures on the expressions of our thoughts are 
manifest as such. In this approach, it falls to solipsism or to the object-centered 
view, to establish in which sense its attempts do not amount to impose strictures 
on the expression of our thoughts. As Wittgenstein puts it: 
4.312 *…+ My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not 
representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of 
facts. 
 
We saw in section 1.1.2, that, on Wittgenstein’s approach, the issue raised 
by solipsism involves imagining that one could (from an ideal standpoint) single 
oneself out from every other human being on the basis of being specifically 
different from them (NB, 15.10.16). The central difficulty with such an approach is 
that it confuses solitude (i.e., a human possibility) and unicity (i.e., the property of 
an object of which there is one and only one exemplary under a description). If 
thinking of being alone amounts to thinking of oneself as a unique object that 
could be owned from a private and exclusive perspective, then it could seem that 
one could inform oneself of one’s uniqueness (i.e. the property of each and every 
individual) in a way that would be exclusive. One could inform oneself of one’s 
exceptional property of being unique in a way that risks calling into question the 
possibility of agreement. Such an approach immediately raises the difficulty of a 
tension between the public character of language (inasmuch as language does not 
depend exclusively on any one person) and individuation (inasmuch as 
individuation requires the appropriation of language). The difficulty is the 
following: could one inform oneself by means of language that one is unique from 
an exclusive perspective? The alleged possibility that should be questioned is thus 
whether one could express this to oneself without first acknowledging or denying 
the existence of one’s world. 
Wittgenstein’s strategy to dissolve this tension in the Tractatus is 
dispelling the confusion according to which one could fail to belong to any world 
(that is, one among others). That is to say, Wittgenstein proposes a means for 
solving the tension between individuation and the public character of language. In 
this approach the section on solipsism is designed to come to terms with the view 
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that what solipsism means could depend on an exclusive perspective. 
Wittgenstein proposes considering solipsism as posing a difficulty that needs to be 
settled: “this remark provides [the] (den) key to the question, to what extent 
solipsism is a truth” (translation modified, TLP, 5.62). The remark he refers to here 
is that “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (TLP, 5.6). I will 
suggest this invites us to reconsider whether there could be an ineluctable 
disagreement between the ways in which one represents the world to oneself, 
and the ways in which one expresses oneself by means of language. 
I will thus argue in section 3.1. that presupposing arbitrary and restrictive 
limits on thought in order to exclude an exclusive appropriation of the concepts of 
world and language stems from a confusion. For, as someone could not take an 
exclusive perspective on the world, it is superfluous and misleading to wish to 
exclude that it is impossible to do so. Then, in section 3.2., I argue that the issue 
raised by solipsism can be settled to the extent that it contains a core of truth – 
“the world is my world” – that it is adequate for appropriation. 
3.1. The Criticism of Legislating on Sense 
At the end of the previous chapter, I considered the difficulties raised by 
alleged attempts to refute solipsism. Similar concerns are addressed in the 
context of the Tractatus. For instance, Hacker  (1986, p. 134) presents the 
Tractatus as an expression of “transcendental solipsism”. He accounts for 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of a “thinking, representing subject” (TLP, 5.631) by 
arguing that it is the counterpart of a conception of “the self” which implies 
acknowledging the “non-encounterability of the self” as an essential feature of 
experience (Hacker, 1986, p. 82) and which also implies a “reference to a 
metaphysical self” (Hacker, 1986, p. 90). As a counterpart of this conception, 
Wittgenstein is said to have conferred a “supreme” and “indubitable” importance 
to “the mystical”  (Hacker, 1986, p. 96). In this approach “the ineffable manifests 
itself, and cannot be said” (Hacker, 2000, p. 382). 
Herein, I suggest that Hacker (1986, p. 82) highlights the core of the issue 
raised by solipsism when he suggests that Wittgenstein invites us to acknowledge 
the “non-encounterability of the self”. However, on the view I will defend in 
chapter 4, this amounts to dispensing with a reference to “a metaphysical self”. In 
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the present chapter, I will try establish that Wittgenstein questions the 
conceivability of refuting solipsism. This is because Wittgenstein’s approach does 
not imply resignation with respect to the limits of language. On this question, I 
agree with Diamond’s suggestion that resignation is not due. 
Diamond  (1995, p. 181) rejects that “an ineffable truth” was conceivably 
“gestured at” by the Tractatus. On her approach, Wittgenstein proposes rejecting 
“the language of ‘feature of reality’”. Such language would only be transitorily 
useful and would need to be “let go of and honestly taken to be real non-sense, 
plain nonsense, which we are not in the end to think of as corresponding to an 
ineffable truth” (Diamond, 1995, pp. 181-182). She proposes that the Tractatus 
presents a “private language argument” (Diamond, 2005, pp. 262; 282-284) best 
understood by comparison with early Russell’s  conception of “acquaintance with 
one’s own self”  (Diamond, 2005, pp. 264-265) that seems required once the 
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is 
granted. She questions the meaningfulness of resignation with respect to the 
limits of language  (Diamond, 2011, pp. 240; 261-263). She underlines the risk of 
reifying “the self” when we attempt to account philosophically for the 
translatability of a “‘my’ centred-experiential language” (presupposed by 
solipsism) and “our ordinary ways of representing the world”  (Diamond, 2011, p. 
272). 
I agree with Diamond’s view that the Tractarian concern with “[t]he 
language which only I understand” prefigures the concern with “private language” 
in the Investigations, and that comparison with the early view of Russell sheds 
light on early Wittgenstein’s approach to solipsism. I also agree with her view that 
the risk of reifying the self, which goes together with referential conceptions of 
the self, is to be taken into account, and I will try to do so both in this chapter and 
the following. On the reading I propose in this chapter, the concept of 
appropriation is treated as useful for both avoiding the difficulty implied by the 
reification of the self and accounting for the Tractarian approach to solipsism. As 
we shall see in the fourth chapter, Sartre uses the concept of appropriation. Its 
usefulness resides in enabling dissolution of the tension between individuation 
and the public character of language, inasmuch as it does not presuppose that the 
relation between individuals and language can be one of ownership (and could 
thereby imply exclusivity). Furthermore, this concept leaves intact the core of 
truth of solipsism which is contained in “the world is my world”. 
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On this question, I side with Friedlander’s (2014, p. 57) idea that 
“solipsism becomes an issue for Wittgenstein as a misfired attempt at essentially 
involving a unique self, myself, in the very nature of experience”. However, the 
truth of solipsism consists in the idea that “the world is my world”, as asserted in 
5.641. This truth provides, on the one hand, “an antidote to certain fantasized 
ways of holding to my sense of uniqueness” without, on the other hand, “giving 
up on individuation, on a way to speak of the self in philosophy”  (Friedlander, 
2014, p. 62). The task that the truth of solipsism provides is that of “realizing the 
self as the capacity to agree with the world expressed as ‘the world is my world’”  
(Friedlander, 2014, p. 62). Friedlander  (2001, p. 118) previously suggested that 
“appropriation is the central determination of existence”. He further said that 
“the pronoun ‘my’ is crucial *…+ in marking the fact that the range of possibilities 
always depends on the concrete use ‘I’ make of language” (Friedlander, 2001, p. 
120). He has also recently suggested that the truth of solipsism “points to the 
relation between uniqueness or essential individuation of a subject and the 
recognition of what is uniquely real”  (Friedlander, 2014, p. 62). 
The reading I propose of the Tractatus (notably of propositions 5.633 and 
5.6331) in chapter 1, by relying on aspects of Sullivan’s approach, differs from the 
views of Hacker, Diamond and Friedlander with respect to the following: I 
emphasize that the gesture implied by the alleged schema of the visual field 
displays the wish to impose an arbitrary limitation from an exclusive perspective 
on all there is, which can be called into question inasmuch as it presents a 
collective dimension that we see Sartre to be explicitly addressing in the second 
chapter and that will be addressed anew in the fourth one. The collective 
dimension it presents is that, endorsed as method, solipsism favours the 
instrumentalization of individuals and nourishes endorsement of indifference as a 
concrete way of relating to others. 
In the present chapter, I continue to side with Sullivan’s (2013, p. 257) 
approach to the limits of sense, according to which “the notion of a ‘limit’ *…+ is a 
non-contrastive, non-excluding one: limits have no ‘other side’; there is nothing 
‘beyond them’”. I assume, following this view, that the confrontation with 
solipsism in section 5.6 is construed in order to reject the idea of a harmony 
between thought and world  (Sullivan, 1996, p. 203).  
Finally, the reading I propose of the Tractarian approach to solipsism is 
indebted to Floyd (1998, p. 104) , particularly her suggestion that “solipsism is a 
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metaphysical version of loneliness – or perhaps better, a metaphysical attempt to 
overcome the possibility of loneliness”. 
As mentioned previously, the aim of this section is to call into question 
whether an exclusive perspective from which legislating on sense, or imposing 
arbitrary strictures one the expressions of our thoughts can be achieved and 
should be achieved. Is it necessary at all to presuppose that there could be such a 
perspective? To admit that there is one amounts to presupposing that one could 
be arbitrarily entitled to contrast what one can and cannot designate in the world 
(TLP, 5.6). However, if such a perspective is not required, the linguistic gesture, 
according to which some possibilities could be excluded a priori, can be rejected. 
This question is thus tied to solipsism, which, as we saw at the end of chapter 2, 
manifests itself through the pretence of drawing limits to the thinkable. This 
gesture is challenged in the introduction to the Tractatus. Wittgenstein affirms 
that the meaning of his book can be summed up with “what can be said at all can 
be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent” (TLP, 
Preface). He immediately specifies that this is not equivalent to drawing a limit on 
thinking (dem Denken), and rather that the book will draw a limit to the 
expression of thought (TLP, Preface). Wittgenstein explicitly states that he is 
indifferent (gleichgültig) to whether his thoughts have already been thought 
before him by someone else. His approach in the preface to the question of the 
limits of thought is developed in sections 4.112-4.12, before its reiteration in 5.61 
at the beginning of the section on solipsism. 
This section starts with the assertion that “[t]he limits of my language 
mean (bedeuten) the limits of my world” (TLP, 5.6). This remark falls between one 
on endorsing an a priori approach and another remark bearing on extensional 
approaches to logic presupposing the relevance of an arbitrary exclusion. 
Wittgenstein suggests in the earlier remark that giving (or specifying) elementary 
propositions a priori must lead to obvious non-sense (offenbarem Unsinn) (TLP, 
5.5571). In section 5.61, Wittgenstein suggests that any attempt to arbitrarily 
contrast what one can designate (or refer to) with what one could not designate 
in the world raises a difficulty. This difficulty is that such an attempt to discount 
possibilities would require an outer perspective on the world. We can therefore 
understand proposition 5.6 as addressing a tension between “the limits of my 
world” and “the limits of my language”. Wittgenstein neither equates nor 
dissociates such limits at this stage. Rather, through the use that he makes of the 
120 
 
first-person possessive determiner “my” he seems to suggest that, as a first step, 
appropriating one’s language with its limits means appropriating one’s world with 
its limits. But why envision, and furthermore question, the possibility of a 
mismatch between the two in the first place? An element of answer to this 
question can be found in the Notebooks: 
The difficulty of my theory of logical portrayal was that of finding a 
connexion between the signs on paper and a situation outside in the 
world. 
I always said that truth is a relation between the proposition and the 
situation, but could never pick out such a relation. 
The representation of the world by means of completely generalized 
propositions might be called the impersonal representation of the world. 
How does the impersonal representation of the world take place? 
The proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. (NB, 27.10.1914) 
 Wittgenstein leaves aside the idea that a connexion between written signs 
and a situation in the world should be “found” in order to account for truth. 
Discounting the relevance for the search for such a connexion does not involve 
renouncing the possibility of an impersonal representation of the world. Rather, it 
suggests that conceiving the proposition as a model of reality as we imagine it 
suffices to account for the possibility of impersonal representation of the world by 
means of completely generalized propositions. If the proposition is a model of 
reality, then anyone can use propositions to describe the world without 
coordinating any name with any definite object (TLP, 5.526-5.5262). However, 
according to how one approaches the notion of an impersonal representation of 
the world (which is not the same thing as a “theoretical” one), incompatible ways 
of reading 5.6 can be construed. 
 If an impersonal representation of the world is taken to imply restrictions 
upon one’s language and one’s world, then 5.6 expresses a nightmare. From the 
“object-centered view” analysed at the end of chapter 1 (which we found also 
criticized in Sartre’s approach), 5.6 leads to considering the worst possible 
scenario. For if “my” is taken as a way of marking that one’s world and one’s 
language could be owned as an object can be owned, then it seems that 
agreements between individuals would be inconceivable. “World” and “language” 
would count as objects whose ownership would be disputed among claimants. In 
order to settle such disputes, sense could and should be subjected to strictures. 
Insofar as the ownership of objects can be exclusive (i.e., someone can exclusively 
own an object), conceiving “world” and “language” on the model of objects 
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implies that they could be exclusively owned. However, inasmuch as they cannot, 
holding on to such an approach would imply subjecting sense to strictures in 
response to the alleged possibility that they could. 
However, if the independence of an impersonal representation of the 
world for reasons which are both collective and individual is acknowledged (for 
specific reasons), then 5.6 can be taken as a transitional step drawing the 
attention of the reader to the use of the first-person possessive determiner. It 
would emphasize that someone’s expressions involve the appropriation of one’s 
language and one’s world in a non-contrastive way. There would be no such thing 
as being disowned from one’s language and one’s world in the absence of 
claiming ownership of them in the manner that one could claim ownership of an 
object. This is not to say that potential disagreements and struggles would need 
and could be excluded a priori. It simply suggests that an approach to sense where 
imposing strictures is unnecessary and confusing contributes to providing public 
means to avoid taking the worst conceivable scenarios as bases for expressions 
and actions. On this approach, sense cannot be legislated upon and one’s 
measured appropriation of language rather involves expressive and meaningful 
activities. 
As mentioned, I will argue in section 3.1. that presupposing arbitrary and 
restrictive limits on thought in order to exclude an exclusive appropriation of the 
concepts of world and language stems from a confusion. As part of this, I will first 
argue in section 3.1.1. that accounting for the uses of the concepts of the 
intertwined wholes of world and language does not imply admitting that they 
could be restrictively limitative. Then I will argue in section 3.1.2. that the 
Tractarian requirement of determinacy of sense is not the instrument of a 
legislation bearing on sense. This requirement does not and cannot exclude 
vagueness, but it does constitute a means to establish that the pretence to 
impose arbitrary strictures on thought is superfluous and misleading. 
3.1.1. World and Language 
In order to examine the relevance of claiming an exclusive perspective 
from which sense could be legislated upon, and inasmuch as I suggest that 5.6 
calls into question the conceivability of an ineluctable disagreement between 
language and world, I will now consider whether Wittgenstein’s approach to the 
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issue of solipsism in the Tractatus requires concluding that limitations would be 
integral to our conceptions of the intertwined wholes of world and language. The 
reason for this is that if using either “world” or “language” involves attributing 
limitations to them, then one’s relation to others by means of language could also 
be internally restrictive. However, if using “world” or “language” does not imply 
such limitations, then interpreting one’s relations to others by means of language 
as restricted in any sense would stem from confusion. Notably, if the notion of 
world can be construed in a way that enables distinguishing between a relevant 
and a conceivable absence in a way that does not depend on one and only one 
individual, then a main pivot of solipsism will be undermined, for it suffices to 
establish the non-situated character of the presupposition of the generalized 
absence of others. I suggest this is achieved through the introduction of the 
notion of negative facts, which will be studied henceforth. 
The first proposition of the Tractatus equates the world with all that is the 
case (TLP, 1). Significantly, Wittgenstein does not write that the world is “merely”, 
“nothing but”, “only” or “solely” all that is the case. The sentence does not involve 
any sort of restriction which could apply to the world. It does not imply that the 
world could be reducible to any (somehow contingent) set of facts. To count as 
“the world”, not just any set of facts could suffice; the world is equated with the 
unique maximal set of facts (or, as we shall see, the unique totality of holding 
atomic states of affairs). If 1 is meant to show anything, it could simply be that to 
count anything as the world necessarily requires a unique set of facts that is not 
exhaustive “merely” contingently. Granting this does not imply that any 
knowledge is thereby acquired about the world.31 
What is at stake in 1 is the distinction between, on the one hand, a set or 
collection and, on the other, a whole or totality. To use Sullivan’s (1996, p. 205) 
example, any of the members of a set or collection can be subtracted from it 
without the set or collection thereby ceasing to be one. One’s stamp collection, 
for instance, would remain a stamp collection even if one were to lose a stamp. 
One could make an inventory or list of the contents of that collection. One could 
take away any item from the collection. One could exclude any of the listed items 
                                                          
31
 On Wittgenstein’s criticism of acquaintance, see Elucidating the Tractatus  (McGinn, 
2006, pp. 259-261). I will return to this question in its relation to the notion of proposition 
in part 3.2.1. 
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from the collection and bar it from the list. Yet this would not prevent the list 
from counting as an inventory of the collection. One could discover or remember 
the content of that collection during an inventory. In any case, the content of that 
collection would be independent of the activity of listing it. 
However, the same cannot be said of a whole or totality. If a stamp 
collection is taken as a whole, then each state of the collection (if stamps are 
added or removed) would correspond to different wholes. A whole or totality 
does not result, as a collection or a list does, from an aggregation of elements 
standing in external relations to each other. On the contrary, it presupposes that 
the relations between the units of a whole are internal: if one can be 
differentiated, then so can every other one. Accordingly, to list the contents of 
such a whole would be uninformative.32 If the relations among units are solely 
external, then listing could be required. But inasmuch as these relations are 
internal, such listing is not required. Subtracting the differentiated units from a 
whole or totality, then, would be tantamount to treating a whole as a set or 
assimilating one whole with another. 
By rejecting the notion that the world could be the totality of things in 1.1 
(“the world is the totality of facts, not of things”), Wittgenstein implicitly suggests 
that certain difficulties regarding some conceptions of the world stem from the 
surreptitious treatment of facts as things. He does not specify which ones, but 
proposes considering whether all the facts together determine the world (TLP, 
1.11). His argument is that the totality of facts determines not only what is the 
case, but also what is not the case (TLP, 1.12). This raises a question: how can all 
that is the case determine all that is not the case? The difficulty is that it might 
seem that all that is not the case is obtained by subtracting all that is the case 
from all that could be the case.33 Accordingly, accounting for the world as the 
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 Wittgenstein (1991, p. 195) puts this point as follows in Gesamtheit und System: “Space 
is the possibility of the ‘where’, time the possibility of the ‘when’, number the possibility 
of the ‘how many’”: one place is one among others, one moment is one among others, a 
number is one among others” (translation mine). This is a crucial criticism addressed by 
Wittgenstein to Russell: “what is false in Russell’s conception is that he builds the points in 
space on the basis of factual events. Such ‘space’ does not go further than our knowledge 
of factual events” (ibid.). 
33
 For a detailed account of these early sections of the Tractatus, see “Negation et totalité 
dans le Tractatus de Wittgenstein”  (Narboux, 2009, p. 128). 
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totality of facts seems to require, as for early Russell, making an inventory of its 
content from a perspective according to which it could be exhausted.34 
Wittgenstein introduces the notion of logical space with “the facts in 
logical space are the world” (TLP, 1.13). This does not imply that facts depend on 
each other. Although the world divides into facts (TLP, 1.2), one fact can be the 
case or not while everything else remains the same (TLP, 1.21). The collective 
whole of facts, the world, is thus not meant to be some thing in which every thing 
can be found (which would involve that something could necessarily exist). On the 
contrary, from the start, Wittgenstein suggests that the misleading appearance of 
the requirement of an existence (of the world as a “necessary” collection of facts) 
results from surreptitiously treating facts as things, which is left aside in 1.1. 
Wittgenstein then defines what counts as a fact: what is the case, the fact, 
is the holding of a state of affairs (das Bestehen von Sachverhalten) (TLP, 2). Next, 
he defines what counts as a state of affairs: a state of affairs is a combination of 
objects (entities, things) (TLP, 2.01). A difference with Russell’s approach can be 
noted: Wittgenstein does not distinguish between facts involving several related 
entities and those involving one and only one simple entity. On the contrary, 
Wittgenstein criticizes the accidental character of the connection between a thing 
and a fact presupposed by any such conception. Granting the accidental character 
of this connection would lead to renouncing the internal relation between a thing 
and a state of affairs (TLP, 2.0121). Insofar as a thing could hold all by itself 
independently from any others, the question would remain of whether or not it 
could fit into a situation. Everything would be as if connecting isolated things to 
the situations in which they could be encountered was necessary.  
However, by affirming that it is essential for a thing that it can count as an 
element of a state of affairs (TLP, 2.011), Wittgenstein suggests that the difficulty 
is actually the opposite. Insofar as something can be situated with respect to 
other things within situations, it can be said to stand independently from others: 
“it is essential to a thing that it may be an element of states of affairs”. The 
possibility of the occurrence of a thing within a state of affairs must be prejudged 
in a thing (TLP, 2.012). That anything could occur into a state of affairs does not 
require either a judgement or a prejudice. It is the independence of things that is 
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 See The Philosophy of Logical Atomism in Logic and Knowledge  (Russell, 2010, pp. 29-
30; 62). 
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at stake and cannot be called into question (TLP, 2.0122). Wittgenstein suggests 
that the intelligibility of something standing by itself requires that it could be a 
constituent of states of affairs in which it would be standing in relation to others: 
2.013 – Every thing (Ding) is, as it were, in a space of possible [states of 
affairs] (Sachverhalte). I can think of this space as empty (leer), but not 
of the thing without the space. (Translation modified). 
That the internal relation between a thing and space cannot be 
conceivably reversed is underlined: the absence of a thing from a space can be 
thought, but the presence of something could not be thought without the 
availability of a space it could occupy.  
Wittgenstein then returns to “objects”, earlier characterized as entities or 
things which can be connected in a state of affairs (TLP, 2.01). As an “entity” or 
“thing”, an “object” (Gegenständ) cannot be conceived independently from its 
possibility of being combined with other objects (TLP, 2.0121c-d). Rather, the 
intelligibility of one’s knowledge of an object requires that one knows the states 
of affairs in which it could be found (TLP, 2.0123) as well its internal properties 
(TLP, 2.01231). Thus, what applies to things also applies to one’s knowledge of 
objects: the absence of an object from a place in space, an empty space may be 
thought, but the presence of an object could not be thought without the 
availability of a space it could occupy. Wittgenstein exemplifies this affirmation in 
four ways (TLP, 2.0131): the spatial object must lie in infinite space; the visual 
speck must have a colour; the tone must have a pitch; the object of touch must 
have hardness. Insofar as they can be thought, spatial objects need to be lying 
somewhere; seen specks to be of some colour; heard tones to be of some pitch; 
touched objects to be of some hardness. A spatial object, a seen speck, a heard 
tone or a touched object count as such insofar as they are one among other 
conceivable ones. Notably, all these examples presuppose the availability of the 
modality under which they can be thought. 
Sections 2.04-2.06 return to the concept of “world” with the distinction 
between facts and states of affairs and the notion of the space of possible states 
of affairs. The totality (Die Gesamtheit) of actually holding (der bestehenden)35 
                                                          
35
 The possibility that a state of affairs holds (when a determinate state affair is 
considered) is its holding (Das Bestehen). This may be distinguished from its holding when 
considered as one among others that are holding (when determinate states of affairs are 
considered collectively), which is their actual holding as a whole (Der bestehenden). 
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states of affairs is the world (TLP, 2.04). Facts are already acknowledged as 
determining the world as a whole by determining both what is the case and what 
is not the case (TLP, 1.11-1.12). Similarly, the totality of holding states of affairs is 
also acknowledged to determine those which do not hold (TLP, 2.05). 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein does not suggest that there is a totality of non-holding 
states of affairs: 
2.06 - [The holding] (Das Bestehen) and [the non-holding] (Nicht 
Bestehenden) of states of affair is reality. 
([The holding] of [states of affairs] (Sachverhalten) we also call a positive 
fact, and [the non-holding] of states of affairs a negative fact). 
(Translation modified) 
Wittgenstein distinguishes a state of affairs that holds from one that does 
not by calling the former a positive fact and the latter a negative fact. This should 
not lead to underestimating a difference that can be noted between “facts” and 
“states of affairs” at this early stage of the Tractatus. While a fact can be negative 
or positive, the same does not apply to states of affairs. This distinction matters in 
order to disarm an obvious difficulty which can arise in any discussion of negative 
facts. In 1918, Russell (2010, p. 42) reported this difficulty: 
One has a certain repugnance to negative facts. The same sort of feeling 
that makes you wish not to have a fact “p or q” going about the world. 
You have a feeling that there are only positive facts, and that negative 
propositions have somehow or other got to be expressions of positive 
facts. When I was lecturing on this subject at Harvard I argued that there 
were negative facts, and it nearly produced a riot: the class would not 
hear of there being negative facts at all. I am still inclined to think that 
there are. 
This difficulty can be rephrased: were we to say that “there is” that which 
is not the case, then that which is not the case would need “to be” or “to exist” in 
order to be said to not be the case. Granting this would lead to an aporia: if a 
negative fact needed “to exist” or “to be” in any sense, then it would need to be 
or exist as a “non-being” or a “non-existent”. Yet, if a negative fact were to exist in 
such a way, then what is not the case would need to be indeterminate, insofar as 
its differentiation from other “non-existents” or “non-beings” would remain at 
best mysterious. 
By distinguishing between facts and states of affairs, Wittgenstein 
provides means to dissolve this aporia. First, as with positive facts, equating 
negative facts with things (the ones “named” by the words used to designate 
them) is misleading. A negative fact is not something, or an entity, that could and 
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would be missing for someone. Rather, something can be absent or lacking to 
someone and a negative fact can be noted. Second, as with positive facts, 
negative facts do not involve only one entity in isolation from all others. The 
absence of something from a space can be noted insofar as it could have occupied 
it, insofar as it could have held in a state of affairs which does not currently hold. 
Third, like facts, states of affairs do not mutually depend on each other (TLP, 
2.061). Furthermore, the holding or not of a state of affairs cannot not be inferred 
(geschlossen werden) from whether another state of affairs holds (TLP, 2.062). In 
no sense would noting that a state of affairs holds or not enable us “to draw the 
conclusion” or “infer” whether or not another one holds. On the one hand, there 
is no such thing as a contradiction that could – as it were – “belong” to the world. 
On the other hand, noting the independence of the eventual holding of states of 
affairs is not informative (i.e., does not provide any information concerning the 
world). 
I can now emphasize that both Wittgenstein and Sartre introduce 
negative facts in order to address the difficulty raised by solipsism. In each case 
this concept is introduced at the beginning of their work, for the notion of 
negative facts enables distinguishing between a relevant and a conceivable 
absence in a way that does not depend on one and only one individual. As 
emphasized, Wittgenstein’s concept of world as the totality of facts does not 
involve restrictions on our use of this concept: “the total reality is the world” (TLP, 
2.063). 
In order to address the issue raised by solipsism, I questioned the 
conceivability of an ineluctable disagreement between language and world that 
would imply a limitation to our uses of these notions. Inasmuch as no limitation is 
implied by Wittgenstein’s introduction of the notion of world, I will now turn to 
the section of the Tractatus in which language is considered, and I will question 
the idea that it involves acknowledging a limitation internal to one’s use of 
“language”. This is evident in the following proposition: 
4.002 - Man possesses the capacity of constructing (bauen) languages, in 
which every sense can be expressed, without having any idea how and 
what each word means (bedeutet) — just as one speaks without 
knowing how the single sounds are produced. 
Colloquial language (Umgangssprache) is a part of the human organism 
and is no less complicated than it.  
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Wittgenstein suggests that anyone can learn any language that others 
have helped to build, and that any language enables expressing every sense (Sinn). 
Nothing requires in advance that anything could not be expressed by anyone. 
Notably, this does not presuppose knowing either how words signify or the 
meaning of words. Wittgenstein does not suggest that languages are built by 
individuals who uniquely have the capacity to build languages. Rather, he stresses 
that, as a part of the human organism, colloquial or everyday language 
(Umgangssprache) is at least as complicated as this organism:  
4.002 – From [colloquial language] it is humanly impossible to gather 
immediately the logic of language (Sprachlogik). 
Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the 
clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because 
the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object 
than to let the form of the body be recognized. 
The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are 
enormously complicated.  
Acknowledging the impossibility of gathering the logic of language 
immediately from everyday language cannot and need not to involve any 
restriction. Acknowledging this impossibility is helpful, as much to internalize the 
autonomy of its everyday uses, as to gather its logic. There is no reason to 
suppose that disguising thought in language was the aim of those who 
contributed to building it. Rather, this shrouding of thought by language is, in fact, 
a clue to the possibility of the agreement of our purposes when attempting to 
gather its logic with the purposes for which language was built. On this reading, 
the Tractatus could not have been written in order to replace, substitute or 
correct ordinary language with an “ideal”, “perfect” or “formal” language, that is, 
with a language of another “sort”.36 
Wittgenstein thus suggests that the complexity of the tacit conventions 
underlying everyday language has been underestimated. He diagnoses that most 
propositions and questions bearing on philosophical things (philosophische Dinge) 
are not false, but nonsensical. This suggests that the importance traditionally 
ascribed to these questions should be reconsidered, as much to acknowledge the 
autonomy of everyday language as to acknowledge the autonomy of philosophy: 
                                                          
36
 On this point, I agree with Friedlander (2001, pp. 103-107). 
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4.003 *…+ we therefore cannot answer questions of this [style] at all 
(dieser Art), but only [establish] (feststellen) their senselessness 
(Unsinnigkeit). (Translation modified)
37
 
Although it is undeniable that such alleged questions have been spelled 
out (and thus involve the past activity of someone), Wittgenstein nevertheless 
rejects that one should have to answer them. This line of analysis leads to the 
second slight modification that I propose: “to state” the senselessness (or 
nonsensicality) of a question does not suffice, since it suggests that their 
senselessness depends on one’s arbitrary decision. Wittgenstein suggests, rather, 
that their senselessness can be established. That is to say, that one can engage in 
a process which ends with the establishment of their senselessness. 
Wittgenstein mentions a question of this style: “the question whether the 
Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful” (TLP, 4.003). This question 
shares an external similarity with everyday questions, as it is composed of a string 
of words in an embedded form (as sometimes in ordinary subordinate clauses, 
such as “she told me that the question of whether he will make it is a complicated 
one”). Such a question could be rewritten as “is the Good more or less identical 
than the Beautiful?” by adding a question mark at its end. Yet the concern such 
string of words raises is that there is no obvious way, without additional 
consideration, to foresee and thereby distinguish what would count from what 
would not count as an answer to it. It can and should be granted that the string is 
composed of familiar words which could each appear in other sentences. Yet 
when disposed in such a way without further explanation, the alleged sense of the 
whole they compose may at best seem intrinsically unsettled. The difficulty is that 
is it unclear how one could fulfil one’s expectation of an answer, for candidate 
answers will be as indeterminate as the alleged question. In other words, the 
alleged answers would be as confused as the alleged question, which means that 
one could not determine whether one’s expectation of an answer has been 
fulfilled: “and so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really 
no problems” (TLP, 4.003). 
 I have thus far questioned the conceivability of an ineluctable 
disagreement between language and world but did not encounter any such thing 
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 The modification of the translation I propose here is an attempt to mark the difference 
between a kind (as this would presuppose that the questions considered by Wittgenstein 
could fall under a category) and the result of an activity. 
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as a reason to consider that limitation could be implied by “the limits of my 
language means the limit of my world” (TLP, 5.6)  
In the Notebooks, 5.6 is immediately followed by the remark below, from 
the 23rd May 1915, which provides the key to deciding on the issue of solipsism:  
There really is only one world soul (Weltsteele), which I for preference 
call my soul, and as which alone I [detect] (erfasse) [this] (das), what I 
call the soul of others. (Translation modified) 
This passage does not appear in the Tractatus, where the following 
appears in its place: 
5.61 - Logic fills the world; the limits of the world are also its limits. 
We cannot therefore say in logic: this and this there is in the world, that 
there is not. 
For that would apparently (sheinbar) presuppose that we exclude 
certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since otherwise logic 
must get outside of the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider 
(Betrachte) these limits from the other side also. 
What (was) we cannot think, that (das) we cannot think; we cannot 
therefore say, what we cannot think. 
How to account for the internal relationship between these passages, if 
there is any? A common element shared by the entry in the Notebooks and 
proposition 5.61 is the use of “this”, an indexical.38 It plays a crucial role in the 
arbitrary contrasting of what we can with what we could not designate (or refer 
to) in the world. The arbitrariness of such a contrast appears when one considers 
such use of language in its internal relation to one’s world. Contrasting two 
objects we can refer to by means of two tokens of “this” with another object we 
can refer to by means of a token of “that” can be done. For example, if we are 
discussing which of three objects we plan to send to someone should be put in a 
given box in which the three objects do not fit. In such a case, we can distinguish 
what can be put in the box from what cannot by taking into account the different 
dimensions of the objects (i.e., their sizes). Given the end of sending these objects 
                                                          
38
 The use of indexicals by Wittgenstein to suggest this point is crucial. In the entry in the 
Notebooks dated the 16
th
 May 1915, Wittgenstein suggests that “what seems to be given 
us a priori is the concept: this – Identical with the concept of the object”. As underlined by 
Ishiguro, if the simplicity of objects is taken to derive from our treatment of them as such, 
so we can always use the expression “this” in order to refer to an object we can refer to by 
a name or a definite description: “for every entity that we can individuate can be referred 
to as ‘this’ or ‘that’, regardless of whether the object is present or absent, or given or not 
given to the senses”  (1969, p. 36). She stresses that this view differs from an approach 
such as that of Russell, according to which the meaning of “this” changes on every 
occasion of its use  (1969, p. 35). On the Tractarian approach, “this” is not a name, and 
cannot be substituted with names or definite descriptions (1969, p. 37). 
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to someone, we could even agree on finding another box that could hold all three 
objects. In such a case, we can consider the three objects and the box as a totality 
in the empirical sense, as a collection of items. 
However, if we apply this line of reasoning in logic, then we treat the 
limits of the world as limitations. As Sullivan  (2013, p. 258) puts it: “limitations 
are boundaries separating what qualifies for inclusion within them from what 
does not”. If in logic we assume there is a conceivable decision with respect to 
what qualifies or not for inclusion in the world, then we presuppose that we could 
discount possibilities from an outer perspective on the world. In the same move, 
the world is treated as a totality in the empirical sense. Importantly, not to 
assume such a scenario is the first element of dispensing with the necessity of 
guaranteeing logic. 
Comparing Wittgenstein’s suggestion in 5.61 to Frege’s (1964, p. 14) 
approach at the beginning of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic might be helpful here:39 
What if beings were even found whose laws of thought flatly 
contradicted ours and therefore frequently led to contrary results even 
in practice? The psychological logician could only acknowledge the fact 
and say simply: those laws hold for them, these laws hold for us. I should 
say: we have here a hitherto unknown type of madness. 
 Frege suggests that one should somehow exclude the possibility that 
“men or other beings” could be discovered and who would be capable of passing 
judgements contradicting our laws of logic. The difficulty Frege (1964, p. 15) spells 
out is not that such “beings” could “reject” the laws of logic, but that they could 
be “right in doing so”: 
If other persons presume to acknowledge and doubt a law in the same 
breath, it seems to me an attempt to jump out of one’s own skin against 
which I can do no more than urgently warn them. 
One can then be tempted “to make” that “what is true is something 
objective and independent of the judging subject”  (Frege, 1964, p. 15) . One 
could also be tempted to consider truth as “unalterable” (thereby assuming truth 
could undergo a process of alteration that could be initiated if it did not belong to 
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 Inasmuch as only the gesture pointed out by Wittgenstein in 5.61 is here studied, I will 
not propose an extensive account of Frege’s rejection of psychologism. With respect to 
the internal relation between this gesture and Frege’s conception of truth, see Sullivan’s 
summary account  (Sullivan & Potter, 2013, pp. 175-176).  
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a domain independent from any of us). This would enable assuring oneself of 
truth irrespective of the constitution of the minds of other “humans or beings”: 
For me there is a domain of what is objective, which is distinct from that 
of what is actual, whereas the psychological logicians without ado take 
what is not actual to be subjective.  (Frege, 1966, p. 16) 
Frege  (1964, p. 17) grants that “every man has his own ideas, which are 
not those of any other”. Nevertheless, he makes an important concession to a 
certain approach to psychologism and thereby to solipsism. For Frege suggests 
that psychologism leads to solipsism through idealism  (Frege, 1964, p. 17). 
Wittgenstein suggests the same but, unlike Frege, he does not suggest that we 
could be constrained to grasping ideas meant to be “within our selves” if there 
were not other ideas external to anyone. Furthermore, logic would and could 
somehow be appointed “arbiter” of conflicts of opinions in order to settle 
disagreements about what we could understand as “outside our own selves”. 
Frege does obviously not deny the availability of logic to anyone when presenting 
his approach as able to render possible a “logical arbitration” of conflicts of 
opinion. However, a tension arises if one admits that the possibility of logic 
presupposes the existence of a distinct “domain of what is objective”. It then 
seems that psychologism (and thereby solipsism) could reject the existence of 
such a domain and thereby could put into question the possibility of logic. This 
could furthermore render impossible a conflict of opinion. The difficulty is then 
that although one considers oneself to be providing a means of a “logical 
arbitration” of conflicts of opinion, there remains a misunderstanding that occurs 
with respect to what a conflict of opinions is. Projection comes to rule.  
To rely on the gesture of arbitrarily contrasting of what we can with what 
we could not designate is to this extent superfluous and misleading, inasmuch as 
this would apparently amount to excluding a possibility. The occupation of a place 
in space manifests, on reflexion, that a possibility holds (cf. TLP, 2.013). It is not 
necessary, and it is misleading to exclude anything in this respect: if a place in 
space is occupied by something, could it be said at all that it “merely” or 
“possibly” occupies that place? In this case, the negation contained in “merely” or 
“possibly” would rather be meant to apply to a possibility that holds, what it 
cannot and need not to. 
At stake is the relevance of the distinction between “objects” and “logical 
objects”, the latter’s existence being rejected by Wittgenstein in 4.441 and 5.4. 
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Furthermore, contrasting individuals on the basis of their “compliance” to the 
“laws of thought” is at stake. A detective’s activity requires him to exclude certain 
possibilities in order to establish the identity of a criminal. But the way in which a 
detective discounts the relevance of a possibility concerning a crime involves its 
intelligibility. However, in logic we are not investigating problems which could be 
solved by means of observation (TLP, 5.551), nor are we concerned with 
incriminating anyone or diagnosing “‘types’ of madness”. Furthermore, in logic it 
is not necessary to coordinate any name with a definite object (TLP, 5.526-
5.5262), so it is not necessary to presuppose the existence of an additional 
domain in order to assure the connection of thought with the world. Our words 
are not reducible to labels of their meanings.40 To presuppose that every word can 
be reduced to a label suggests that the significance of our uses of words could be 
discounted (as if our uses of words could be meaningless until things are labelled 
anew). Moreover, it also points to a difficulty stemming from the assumption that 
logic could depend on a single mode of labelling or a single categorical ordering. 
That multiple ways of labelling can be conceived can be taken into account. 
However, if it is superfluous and misleading to claim an exclusive 
perspective from which sense could be imposed strictures on, is it necessary to 
admit that the determinacy of sense should be renounced? If this were the case, 
then the means provided in 5.62 by Wittgenstein to settle the issue raised by 
solipsism would be inadequate. If determinacy is the only opposite of vagueness, 
then the possibility of vagueness should be excluded in order to settle the issue of 
solipsism. But this would exclude that requiring the determinacy of sense could 
suffice to settle the issue of solipsism without implying a decision. In order to 
suggest that a decision is not implied in settling the issue raised by solipsism, I will 
consider whether it is necessary to set determinacy in opposition to vagueness.  
3.1.2. Determinacy and Sense 
In this section, I argue that the Tractarian requirement of determinacy of 
sense is not an instrument for imposing strictures on the expressions of our 
thoughts. I argue that, on the contrary, requiring determinacy of sense is designed 
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 I here agree with Ishiguro’s (1969) seminal suggestion that conceptions according to 
which ostensive definitions would suffice to account for meaning were already targeted in 
the Tractatus. 
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to render explicit that we can mean precisely without such strictures. Not to know 
what one means or not to know what someone else means can happen. However 
could this always be the case? If it was granted that it could always be the case, 
then it would seem that one could never know what one means or what others 
mean. Consequently, one could be tempted to implement a “legislation” (i.e., a 
set of rules excluding some uses) which could bear on our use of propositions in 
order to assure that they are meaningful, and that some of them are true. 
However, are cases where one does not know what one means or what someone 
else means exceptional or, rather, ordinary? If they are ordinary, then, the 
intelligible occurrence of such cases implies (necessarily or non-contingently) that 
we can distinguish them from other cases where we know exactly what we mean 
by our words. It would then be superfluous and misleading to attempt to provide 
rules to assure that we mean what we mean with the words we use. Such views 
are, in the reading I propose, targeted by Wittgenstein’s account of the 
determinacy of sense. This, nevertheless, does not preclude that either 
clarifications of our language-use or means for clarifying our language-use can be 
shared. As an alternative, Wittgenstein clarifies that the determinacy of the 
senses of our propositions could not be at risk and that we can express our 
ourselves precisely. In the terms of the Tractatus, if it can be shown that a given 
string of signs having one and only one analysis displaying its existential 
presuppositions is the same as counting as a proposition, then it is not necessary 
to exclude that a string of signs which does not have such a unique analysis does 
not count as a proposition. This shows that one can, by means of a given 
proposition, mean exactly what one means, nothing less and nothing more. In 
relation to the issue raised by solipsism, the difficulty implied by granting that the 
determinacy of sense would need to be renounced is that the means provided by 
Wittgenstein to settle the issue raised by solipsism would be inadequate. The first 
question I will thus address is thus whether we need to grant that the Tractarian 
requirement of the determinacy of sense excludes vagueness. 
That the requirement for determinacy would involve, as an unbeknownst 
counterpart, the exclusion of vagueness is suggested by Maddy  (2014, p. 63) and 
Putnam  (2012, p. 349). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein, unlike Frege  (1979, p. 155), 
notably refrains from presenting vagueness as being excluded by the requirement 
of determinacy of sense in the Tractatus. He earlier wrote in the Notebooks, “[i]t 
seems clear that what we mean must always be ‘sharp’ (sharfen)” (NB, 20.6.15), 
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and that “I only want to justify the vagueness (die Vagheit) of ordinary sentences, 
for it can be justified” (NB, 22.6.15). The tension can be addressed as follows. If 
“determinate” (bestimmt in German) is sometimes used as an antonym of 
“vague” (vage in German), another antonym is “indecisive” (unentschlossen). 
Were it used as the contrary of “vague”, “determinate” would mean something 
similar to “sharp” (scharf), making it an adjective used to qualify what one speaks 
about.  
Frege assumes that the user of these terms can be described as 
predicating properties of a boundary (e.g., “a sharp boundary”). But were it used 
as an antonym of “indecisive”, “determinate” would mean something similar to 
“resolute” (entschlossen) in order to describe someone whose words or actions 
express what they mean. Accordingly, used as an opposite of “vagueness” 
(Vagheit), determinacy (Bestimmtheit) is used to mean ascription of a property to 
what one speaks about (e.g., a question or report). However, when used as the 
opposite of “indecision”, determinacy could hardly be said to belong to someone 
as a property. In this use, “determinate” is used to qualify or characterize the 
attitude of someone. The question becomes, whether using “determinacy” as 
Wittgenstein does in relation to “sense” (des Sinnes) implies a requirement which 
could bear on sense: 
3.23 - The requirement (die Forderung) that simple signs be possible is 
the requirement that sense be determinate (Bestimmtheit des Sinnes). 
(Pears &McGuinness)
41
 
Wittgenstein suggests that the requirement of the possibility of simple 
signs is tantamount to requiring the determinacy of sense. He does not use 
“sense” as a term designating a thing whose determinacy is a property awaiting 
ascription. This would involve reifying “sense” or equating it with “substance”. 
That Wittgenstein’s approach to propositions as pictures of reality is 
designed to put into relief our shared ability to use them to communicate 
thoughts to each other has previously been considered. According to 3.23, 
requiring the possibility of simple signs just is requiring that sense is determinate. 
Furthermore, 3.23 has a pivotal role in the Tractatus: key elements of 
Wittgenstein’s approach to images are set out and considerations regarding 
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 Contrary to Ogden, Pears and McGuinness do not translate “die Forderung” as 
“postulate” in 3.23. But they translate “fordern” as “postulate”, like Ogden, in 6.1223. I 
suggest that “requirement” is adequate in both passages. 
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notations are introduced in the passages that follow immediately (TLP, 3.24). He 
suggests later in 6.1223 that the feeling that “logical truths” are required is tied to 
our possibility of requiring an adequate notation. What needs to be explained is 
how the determinacy of sense can be required without also requiring the 
“givenness” (as an essential property) of sense, whether a priori or not? 
To answer this question, marking the distinction between a requirement 
and a process can help. Indecision does not result from a process initiated by 
someone for this purpose. But vague questions and vague answers can be spelled 
out or expressed, requiring someone’s agency or activity. However, doing so could 
not transform indecision into a process that one could both initiate and undergo. 
If one can be uncertain with respect to what could answer a vague question 
(before having realized its vagueness), conversely, one can be surprised by a 
determinate answer to a vague question (after having realized that one’s question 
had a determinate meaning although one did not realize it yet). On this approach, 
in the Tractatus, logic is indifferent to vagueness, which differs to contemporary 
attempts to either account for or exclude its possibility. Indifference with respect 
to vagueness does not presuppose that vagueness could have been excluded by 
indifference. It is not because vagueness constitutes a threat to language use that 
the determinacy of sense is required. Rather, it is because vagueness cannot 
conceivably constitute a threat to language use that the determinacy of sense is 
required. Wittgenstein affirms that “all propositions of our colloquial language are 
actually, just as they are, logically completely ordered” (TLP, 5.5563). 
This affirmation does not imply that ordinary languages use is possible 
only against the background of a logical order that could and should be 
considered independently of its use from an exclusive perspective. To explain this 
point, a parallel can be made with Sartre’s approach, inspired by gestalt 
psychology, as considered previously. Every form implies a background of 
undifferentiated forms: it is immanent to perception to require a background 
which cannot conceivably come to the foreground. Similarly, Wittgenstein 
suggests that the logical ordering of the propositions of our colloquial language is 
immanent to them: acknowledging the impossibility of immediately gathering the 
logic of language is not tantamount to requiring that the possibility of 
indeterminacy in colloquial language should be excluded. Nevertheless, does this 
conversely involve appealing to a conception according to which logic could be 
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ascribed an action, such as “imposing demands on the world” (Putnam, 2012, p. 
349)? 
This question, I suggest, can be answered only if the personification 
involved by such a charge is called into question. If the Tractarian approach to 
logic involves acknowledging the intelligibility of propositions in our everyday 
language as implied by formalized operations that can be done by us, then there 
is no such thing as a tension between our colloquial propositions and logic. I 
suggest that evaluating “sense” solely by means of the yardstick of the verb “give” 
creates this tension. While someone can decide to give something to someone, to 
require that “sense” may be given implies that “sense” depends on one’s decision 
to give it to an item, on the model of labelling an entity. This is what Wittgenstein 
invites us to reconsider in the Tractatus, for he does not presuppose that logic 
could be an author (TLP, 4.312).  
Notably, the requirement of the determinacy of sense in the Tractatus is 
neither meant, as proposed by Kant (1998, pp. 553; A572-B600), to bear on 
“things” nor, as proposed by Frege (1979, p. 155), on “boundaries of concepts”. 
Rather, Wittgenstein suggests that accounting for the determinacy of what is 
meant in ordinary situations cannot involve questioning whether anything is 
meant. Otherwise, everything would be as if the intelligibility of what one can 
attempt to account for was tied to how one accounts for it. Accordingly, the 
intelligibility of any account would depend only on someone’s decisions. 
What requires explanation is why Wittgenstein equates the possibility of 
“simple signs” with requiring the determinacy of sense. Simple signs are defined 
in 3.201 as elements of a completely analysed proposition. In 3.2, they are further 
assimilated to the elements of the propositional sign corresponding to the objects 
involved in a thought and which can be expressed in a proposition. Wittgenstein 
says that simple signs are meant to be called “names” when used in a proposition 
(TLP, 3.202) and further specifies that they stand for (verttrit) objects (TLP, 3.22). 
Combined with others, objects involved in states of affairs are characterized in 
2.021: they form the “substance of the world” (die Substanz der Welt). At this 
stage, their having such a role explains their being characterized as “simple” in 
2.02. Wittgenstein then remarks that if the world had no substance, then whether 
a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. 
As a result, it would be impossible to sketch a picture of the world (Bild der Welt), 
whether true or false (TLP, 2.0212). 
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Explaining this remark involves questioning the relevance of an infinite 
regress: once it is admitted that the sense of a proposition (“p”) could lie in the 
truth of second proposition (“q”), then the sense of “q” could lie in the truth of a 
third proposition (“r”), whose sense could lie in another proposition and so on. It 
would be as if no proposition could depict. Thus, 3.23 invites the reader to 
distinguish the evaluation of the truth from the evaluation of the sense of a 
proposition. A question which bears on the truth of a proposition differs from a 
question which bears on the meaningfulness of a string of signs. To confuse the 
two introduces an appearance of indeterminacy which cannot be dispelled and 
which requires a principle to exclude it. 
However, the scenario according to which the sense of propositions could 
be indeterminate is not presented in a contrastive way: “it is clear that however 
different from the real one an imagined world may be, it must have something – a 
form – in common with the real one” (TLP, 2.022). This form is characterized as 
the “fixed” (feste) one of objects (TLP, 2.023). 
This accounts for the deflationary character of Wittgenstein’s affirmation 
of the availability of a single complete analysis of each proposition (TLP, 3.25). 
This affirmation is echoed in 4.122: “it is obvious that the analysis of propositions 
must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate 
combination”. The motive for the later affirmation can be considered by exposing 
the inanity of a counterfactual scenario: if the world were infinitely complex, it 
nevertheless would have to comprise objects and states of affairs (TLP, 4.2211). 
To affirm the irreducibility of objects and states of affairs can be taken as a claim 
concerning the world if and only if we regard introduced means as able to 
describe it in a way we could not specify. Nevertheless, the independence of the 
world from our notations has earlier been emphasized. The irreducibility of facts 
and states of affairs can thus be understood as a counterpart of providing an 
adequate notation concerning the logic of depiction (TLP, 4.015). 
Indeed, if the end-terms of the analysis of a proposition could depend on 
the truth of another one, then the risk of indeterminacy that has been dispelled 
concerning propositions could resurface at the level of elementary propositions. 
By contrast, conceiving the end-terms of the analysis as elementary propositions 
consisting in immediate concatenations of names (TLP, 4.22) in which objects 
“hang one in another, like the links of a chain” (TLP, 2.03) does not imply 
indeterminacy. In one chain, all links are dependent on each other. Yet each link 
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counts as a link independent of the chain of which it is part (i.e., each one could 
be used to constitute other chains). Consequently, reducing a chain to its 
constitutive links does not involve reducing all chains in which those links could be 
used to its constitutive elements. On the contrary, it suffices to have one chain to 
be able to distinguish its constitutive links. Accordingly, the connection between 
the requirement of the determinacy of sense and the existence of one and only 
one complete analysis of each proposition can be spelled out: given any adequate 
notation, only the mere possibility of a unique complete analysis for each 
proposition is required. So it is unsurprising that simple signs turn out to be words 
in 4.026. 
Requiring that sense is determinate is not so much an obstacle as an 
invitation to both require and provide helpful means. By contrast, inasmuch as 
logic is involved, in case it is taken for a universal medium, the attribution of 
mistakes to it is unhelpful: “Logic must take care of itself. A possible sign must also 
be able to signify. Everything which is possible in logic is also permitted” (TLP, 
5.473). If someone yields to the temptation of imputing an illogical use of signs (or 
a logical mistake), then that one presupposes that one is entitled to differentiate 
between licit and illicit uses of signs. However, the counterpart of such a move is 
that the limits of the expressions of our thoughts are taken for limitations. 
Nonsense would result from the transgression of such limitations rather than 
from not having given a meaning to some constituent parts (and not to a whole) 
of a would-be proposition, i.e. to a string of signs (TLP, 5.473). 
However, this is the view that the Tractatus invites us to come to terms 
with: “every possible proposition is legitimately constructed” (TLP, 5.4733). 
Requiring the autonomy of logic does not involve acknowledging that one is 
conceivably restricted by ordinary expressions. The Tractatus suggests, rather, 
that it really is up to anyone who engages in logic to make sure that the rules for 
operating with signs that she implements are appropriate to the scale of what she 
projects to account for: 
5.475 - It is only a matter of constructing (zu bilden) a system of signs of 
a determinate number of dimensions – of a [determinate] (bestimmten) 
mathematical [manifoldness] (Mannigfaltigkeit). (Translation modified) 
This approach is meant to provide means to realize that an a priori 
hierarchizing of the forms of elementary propositions is inconceivable (TLP, 
5.556). One can anticipate the results of what one construes, which precludes the 
140 
 
conceivability of an ordering of elementary propositions into classes. A 
classification of elementary propositions could not be “pre-shaped” or “dictated” 
by an a priori set of ordered concepts. Applying logic surely involves grasping what 
one does. However, to require this for oneself does not suggest that anything 
could be “transformed” by what one thereby does (TLP, 5.557). If it is not possible 
to specify elementary propositions a priori, then wishing to specify them must 
lead to obvious nonsense (TLP, 5.5571). 
I have attempted to show that 5.61 perfects the criticism of would-be 
attempts to rule on our language-uses. This is shown by the unhelpfulness of 
contrasting what can with what could not be referred to. That one may point to 
something in space not only involves the possibility of this place in space being 
occupied, but also that this place is effectively occupied. What one can point to 
manifests that what, on reflexion, can be thought, is the actual holding of a 
possibility. Doing so does not preclude the possibility that disagreements and 
misunderstandings may occur with respect to the designatum of an indexical (for 
different dimensions of an object can be evaluated, such as size, colour, texture, 
etc.). Rather, the very intelligibility of such disagreements and misunderstandings 
rests on our ability to designate things by means of indexicals like “this”. The 
implementation of logical notations implies our past appropriation of ordinary 
language. It can be granted that logical notations do not depend on ordinary 
language, but it is not necessary to admit that they could provide grounds to 
impose strictures on ordinary language. 
The difficulty is that, on the one hand, the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s 
contemporaries’ approach to logic suggests that strictures would need to be 
imposed on sense.42 On the other hand, solipsism seems to call the possibility of 
agreement into question. Our difficulty can be stated: can an agreement which 
neither disqualifies ordinary language nor makes undue concession to solipsism 
nevertheless be reached? 
                                                          
42
 See, for example, Sullivan’s account of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell (2002, pp. 55-
56). 
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3.2. “To what Extent is Solipsism a Truth?” 
In this section, I will argue that the issue raised by solipsism can be settled 
to the extent that it contains a core of truth that it is perfectly adequate to 
appropriate. At the beginning of this chapter, I sketched a new reading of 
Wittgenstein’s approach to the question of solipsism. As an important point of 
controversy, I singled out the issue of whether solipsism can be ascribed to 
Wittgenstein. As indicated earlier, Hacker reads Wittgenstein’s approach to “the 
Mystical” (TLP, 6.44-6.45; 6.522) as playing a cardinal role in the Tractatus and 
proposes to read this work as an expression of “transcendental solipsism” 
(Hacker, 1986, p. 215). Diamond (2011, pp. 240; 261-263) suggests, on the 
contrary, that Wittgenstein criticizes solipsism in the Tractatus and questions an 
attitude of resignation with respect to the limits of language. Friedlander (2014, 
pp. 62-64) suggests that Wittgenstein criticizes solipsism in the Tractatus but that 
“the truth in solipsism” encapsulates the task of “realizing the self as the capacity 
to agree with the world expressed as ‘the world is my world’”. 
While studying Sartre’s approach, I addressed the suggestion that the 
difficulties posed by solipsism are irreducible to the correct identification or 
ascription of intention to someone. Instead, Sartre proposes a characterization of 
the felt counterpart of an attitude that he also calls “blindness with respect to 
others” after having rejected a categorical approach to the other. On this 
approach, identifying someone could be accounted for in terms of the correct 
belonging of individuals to a category. I attempted to show in part 3.1. that the 
beginning of the section of solipsism in the Tractatus consists of a criticism of a 
priori categorical approaches to world and language. I now suggest that the 
criticism of the a priori categorical understanding of others is a common aspect of 
Sartre’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to solipsism. Wittgenstein’s approach 
involves confronting a difficulty that calls into question the relevance of an 
ordering of different versions of solipsism.43 Consider this section: 
5.62 - This remark provides [the] (den) key to the question, to what 
extent (inwieweit) solipsism is a truth. 
                                                          
43
 If it is true that Wittgenstein calls into question the possibility of “sorts” of solipsism, 
then it probably also calls into question whether we can distinguish “types” (Johnstone, 
1991, p. 1991) of solipsism. 
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In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but 
it shows itself (zeigt sich). 
That the world is my world, shows itself in, that the limits of language 
(the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world. 
(Translation modified) 
Wittgenstein suggests that there are appropriate means (the key) to settle 
the question “to what extent solipsism is a truth”. This involves (linguistic) means 
which have been construed on the model of ordinary locks built by somebody. 
This question can be rephrased as: “to what extent is solipsism a truth?” However, 
performing such operations on signs would not presuppose that an answer could 
and should be provided to this question. This would require granting that the 
question is meaningful as it stands. Rather, whether the string of signs displays 
any sense, and thereby whether there is any question awaiting an answer, could 
be what Wittgenstein calls into question. It is worth recalling in this context the 
assertion made in 4.003 that most propositions and questions written about 
philosophical matters are not false, but senseless. 
If, then, the question raised in 5.62 is rhetorical, the usefulness of its 
written expression could reside in providing a means for determining the stakes of 
answers to the question “to what extent is solipsism is a truth?” Doing so would 
neither suggest that solipsism is meaningful nor “render it unthinkable”, as in 
Sartre’s early attempt to provide “the sole possible refutation to solipsism”; 
rather, it enables us to measure what we are committing ourselves to when we 
linguistically call into question the existence of other minds. 
Within the classical approach, I could call into question the existence of 
other minds by doubting the existence of the world. I will attempt to explain the 
shift in Wittgenstein’s way of addressing solipsism at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. In ordinary situations, in order to measure an extent, I need a 
rule. With respect to solipsism, as suggest the Notebooks, the difficulty is the 
assumption of one’s alleged duty to judge, report and measure irrespective of any 
past: 
What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world! 
I want to report how I found the world. 
I have to judge the world, to measure things. (NB, 2.9.16) 
According to the attitude characterized by Wittgenstein, one would simply 
assume that one could judge the world (as a whole), measure things (somehow 
altogether) by presupposing that one could have an ability to do so that no one 
143 
 
else could have (that one could have had legitimately inherited from oneself, as it 
were). So if the question raised in 5.62 by Wittgenstein is taken as a challenge 
bearing on one’s ability to decide on its meaningfulness, thus admitting that it 
could be meaningful, then the following gap seems to open: either I can decide or 
I cannot decide on the extent to which solipsism is a truth. 
Inasmuch as I assume my unsettledness with respect to the 
meaningfulness of such a choice, two approaches were available. I can assume 
that I can or cannot decide of the truth of solipsism, for solipsism could be 
partially true (the discovery of its partial truth would then be an event whose 
probability could be envisaged). Or I can assume that I can or cannot decide on 
the truth of solipsism, for solipsism could not have been partially true.  
If I assume I cannot decide on the truth of solipsism, then, on reflexion, I 
had two options. In the first, I assume that I was unable to make such a decision, 
for I assumed that solipsism is partially true and that the discovery of its partial 
truth is an event I could have envisaged. Thereby I granted that my thoughts are 
hostage to facts, and that other options could have lacked, for I cannot verify this 
probability. In this case, I assumed I could have been partly false with respect to 
my decision in a way that could have depended on facts and could not have been 
established. Then, I would have assumed that the eventuality of a mismatch 
between my representations and the world could have been unavoidable. It could 
always be possible that my representations could be false. But then, I assume that 
truth is inherently vague and admit gradations. 
In the second option, I assumed that I was unable to take such a decision, 
for I assumed that solipsism is partially true and that it never has been a mere 
possibility. Thereby I admitted that I can be unfair to facts and that it is an option. 
In this case, I assumed I am partially true with respect to my decision in a way that 
depended on facts and could not be established. Then, I assumed that the 
eventuality of a harmony between my representations and the world is necessary. 
It could always be possible that my representations could be true. But then, I 
would assume that facts could be inherently vague and admit gradations. 
This disjunction between two ways of remaining unsettled with respect to 
the issue raised by solipsism mirrors the difficulty tied to the implicit reliance on 
the analogy with the visual field as a model for reflexion. I suggest that this 
difficulty is similar to Sartre’s concern with “mineness” in Being and Nothingness. 
That is to say, were I to acknowledge on reflexion that my relations to others 
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depend solely on how I represent those relations to myself (from a “theoretical” 
or “exclusive perspective”), then I could come to question the independence of 
the world from my will. Could I will this at all? 
To address this tension, I will first return in part 3.2.1. to the manner in 
which Wittgenstein introduces his approach to images before they are assimilated 
to images of reality (TLP, 4.01). His approach dissolves the double difficulty of an 
alleged unavoidable mismatch between one’s representations and the world, as 
well as an alleged necessary harmony between one’s representations and the 
world. I will suggest that these two opposed fictions are to be dismissed in order 
to account for the role of the section on solipsism in the Tractatus (before 
Wittgenstein’s appeal to recognizing the nonsensicality of his propositions in 
5.62). Then, I will turn in part 3.2.2. to the fiction considered by Wittgenstein in 
5.62, that of “the language that *alone+ I understand” (TLP, 5.62; translation 
modified), in order to stress that Wittgenstein invites the solipsist to focus on the 
public dimension of our uses of language. 
Wittgenstein does apparently suggest, in a transitional way (i.e., before 
his invitation to recognize the nonsensicality of his propositions in 6.54), that the 
possessive determiner “my” can be applied to “world” (TLP, 5.6; 5.63) rather than 
to “my-representation-of-the-world” (e.g., as Schopenhauer suggests). In order to 
suggest the relevance of such a step, I will return, in section 3.2.1., to 
Wittgenstein’s assimilation of propositions to images of reality in 4.01 and suggest 
that his approach provides the means of avoiding both an unavoidable mismatch 
and a necessary harmony between one’s representations and the world. I will 
suggest in section 3.2.2. that Wittgenstein, by considering the fiction of “the 
language that only I understand” (TLP, 5.62), invites the solipsist to focus on and 
acknowledge the public dimension of appropriation in the use of language. The 
public character of language excludes that there could be an ineluctable 
disagreement between someone’s conception of the world and one’s expressions. 
3.2.1. Pictures and Reality 
If the question “to what extent solipsism is a truth?” is taken as bearing on 
one’s ability to decide, through reflexion, whether it can count as a question, then 
a double concern arises. On the one hand, it raises the issue of an unavoidable 
mismatch between one’s representations and the world, the opposite of which 
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leads to assuming the possibility that one’s thought could be hostage to facts. On 
the basis of such an approach, some facts could compel one to think in some way, 
although one would be vaguely uncertain about being compelled to think in that 
way. On the other hand, it could raise the issue of a necessary harmony between 
one’s representations and the world, the opposite of which leads to assuming a 
would-be permission for facts to be taken hostage by one’s thought. On the basis 
of such an approach, one’s mind might discount facts in some way, although one 
would be vaguely uncertain about whether facts could be discounted in that way. 
If I consider these two possibilities, which immediately raise the collective 
dimension of the issues raised by solipsism, I do so while recognizing that 
criticizing the relevance of the use of the image of tribunals in philosophical 
contexts is not tantamount to discounting the intelligibility of the practices 
involved in tribunals. Already in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein has taken one of 
those practices to exemplify his conception of propositions: 
In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As 
when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by 
means of dolls, etc.) (NB, 29.9.14) 
Wittgenstein alludes to the use of dolls to represent accidents in order to 
evaluate responsibilities in tribunals. Inasmuch as dolls provide a collective means 
enabling us to represent an accident, they allow us to survey and follow a public 
procedure that suffices to evaluate a case. (This point shall be further developed 
in the present section). For now, although for all the reasons we considered 
earlier Wittgenstein does not grant that philosophy could and should be 
concerned with legislating on sense, the above quoted passage shows plainly that 
he nevertheless thinks that our approach to language should not present fewer 
dimensions than the practices involved in tribunals. 
I suggest that this aspect of Wittgenstein’s approach to propositions 
should be taken into account in order to read the section on solipsism in the 
Tractatus. That is to say, Wittgenstein apparently suggests, in a transitional way, 
that the possessive “my” can be used with “world” (TLP, 5.6; 5.63) rather than 
with my-representation-of-the-world. This is a step which, I suggest, enables 
dispelling the unsettledness that can occur in reflexion on solipsism. That is to say, 
Wittgenstein considered the possibility of someone becoming confused with 
respect to their inhabitation of their world, rather than “some” world (that is, one 
among others).  
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However, Wittgenstein does not presuppose that such uncertainty would 
require relying on an alleged law of third-middle in order to exclude, as it were, 
the very possibility of vagueness, a position tied to his implicit rejection of the 
appeal to logic as an arbiter that could be appointed to resolve conflicts of 
opinion. These elements are, I suggest, crucial for addressing the issue of 
solipsism in the way Wittgenstein puts forward, that is, by providing the means to 
settle the question “to what extent solipsism is a truth?” 
For this reason, I will return to the way in which Wittgenstein introduces 
his approach to images prior to the assimilation of propositions to images of 
reality in 4.01, in order show that his approach is designed to dissolve concerns 
with respect to our ability to represent the world to ourselves by means of 
language (as much in the approach of a transcendental idealism as in the 
approach of metaphysical realism). 
In part 3.1.1., I proposed reading the sections prior to the assimilation of 
the world to the whole of reality in 2.063 as arguing that, pace both 
transcendental idealism and metaphysical realism, our use of the concept of 
world does not presuppose acknowledging a limitation. The commentary I 
proposed stopped at the assimilation of the world to the whole of reality in 2.063. 
The section on pictures starts with: “we make to ourselves pictures of 
facts” (TLP, 2.1.). Insofar as no argument is provided by Wittgenstein, 2.1 could be 
taken as a rather superfluous and idealist demand of realism or as a necessary and 
realist demand of idealism. In any case, it can also be taken as engaging with a 
concern that could be voiced in connection with in an idealist approach at this 
stage: that of how we can dispel the vague uncertainty about whether we are 
lacking the means to picture to ourselves all the facts that correspond to the 
states of affairs that hold and together are the world. If we could have been 
lacking those means, then we could have been condemned to an unavoidable 
mismatch between our representations and the world. 
2.13 provides a key to solving this difficulty: to the objects correspond in 
the picture, the elements of this picture. That is, to the determinate 
concatenations of objects in states of affairs (TLP, 2.031-2.032) correspond 
determinate concatenations of elements in pictures: “The picture consists in that 
its elements are combined with one another in a determinate way” (TLP, 2.14). To 
each object of a state of affairs corresponds an element which stands for it 
(vertreten) in the proposition that depicts it (TLP, 2.1511). The picture may 
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thereby be assimilated to a fact (TLP, 2.141). A fact is characterized by its ability to 
present (stellt) facts in logical space, the holding or not of states of affairs (TLP, 
2.11). Thereby, it can be equated with a model of reality (Modell der Wirklichkeit) 
(TLP, 2.12). The determinate combination of elements composing a picture can be 
used to present (stellt) determinate combinations of things (TLP, 2.15). That a 
picture can present combinations of things rather than represent them should be 
noted: a picture can present a combination whose possibility was previously 
unknown to someone. That is to say, room is left for novelty (which obviously 
does not imply that every picture presents an unknown possibility). 
The structure of a picture is the connection among its elements, and the 
form of depiction of a picture (Form der Abbildung) is the possibility of this 
structure (TLP, 2.15). With this distinction, Wittgenstein inverts the direction of 
the argument. What is required by a picture to count as a fact is that which 
isquestioned at this stage: “In order to be a picture, a fact must have something in 
common with what it pictures” (TLP, 2.16). 
What a picture must have in common with reality if it is to be a fact is the 
form of depiction (TLP, 2.16-2.17). This does not involve any restriction with 
respect to what a picture can depict. Using the same examples as in 2.0131, 
Wittgenstein specifies that the picture can represent every reality whose form it 
has (spatial objects, coloured objects, etc.). Nevertheless, the form of depiction 
cannot itself be depicted by a proposition. Rather, the form of depiction is shown 
forth by the image (TLP, 2.172). 
Wittgenstein further distinguishes between the form of depiction (form 
der Abbildung) and the form of representation (form der Darstellung) of a picture. 
The latter is the standpoint of the picture, a standpoint from outside the object of 
the picture (TLP, 2.173). The form of depiction is the possibility of the connection 
among the elements of a picture in a determinate way, but the standpoint of that 
picture on its object is its form of representation. A picture cannot either depict 
its form of depiction (TLP, 2.172) or stand outside its form of representation (TLP, 
2.174). 
Wittgenstein connects the correctness of the presentation of an object by 
a picture to its form of representation (TLP, 2.173). The relevance of this 
distinction can be explained as follows: it is insofar as a picture conveys its form of 
depiction that its displaying a form of representation can be called into question 
(e.g., did I ever see the state of affairs this picture depicts?). We have seen that a 
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picture conveys the possibility that objects can be combined in a state of affairs in 
a determinate way. To depict determinately a state of affairs requires that the 
depicting fact shares with the depicted fact a form, which is the form of depiction. 
Conversely, for a state of affairs to be depicted requires the depicting fact to be 
distinct from the depicted fact. The image has a form of representation, that is, it 
stands for a determinate combination of elements with which it cannot be 
identical. This in turn enables determination of whether it represents its object 
either correctly or falsely. The question of whether a depicting fact (the picture) 
depicts the depicted fact (the state of affairs it represents) correctly can be posed 
if and only if a depicting fact (a picture and thereby a proposition) is considered. 
The distinction between the form of depiction and the form of 
representation matters when confronting the issue of solipsism, for it enables us 
to account for the independence of possibilities, which are the medium of 
representation  (Friedlander, 2001, p. 55) and which could not be affected by 
anyone. 
A requirement concerning pictures can thus be spelled out in 2.18: for any 
picture to be able to depict reality, it must share its logical form (die logische 
Form), that is, the form of reality (die Form der Wirklichkeit). If the form of 
depiction is logical, then the picture is a logical picture (TLP, 2.181). This does not 
involve any restriction with respect to the ability of pictures to depict reality. To 
distinguish logical pictures is not to distinguish them from allegedly “non-logical” 
pictures. Rather, Wittgenstein questions what is reflexively required for a picture 
to determinately depict a fact. If a picture depicts, then it is a determinate 
combination of elements with a logical form or form of reality in common with a 
determinate combination of objects in a state of affairs that could hold. To this 
extent, saying of a picture that it is logical is not asserting that pictures are things 
which fall under the “logical”. Rather, it is to say that every picture is a logical one 
(TLP, 2.182) and can depict the world (TLP, 2.19). 
Wittgenstein can thus account as much for the independence of pictured 
facts as for the autonomy of the picturing ones: “the picture has the logical form 
of [depiction] (logische Form der Abbildung) in common with what it [depicts] 
(dem Abgebildeten)” (translation modified, TLP, 2.2). Insofar as an image shows 
the possibility of combining elements in a determinate way, whether the depicted 
fact holds is independent of the depicting fact. However, inasmuch as an image 
depicts elements combined in a determinate way, the image depicts the 
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possibility of a fact independent of its holding or not. What a picture depicts is the 
possibility of a holding state of affairs (TLP, 2.201). What it presents to the one 
who sees it is that one has imagined a possible situation within logical space (TLP, 
2.202). 
The counterpart of the independence of pictures from states of affairs is 
the dependence of their truth or falsity on reality: the distinction between the 
false and the true cannot conceivably apply to pictures irrespective of everything 
else (TLP, 2.224). If the truth of a picture is questioned on the basis of its 
agreement with reality (i.e., “does the state of affairs depicted by the picture 
hold?”), then recognizing (erkennen) its truth or falsity involves a comparison with 
reality (TLP, 2.223). Thereby, as a comparison with reality is involved in the 
recognition of the truth or falsity of that which is depicted by a proposition, there 
is no such thing as an image which is true a priori (TLP, 2.225). 
Wittgenstein here highlights the internal limit of an a priori conception of 
investigation. It is nothing less than a central pivot to the Kantian enterprise which 
is thus called into question. In the introduction of the First Critique, a priori 
knowledge is equated with knowledge which is absolutely independent of any 
experience  (Kant, 1998, p. 137; B4). By contrast, in the Tractatus, by rejecting 
that it is conceivable to determine a priori the truth or falsity of an image, 
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that knowledge can be acquired a priori. If anything 
is to be argued against Kant, it is that knowledge is acquired a posteriori. That 
Wittgenstein questions the very conceivability of a priori investigation is plain in 
3.04: “a correct a priori thought would be one whose possibility guaranteed its 
truth”. Such a thought would need to be one whose truth could be evaluated 
without any conceivable “object of comparison” (TLP, 3.05). According to this 
approach, if an investigation can provide any knowledge, then it is not a priori. 
And if anything is done a priori, then it cannot and need not be an investigation. 
Thus, the possibility of an unavoidable mismatch between one’s 
representations and the world has been dispelled. Inasmuch as one can imagine 
determinately one fact, one has the means to represent to oneself any of the facts 
that correspond to holding states of affairs and that together are the world. That 
is to say, I cannot assume any longer that the discovery of the partial truth of 
solipsism is an event whose probability I could have envisaged, due to my inability 
to verify it. My thought could not have been solely dependent on facts in any 
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sense. The eventuality of an unavoidable mismatch between my representations 
and the world was a fiction. 
However, this approach can be judged to be a rather excessive and 
idealist demand of realism or as a rather superfluous and realist demand of 
idealism. That is to say, in a transcendental idealist approach, or in a purely realist 
approach, it can seem that dispelling the fiction of an unavoidable mismatch 
between one’s representations and the world commits one to the opposed 
fiction: namely, that of a necessary harmony between one’s representations and 
reality. The questions that should be addressed is then what can establish that 
facts suffice to express whatever one wishes to express? How can we dispel the 
vague uncertainty that we are not lacking the means to express ‘all’ that we could 
imagine, that is, all the facts that correspond to holding states of affairs and which 
altogether are the world? 
Section 3 of the Tractatus, I suggest, answers such concerns. It starts with 
the assimilation of the logical picture of the fact (Das logische Bild der Tatsachen) 
to the thought (der Gedanke). Wittgenstein immediately suggests that thinking a 
state of affairs is literally making a picture of it (TLP, 3.001). A picture of the world 
(ein Bild der Welt) is the totality of true thoughts (TLP, 3.01). This accounts for the 
possibility of several pictures of the world without either precluding their 
distinctness (which would involve the relevance of dogmatism) or presupposing 
their incommensurability (which would involve the relevance of relativism). 
Accounting for their commensurability requires inverting the traditional 
conception of the relation between the possible and the thinkable (as Sartre does; 
cf. BN, 28-29; 105). We do not have to extract the conditions of possibility which 
compel thought in an unbeknownst way. Rather, what can be thought is possible 
(TLP, 3.02): it is the conditions of intelligibility that require reflexion, inasmuch as 
we cannot think illogically (TLP, 3.03). Accounting for the way in which a 
determinate thought can be perceptibly expressed by means of a proposition 
(TLP, 3.1) therefore suffices to render explicit that we can dispel the alleged 
eventuality of being unable to express whatever we might wish to express. If it is 
possible to express determinately one thought by means of a fact, then that any 
thought can be expressed by means of a fact will be rendered clear. 
Wittgenstein calls the sign by means of which a thought can be expressed 
a propositional sign (TLP, 3.12). That is to say, abstracted from its projective 
relation to the world, the proposition is a propositional sign. Considered in its 
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projective relation to the world, the propositional sign is a proposition. The 
upshot of 3.14 is to render explicit that the propositional sign is a fact. 
Wittgenstein presents ordinary forms of expression, whether written or printed, 
as blurring the way in which the propositional sign is a fact (TLP, 3.143). He 
suggests that in a printed proposition, a proposition-sign (Satzzeichen) is not seen 
in a way that differs from the word. He furthermore suggests that this absence of 
notational difference between a proposition-sign and a word is what enables 
Frege to call the proposition a compounded name (zusammengesetzen Namen).  
At this stage, Wittgenstein implicitly confronts two conceptions: Frege’s 
conception of propositions as proper names of truth-values conceived as 
objects,44 and Russell’s conception of facts as involving the existence of objects of 
acquaintance with either one or several entities.45 He then provides a key to 
dissolving difficulties rising from treating propositions as correlatives of “internal” 
images  (Frege, 1966, p. 61) or as correlated to “external” entities (as for Russell): 
3.14 - The propositional sign (Satzzeichen) consists in the fact that its 
elements, the words, [stand] (verhalten) in it in a [determinate] 
(bestimmte) way. / The propositional sign is a fact (Tatsache). 
(Translation modified) 
Facts or determinate combinations of objects in states of affairs (TLP, 
2.031-2.032), can be depicted with determinate combinations of elements (TLP, 
2.13-2.14) and expressed with propositional signs, which are facts consisting in 
determinate combinations of words (TLP, 3.14). Wittgenstein’s diagnosis with 
                                                          
44
 A clear expression of early Frege’s (1966, p. 65) view on this point is the following: “By 
the truth value of a sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or false. There 
are no further truth values. For brevity I call the one the True, the other the False. Every 
declarative sentence concerned with the reference of its words is therefore to be 
regarded as a proper name, and its reference, if it has one, is either the True or the False. 
The two objects are recognized, if only implicitly, by everybody who judges something to 
be true – and so even by a sceptic”. 
45
 According to early Russell’s “logical atomism”: (i) in response to sceptical arguments we 
should maintain that our knowledge of the external world is based solely upon our 
acquaintance with sense-data somehow related to particular entities (1914, p. 71); (ii) our 
knowledge about the external world based on acquaintance with meanings rather than 
sense-data would enable us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience (2009, p. 
198); (iii) what lies beyond those limits – and thus the external world – is reducible to 
independent and simple entities from which facts can be formed when related to each 
other. Facts are complexes or molecular when involving several entities. Facts are simple 
or atomic when involving one and only one simple entity (2003, pp. 91-96); and (iv) 
correlatively, Russell claims that we can obviously “see” that other people’s mind are not 
directly perceived (1905, p. 480). Indeed, what we know about others minds, as with 
physical objects, is tied to acquaintance with the contents of our minds or introspection 
(2009, p. 193). 
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respect to conceptions of propositional signs which do not treat them as facts is 
that they fail to account for the significance of the spatial positions of the signs 
composing a propositional sign. This failure undermines the idealist explanation of 
seen spatial relations inasmuch as it cannot account for the multiplicity of these 
relations (TLP, 4.0412). 
This does not imply that the relations of signs are reducible to spatial ones. 
But it does imply that the spatial relations of the signs composing a propositional 
sign contribute to the sense of complex signs in determinate ways. To account for 
this, Wittgenstein suggests the following: 
3.1431 ― The [essence] (das Wesen) of the propositional sign becomes 
very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, 
chairs, books) instead of written signs. (Translation modified) 
Wittgenstein invites his readers to imagine a situation by using spatial 
objects in place of the names of objects one ordinarily uses. This procedure is 
similar to the previously described practice of using dolls in a tribunal to represent 
a situation publicly. This immediately implies that not every configuration of 
spatial objects would be relevant to representing the relations of the objects 
depicted by a given proposition. Any change in the positions of the spatial objects 
used in place of names of objects contained in a proposition would involve 
different imagined situations. Finding a relevant positioning of the spatial objects 
standing for names of objects involved in a given proposition is tantamount to 
finding a way of saying with spatial objects what is pictured by means of that 
given proposition. To imagine such a situation suffices to bring out that the spatial 
or external relations of the signs standing for objects in a propositional sign 
determinately contribute to the expression of relations internal to objects in 
imagined situations. Although the convention is specified arbitrarily, the 
determinacy of what it permits expressing does not depend on its user. In section 
4, Wittgenstein suggests that this convention can be used to form propositions 
and evaluate reality (TLP, 4.023). 
This suggestion clarifies his earlier assimilation of a picture to a scale 
(Maßstab) when it is applied to reality (TLP, 2.1512). After having read a 
proposition, one can fix reality, that is to say, determine whether the depicted 
fact holds by evaluating it against the yardstick of the depicting fact considered. 
Thus, one can provide to oneself the answer to a determinate question that one 
poses to oneself when considering a depicting state of affairs (i.e., a proposition). 
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If the depicted state of affairs holds, then it is a positive fact. If the depicted state 
of affairs does not hold, then it is a negative fact. Obviously, the positive answer 
(yes) does not amount to the correct answer any more than the negative answer 
(no) amounts to the incorrect one. 
Thus, the eventuality of a necessary harmony between one’s 
representations and the world is dispelled. Inasmuch as one can express 
determinately one fact, one cannot be short of the means to express to others 
any fact that corresponds to a holding states of affairs, which taken together are 
the world. Furthermore, one can question and provide to oneself independent 
responses with respect to any fact in a way that does not depend on one and only 
one individual. Thus, I cannot assume any longer that the discovery of the whole 
truth of solipsism could be an event whose probability I could have envisaged, for 
I could have been unable to verify it. Facts could not have been solely dependent 
on my thoughts in any sense. The eventuality of a necessary harmony between 
my representations and the world was a fiction. 
I have tried so far to show that the difficulty raised by Wittgenstein in 5.62 
with respect to solipsism can thus be solved. Someone cannot willingly deny the 
independence of the world in any sense. The reading I have proposed of 
Wittgenstein so far is thus independent of any fact, but it is also compatible with 
the intelligibility of any of them. Anyone can represent to themselves that some 
facts differ from what they imagine, and anyone can say to themselves that some 
facts should be acknowledged. The question of “to what extent solipsism is a 
truth?” cannot bear on one’s ability to decide on it. No more but no less can be 
foreseen. And this surely matters with respect to the issue of solipsism, for 
arbitrariness is involved in the implementing of notations. To this extent a (public) 
dimension of conventionality is involved in language, even at the level of an 
impersonal representation of the world by means of completely generalized 
propositions. 
However, with solipsism, it is one’s willingness to decide by oneself and, 
thereby, one’s commitment to one’s world which is at stake. Could I report, judge 
and measure an alleged absence of the world or of any past?  
As stated earlier, the classical approach is supposed to enable me to call 
into question the existence of other minds by questioning the existence of the 
world. What I assume to be dispelled at this stage is the relevance of such a 
scenario. The past acknowledgement of the existence of other minds is 
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presupposed by any questioning concerning one’s “singling out” of oneself from 
them. It could not have been true that other minds did not exist.   
This immediately raises the question, then, of how to understand the idea 
that “what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said but it shows 
itself”? At this stage of the Tractatus, this explicitly suggests that solipsism 
contains a core of truth. 
As a reminder, Sartre suggested that attempts to refute solipsism lead us 
to reproduce the difficulty from which solipsism stems. Inasmuch as alleged 
doubts with respect to the existence of the world or other minds cannot be 
grounded in experience, his “theory of the existence of other minds” is best 
conceived as conceptual means to dispel the appearance of doubt with respect to 
the existence of others minds (and thus irreducible to an alleged “proof of the 
existence of others”). Now, with Wittgenstein, we considered that our medium 
(language) could not depend on one user at the exclusion of another, and that it is 
internal to it to display that which has been meant by an author, even eventually 
contrary to one’s self-ascribed intentions. On reflexion, the inconceivability of 
proof of the existence of others minds mirrors the inconceivability of a refutation 
of the inexistence of others minds. 
This is to say that our medium, language, will eventually show, even 
against one’s self-ascribed intentions of providing such proof, one’s unsettlement 
with the existence of other minds. Inasmuch as it could not have been the case for 
someone to be the only one there is, on occasion it can be said that one acted as 
if one were the only one (nothing new; rather something any language-user knew 
already). Nevertheless, there is no such thing as (intentionally) showing (as when 
someone shows to someone else a picture) that solipsism is inconceivable. This 
would commit one to providing the counterexample of what one could have 
wished to establish. 
Not to take solipsism to be raising a meaningful question does not thereby 
involve making a decision on what “solipsism” can come to mean at one’s 
expense, particularly in its linguistic manifestation, as the doctrine according to 
which one alone could fix the limits of the thinkable. Sense does not await being 
decided. This does not mean that there are no limits to language, but rather that 
inasmuch as they could not have constrained anyone, it is up to one to situate 
oneself with respect to them by means of appropriate uses.  
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Nevertheless, that anyone could decide to “check” the “extent of the 
truth of solipsism” is surely not incidental in the Tractatus. To provide a reading of 
the section on solipsism requires accounting for its composition. As considered 
earlier, Wittgenstein apparently suggests, at least transitorily, that the possessive 
determiner “my” can be used with “world” (TLP, 5.6; 5.63) rather than with my-
representation-of-the-world. Marking the difference between one’s world and 
“some” world could be significant, for if one did not mark it, then a possibility 
would apparently be excluded. As recently reemphasized by Friedlander (2014, p. 
56), the ascription of solipsism to Wittgenstein is confusing. There is no reason 
why the author who suggests that “language disguises thought” and the 
possibility of the agreement of our purposes when attempting to gather its logic 
with the purposes for which language has been built could have set a trap. If 5.62 
can be taken for a trap, it can also be taken as a linguistic means whose manifest 
indifference is the mark of its helpfulness. 
3.2.2. “The Language which only I understand” 
I have suggested that the problem apparently raised by solipsism can be 
solved, that our medium (language) cannot depend on one user at the exclusion 
of another, and that it is internal to language to show what is meant by an author, 
even contrary to one’s self-ascribed intentions. I also suggest that these three 
threads are involved in 5.62c: 
5.62c ―That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits 
of language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my 
world.  
It is apparently with a fact that Wittgenstein presents the means for 
reflexion on the counterpart of one’s engagement with the fiction of a “language 
which only I understand”. If we grant that “the proposition shows its sense” (TLP, 
4.022), then nothing precludes that 5.62c can be evaluated. That is to say, I 
assume that one can (reflexively) determine, as a step, whether what 5.62c shows 
could hold. If it holds, then it would be a positive fact; if it does not hold, then it 
would be a negative fact. The difficulty is obviously that if any relation between 
some facts that could concern me is suggested by 5.62c, a picture of my standing 
somewhere could hardly be relevant to posing to myself a determinate question 
with respect to my use of language. Rather, what 5.62c is calling into question is 
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whether I should allow a discrepancy between what I do not understand and what 
I mean to show by my expressions. Indeed, these expressions testify to the ways 
in which I appropriate language. 
What this approach questions is whether our medium, language, could fail 
to manifest the detachment of a feeling of solitude (which can equally obtain 
when among others) and a situation of solitude (what cannot happen among 
others). In this respect, Friedlander (2001, p. 120) suggests that “the pronoun ‘my’ 
is crucial *…+ in marking the fact that the range of possibilities always depends on 
the concrete use ‘I’ make of language”. He also says that “appropriation is the 
central determination of existence” (Friedlander, 2001, p. 118). These ideas call 
into question whether one’s relation to language can be understood on the model 
of one’s relation to property at all. 
Notably, Wittgenstein does not suggest that one could be unintelligible, as 
if unintelligibility could be a state in which one could be and that one could be 
unable to escape. Rather, he seems to suggest that one may not realize what one 
means, irrespective of what one thinks oneself to mean. On given occasions, this 
could be the case. This is a possibility, I suggest, that 5.62c enables interrogating. 
My potential misunderstandings cannot and should not involve others. On the 
contrary, others could have understood what I meant on an occasion I can 
retrospectively have to reconsider. 
If that is correct, then Wittgenstein suggests that one’s confusion in such 
a case mirrors the fact that one took one’s picture of the world for the sole 
picture that there could be of the world, in other words, by taking the limits of 
language to mean the limits of one’s world. This could hardly demote one’s 
responsibility with respect to one’s uses of language. Could one mean at all to 
show the contrary of what one means and mean the contrary of what one shows?  
Projecting rather than getting used to the rule of projection allows us to 
surmount this difficulty: in order to mean, one uses language that has been 
appropriated. It is language used by someone, but certainly not one’s property. 
Sense cannot be “made”, for one could not have initiated a process from which 
“sense” could result. Thus, if I assume there could be a “language which only I 
understand”, then I would be confusing the public character of language with an 
obstacle to expression. 
The confusion between solitude and unicity in solipsism can thus be 
dispelled as follows. To think about oneself implies one’s acknowledgement of the 
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uniqueness (i.e., the property of each and every individual) of individuals. Thinking 
to one’s solitude could not have involved the discovery of a “state” that could 
have been proper to one. That is to say, to think solitude implies 
acknowledgement of one’s potential presence to others, that which suffices to 
circumstantially determine whether one is alone or not. But a “specific unicity” is 
not, as it were, “realized” through solitude (or its linguistic practice). That is to 
say, thinking of being alone need not amount to thinking about the property of a 
unique object. Solitude cannot and need not be established in the abstract. Sense 
does not await being decided upon. It is exactly inasmuch as it is up to anyone 
except oneself to decide whether one acted as if one was the only one that it is 
also the case that no one but oneself can decide not to act as if one was the only 
one (nothing new; rather something any language-user knew already). It is 
inasmuch as it is not conceivable to decide on sense that it is intelligible that what 
solipsism means “shows itself”. This does not imply that solipsism could be, as it 
were, rendered legitimate or desirable. 
According to this approach, acknowledging the dimension of 
appropriation involved in the use of language by an individual is valuable in order 
to acknowledge that it is not hypothetical at all that individuals dispose of their 
will. An individual can stand with respect to the world in an appropriate relation, 
one that is to be conceived, which involves one’s appropriation of the linguistic 
means to stand in such a relation to it. In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein addresses 
the difficulty raised by Schopenhauer’s (2010, p. 23) formula: “the world is my 
representation”. On the basis of such an approach, all that I could “have” of the 
world would be “representations”, and a “willing subject” would be required to 
account for one’s internal relation to the world from a unique impersonal 
standpoint because it would a priori remain beyond any conceivable reach. But 
there is no reason for this, as Wittgenstein suggests: 
What kind of reason is there for the assumption of a willing subject? Is 
not my world adequate for individuation? (NB, 19.11.16) 
Wittgenstein thus proposes in the Tractatus a radically new approach to 
addressing the issue raised by solipsism which implies appropriating the use of 
“world” but does not require acknowledgement of a mediation through 
representations. This approach finds its value in the indifference it marks with 
respect to the individuation of whom it can be helpful to. That is to say, that 
anyone should appropriate and use “world” in measured ways is obvious. It shows 
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itself by the stricture that foreseeably arises with respect to others to use it in 
unmeasured ways. In this respect, I suggest that Wittgenstein provides a means to 
neutralize the issue raised by solipsism through implementing a linguistic 
structure designed, among other things, to render manifest the denial of the 
existence of other minds implied in solipsism. 
Wittgenstein indeed suggests that “world” and “life” can be assimilated to 
each other (TLP, 5.621). This suggestion comes close to that of Sartre, who affirms 
that the concept of “absolute objectivity” is tantamount to a “desert world” or 
“world without humans” (BN, 331). Wittgenstein’s suggestion is helpful in that it 
shows that the abstraction involved by an impersonal representation of the world 
does not imply that it would require being at odds with life. As he will put it later: 
“our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades 
all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position 
sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well” 
(Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 59). The expression of the position in which ordinary 
language can hold our mind rigidly could be contained in the affirmation that “I 
am my world. (The microcosm)” (TLP, 5.63). To acknowledge this does not imply 
opposing or submitting to anyone. That is to say, there is no basis for worry with 
respect to the possibility that the world that is thereby appropriated could be the 
world of someone else. The world is certainly not to be claimed, but neither 
should it be renounced. 
The goal of this chapter was to call into question the conceivability of an 
exclusive perspective which could imply or preclude our potential confinement to 
representations. This involved considering whether such confinement would 
require acknowledgement from a perspective independent of experience and 
from whence the possible discrepancy between one’s representations and the 
world would need to be ruled out. But, inasmuch as the possibility of such 
mismatch could not be exceptional, that is, could not rule “by itself” as it were, it 
is at once superfluous and confusing to rule it out. Linguistic and shared means 
enabling us to express ourselves are available. Projecting rather than getting used 
to “the rule of projection” suffices to acknowledge that the issue raised by 
solipsism could not require any proof.  
If it is granted that it is superfluous and misleading to exclude the 
possibility of confinement to our representations, then the question that remains 
to be addressed is whether it could have been possible to “discover oneself” as 
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solipsism implies one can. To do so, I will address in the last chapter two 
objections considered by Sartre and Wittgenstein. The first objection is that 
appropriating the language of the other presupposes the subordination of my 
language to that of the other. Does the subordination of my language to that of 
the other presuppose that what I can mean and do is restricted? The second 
objection is that I could attempt to discover myself in the world. Can I not attempt 
to express to myself that I have discovered myself to be metaphysically isolated? 
Can I not attempt to use language in a way that I could have inherited from 
myself?  
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4. Individuals in their Appropriative Relation to the 
World 
The aim of this chapter is to show that Sartre and Wittgenstein establish 
both the superfluity and misleading nature of the ideas of self-discovery and self-
inheritance implied by solipsism. A “self-discovery”, as I use this phrase, means a 
discovery that (1) is necessarily made by its discoverer (it cannot be made by 
another discoverer) and that (2) its discoverer can necessarily make (its discoverer 
could not fail to make it). A “self-discovery”, in this use, at once (2) essentially 
makes its discoverer and (1) is essentially made by that very same discoverer. 
Similarly, a “self-inheritance”, as I use this phrase, means an inheritance that (1) is 
necessarily legated to its inheritor (it cannot be inherited by another inheritor) 
and that (2) is necessarily inherited by its inheritor (it cannot be inherited from 
another inheritor). Thus, a “self-inheritance”, in this use, at once (2) essentially 
inherits its inheritor and (1) is essentially inherited by that very same inheritor. 
Thus, if the solipsist could discover that he is the only person there could 
be, then no one but he could make such a discovery. And if the solipsist could 
report such a discovery, then no one but he could inherit the language to report 
such a discovery. The ideas of self-inheritance and self-discovery that solipsism 
implies would be essentially private, or they would be properties essential to one 
and only one individual. In this final chapter, I will question whether such ideas 
are required at all and suggest that holding on to them cannot but lead to 
confusion. That is to say, I will call into question whether the alleged events of 
“self-discovery” and “self-inheritance” could have happened. 
Indeed, self-discovery, in which the placement of “self” prior to 
"discovery" underscores that one has discovered something by oneself, is 
intelligible, although it is redundant. It would be a way to mark that such a 
discovery differs from a discovery made by several persons together, or from a 
discovery that was rendered possible due to the help of someone else. Against 
the backdrop of a context where it would be pertinent to underscore that one has 
made a discovery by oneself it could be useful. However, the idea of self-
discovery, as previously defined is, I suggest, targeted both Sartre and 
Wittgenstein, for it implies that an individual could be both the discoverer and the 
object of discovery of one single and same discovery. Similarly, “self-inheritance” 
in which the placement of “self” prior to “inheritance” can be used to underscore 
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that a fortiori the intervention of someone else not required in order to inherit a 
legacy could be used in some intricate context, although it would be redundant to 
do so. However, the idea of self-inheritance, as previously defined is, I suggest, 
targeted by both Sartre and Wittgenstein, for it implies that an individual could be 
legating and inheriting one single and same legacy. 
At the end of the first chapter (cf. 1.2.3.), I suggested that Sartre and 
Wittgenstein’s approaches to solipsism are compatible in that they criticize the 
conceivability of the idea of self-inheritance in relation to self-discovery.46 
Wittgenstein demonstrates that the nature of our medium, language, inevitably 
displays pretences related to adopting a perspective on all that is the case, which 
means that the criticism he provides of such a gesture is not conditional. Similarly, 
Sartre argues that it suffices to think conditionally in order to acknowledge the 
nature of freedom. In both cases, the difficulty presented by solipsism is that it 
suggests that the generalized absence of other minds, could be taken as a 
relevant basis for expression and action. 
Addressing the issue of solipsism in the second chapter, I considered 
Sartre’s proposed resolution of the theoretical problem of the existence of other 
minds, which retrospectively showed the inconceivability of proving their 
existence. In the third chapter, I considered Wittgenstein’s way of settling the 
issue of solipsism, which shows that, on reflexion, the inconceivability of proving 
the existence of other minds mirrors the inconceivability of disproving the non-
existence of others minds. Thus, neither of these possibilities is relevant. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as they can be considered, at the end of the third chapter 
I spelled out two objections implied by the ideas of self-discovery and self-
inheritance that solipsism presupposes, and which are yet to be addressed. The 
present chapter will address these objections by tracing the reliance on the 
analogy with visual field that they presuppose. 
The first objection is that appropriating the language of the other 
presupposes the subordination of my language to that of the other. Does the 
subordination of my language in this manner presuppose that what I can say and 
do is restricted? In what sense can the indifference involved in Wittgenstein’s 
invitation to consider that “I am my world” (TLP, 5.63) be relevant? One can a 
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 The approach I propose here is indebted to Narboux (Narboux, Forthcoming) and 
Descombes (2014, pp. 189-192). 
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posteriori interrogate oneself concerning one’s relations to others in terms of 
probability, and one can even retrospectively doubt the relevance of advice: does 
the possibility of marking off one’s possibility of “being one’s world” as distinct 
from someone else’s not imply some restriction upon what can be meant and 
done in the first person? Can I not attempt to discover (see and judge) myself 
from the standpoint of the other? 
The second objection is that I could attempt to discover myself in the 
world (i.e., all that is the case). One can attempt to a priori interrogate oneself in a 
way that would rule out the relevance of any advice: can I not attempt to express 
to myself that I have discovered myself in a way that could ground the idea of a 
metaphysical solitude, and that cannot be dispelled? Can I not attempt to use 
language in a way that I would have inherited from myself? 
In section 4.1, I confront the first objection. I try to show that in Sartre’s 
approach, appropriating the language of others does not imply a restrictive 
subordination of my language to theirs. It is, on the contrary, inasmuch as we use 
an appropriated language that we can agree and disagree with one another. To 
presuppose that I could be limited by the language of others amounts to 
presupposing that I could discover (see and judge) myself from the standpoint of 
another mind (by contrast with learning about myself from others). I will argue 
that such a presupposition is superfluous and misleading. 
In section 4.2., I confront the second objection. I try to show that on 
Wittgenstein’s approach, the discovery of the existence of the subject, as a “part” 
or “component” of the world (i.e., of all that is the case) belongs to the register of 
fiction. The event of “the discovery of the subject” could not happen because “the 
subject” could not appear in, or be missing from, the register of conceivable 
discoveries. If this is granted, then the idea of self-inheritance implied by solipsism 
can be dispensed with. 
4.1 The Aporia of the Relation to My Fellow 
In this section, I try to show that, in Sartre’s approach, appropriating the 
language of others does not imply a restrictive subordination of my language to 
that of others. I argue in section 4.1.1. that language is a collective technique that 
individuals share: in others words, that it is inherently public. Then, in section 
4.1.2., I argue that appropriating the language of others does not imply that my 
163 
 
language is restrictively subordinated to theirs. It is superfluous and misleading to 
suppose the existence of “the Person” to confront the existence of “No-body”. 
Finally, in section 4.1.3., I argue that the limits of freedom are confused with 
restrictions if I presuppose that they are imposed upon me by others. However, 
this is not necessary. It is superfluous and misleading to presuppose that I could 
attempt to discover (see and judge) myself from the standpoint of the other.  
4.1.1. The Collective Ownership of Techniques 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre questions whether the public character 
of the linguistic and technical organizations that one can appropriate implies a 
limitation with respect to what one can mean and do. This amounts to asking the 
following question: if I appropriate the language of the other, is my language 
restrictively subordinated to theirs (BN, 540)? 
This objection occasions a new aporia. The first aporia resided in the 
appearance that the heterogeneity of consciousness and world could cast doubt 
on their relation. But as consciousness and world are de facto related, the 
difficulty resided in accounting for consciousness’s internal relation to the world 
(in Sartre’s terms the complete whole of being). The second aporia resided in the 
appearance that the distinction between my consciousness and that of someone 
else could cast doubt on their relation. But as non-thetic consciousness (notably, 
shame) presupposes, on reflexion, an “intermonadic relation”, our 
consciousnesses are de facto related, and the difficulty instead resides in 
accounting for their internal relations (BN, 246). This brings us to a new aporia in 
the section entitled “My Fellow”.47 Here, Sartre considers whether the other could 
be the “center of reference” to which meanings I discover as “already mine” 
would refer (BN, 531). Could the distinction of individuals among themselves cast 
doubt on their relations by means of language? 
To answer this question, Sartre targets the idea that the meanings of 
one’s world are discovered solely against the yardstick of one’s aims. Its 
counterpart would be that one can decide the meaning of an obstacle or a 
standpoint. For example, one’s choice to climb a mountain could account for the 
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 I translate the title as “My Fellow” rather than “My Neighbour” in order not to suggest 
the primacy of a relation of acquaintance.  
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difficulty of climbing it. As a monad, I could accredit the conformity of this 
difficulty to my representation of it, as everything would depend on the imaginary 
point of view I take. Sartre diagnoses the difficulty raised by such conceptions 
thusly: 
We have seen that this monadic conception conceals a hidden solipsism 
precisely because it is going to confuse the plurality of meanings which I 
can attach to the real and the plurality of meaningful systems each one 
of which refer to a consciousness which I am not. (BN, 531) 
Sartre grants that one can attach meanings to the real, as exemplified by 
the practice of using dolls to reconstitute a car crash in order to determine 
responsibilities (as considered by Wittgenstein and previously commented in 
section 3.2.1). However, each ascribed meaning involves a meaningful system, 
inasmuch as its determinacy implies its difference from other meanings. The 
possibility of variation between meaningful systems thus ought to be considered. 
Could meaning be accounted for solely on the basis of its arbitrary attachment to 
the real by an individual? Were this the case, the meanings unveiled to my 
consciousness as “already mine” could also be attached to and imposed upon me 
by the other. 
However, Sartre purports to show that admitting this is not required and, 
furthermore, that it is misleading. That is to say, presupposing that a choice made 
in the first person always admits other possible meanings presupposes detaching 
oneself from the meanings of one’s actions (BN, 531).  
An “action”, as I use this expression after Anscombe (2000, p. 38), means 
an action which is intentional under a given description: “‘He is X-ing’ is a 
description of an intentional action if (a) it is true and (b) there is such a thing as 
an answer *…+ to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’”. The sense of the question 
“Why?” that is considered here is one in which it is given an application, which 
means that its answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting (Anscombe, 2000, p. 
9). For example, answering “why are you calling for a cab?” with “I am calling a 
cab in order to reach the airport in time”. In this specific sense, the question 
“Why?” suffices to consider descriptions which are relevant to characterizing 
what someone is doing intentionally and only such descriptions. Indeed, answers 
to “Why?” questions which rely solely on someone’s knowledge of anatomy are 
ruled out, as they do not give a reason for acting. An exception here would be if 
we consider a case where someone plans either to exemplify or produce a sample 
of something which implies such knowledge; but then, such cases do not call into 
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question the applicability of the “Why?” question in the specified sense 
(Anscombe, 2000, p. 38). Anscombe (2000, p. 39) emphasizes that in ordinary 
circumstances, a description such as “He is X-ing” suffices to answer a “Why?” 
question bearing on someone’s action, and thereby to characterize it as an 
intentional action. This means that after having answered a “Why?” question 
bearing on one’s action with “in order to X”, and being asked anew “Why are you 
X-ing?”, one cannot reply either “Oh, I did not know I was doing that” or refuse 
any sense except a causal one to the questions that are asked without calling into 
question the sense of one’s answers (Anscombe, 2000, p. 39). 
So, if it seems that there could always be other possible meanings to what 
someone else does, then it could be that I am uncertain about the meaning of 
what I do, and that I assume that my choices could always have other “possible” 
meanings. By raising this issue, Sartre confronts two approaches to action in the 
first person: the behaviourist and the hermeneutical approaches. On the one 
hand, behaviourism (as presented by Watson) purports to exclude first-person 
certainty: because one cannot observe oneself in the first person while acting, 
one cannot know with certainty what one does, in which case only hypotheses are 
available concerning what one does. 
On the other hand, at the end of the third part of Being and Nothingness, 
Sartre suggests the insufficiency of Heidegger’s hermeneutical description. On the 
basis of this approach, interpretations, in probable or hypothetical terms, would 
suffice to account for the intelligibility of action in the first person. This 
conception is diametrically opposed to behaviourism, since one would always be 
better positioned than someone else to know what one does, but could still only 
interpret one’s actions. However, in this case, it would be as if one could always 
relevantly doubt the meaning of one’s actions. The section “My Fellow” in fact 
begins by addressing this difficulty. Encounters with “the other” are taken to be 
coincidences inasmuch as it is presupposed that “my fellow” could have been 
missing from the world. Sartre previously criticized Heidegger’s conception of the 
“mit-sein” (being-with) in Being and Nothingness. Hoping our acting in unison 
presupposes that we are all related, as if we were members of a single team or 
crew (BN, 270). 
This accordingly requires an account of language which suffices to explain 
the intelligibility of my actions with respect to my fellow, but which nevertheless 
does not presuppose that I am in principle always better positioned than my 
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fellow to specify the meanings of my actions. In other words, the difficulty is 
providing an account that suffices to internalize the distinction between “the 
other” and “my fellow”. This amounts to suggesting that it is from a standpoint 
which could not be exclusive, within given situations who meaning is public, that 
such a distinction can be marked. The presupposition that there could be an 
exclusive impersonal perspective from which it could be marked, independently 
from any conceivable situation and expression, is the difficulty that Sartre 
addresses. 
To do so, Sartre distinguishes between meanings which obviously do not 
result from the stipulations of a single consciousness (“streets”, “houses”, etc.) 
with meanings that one can assume, in solitude, to confer upon what unveils. In 
solitude, the “unpredictable and brute existent”, or “this existent here and 
outside of it nothing”, can be unveiled to a consciousness (BN, 532). On such 
occasions, a single consciousness confers, through minimal evaluation, a meaning 
to such existents as “to climb”, “to avoid” or “to contemplate”. However, the 
meaning of “house” cannot be accounted for on this model of arbitrary 
attachment. Sartre here criticizes the view addressed by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus (i.e., that sense could result from the arbitrary attachment of labels to 
things). 
Although the meaning of “house” is contingent, it resists one’s reflexion 
and does not depend on one’s concrete existence or choices because it has 
become a quality of the in-itself. Similarly, one discovers that the difficulty of 
handling situations is relative to the way in which they are handled (what Sartre 
calls “the coefficient of the adversity of things”) before feeling them through 
indications such as “slow down” or “dangerous turn”. Such indications inform one 
of the determinate and relevant attitudes to be endorsed. Could they also 
indicate the “narrow limits to my freedom” (BN, 532)? 
Following indications provided by others is necessary in order to situate 
oneself and act. Such indications are often imperatives, such as “entrance” 
(“enter this way”) or “exit” (“exit this way”), addressed to anyone. If one takes 
such imperatives as constraints to which one must “submit” (as if obstacles), then 
the world apprehended through the use of techniques (e.g., using a bicycle or 
taking a train) “reveals to me a countenance strictly correlative with the means I 
employ; therefore, it is the countenance which the world offers to everybody” (BN, 
533). This implies a disjunction: either I can acknowledge that this countenance is 
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offered to everybody, in which case it is within the situations I encounter that I 
can situate myself as anyone; or I can refuse to admit that this countenance is 
offered to everybody, in which case everything happens as if a state is imposed on 
me. 
To address this tension, Sartre regresses to facticity (or contingent 
necessity) inasmuch as it is indubitable (ibid.); it is a fact that I belong to an 
inhabited world in which other minds exist. As mentioned in chapter 2 (cf. 2.2.2.), 
calling into question linguistically the fact of the existence of others amounts to 
denying their existence (except in contexts where the production of a fiction 
staging such denial is that which is explicitly intended). But it further appears, 
retrospectively, that this fact held prior to one’s coming into existence in an 
inhabited world. Sartre can now suggest that the world unveils itself to individuals 
by means of collective techniques designed to enable individuals to apprehend it 
under determinate aspects. The meaning of collective techniques of appropriation 
of the world, already constituted and defined as such by others, is presupposed by 
one’s belonging to collectives, such as the human species, nationalities, or familial 
and professional groups. Notably, Sartre characterizes one’s belonging to the 
human species as follows: 
Belonging to the human species is defined by the use of very elementary 
and very general techniques: to know how to walk, to know how to take 
hold, to know to pass judgment on the surface and the relative size of 
perceived objects, to know how to speak, to how in general distinguish 
the true from the false, etc. (BN, 533) 
Although the appropriation of elementary and general techniques is 
presupposed by one’s relation to the world among others, Sartre rejects the idea 
that appropriation of such elementary techniques involves their ownership 
“under an abstract and universal form” (ibid.). He criticizes, as does Wittgenstein, 
explanations according to which the “ownership” of language explains one’s 
belonging to the human species from a non-situated perspective, that is, from 
nowhere. In this approach, the alleged opposition between the individual in its 
local situation within a collectivity (e.g., a national one) and the universal stems 
from the assumption that one must abstractly own the knowledge of the activity 
which consists in naming and understanding words in general. Such approaches 
presuppose that a mediation could be missing between, on the one hand, the 
individual in his or her local situation within a collectivity (national, regional, etc.) 
and, on the other hand, the universal. Adopting this perspective would imply 
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granting that my national tongue or dialect were only an inferior version of the 
universal. To resolve this tension, Sartre first suggests that the appropriative 
dimension of language is necessary and sufficient to render clear the superfluity 
of a mediation between the individual and the universal (BN, 533-534). Second, 
he rejects the idea that there is any such thing as an internal opposition or 
incompatibility between the concepts of “dialect”, “tongue” and “language”. 
Thus, if it is granted that there is no such thing as a restrictive limit 
separating the individual from the universal, then one can consider “the universal 
and perfectly simple essence of any technique whatsoever by which any being 
whatsoever appropriates the world” (BN, 534). 
This shows that anyone who inhabits the world among others 
appropriates the world in an ordinary manner with ordinary techniques. Sartre 
characterizes this by specifying two clauses. The first clause is universality: all 
techniques have in common that they are ways of making what a fortiori anyone 
can use in order to achieve what these techniques enable. The second clause is 
essentiality: there is no such thing as a technique that, in principle, could not be 
used by others. 
In the absence of the requirement of mediation between the individual in 
a particular situation and the universal, the significance of the difficulty of 
surmounting an obstacle (e.g., on the occasion of climbing a mountain) is relative 
to a local context where a technique (e.g., climbing) has been appropriated in the 
past (BN, 534). Distinct individuals use distinct techniques in distinct places and in 
distinct manners in order to realize similar activities. Nevertheless, that one has 
learned, for example, to ski or cycle in a determinate locality involves one’s past 
appropriation of a technique that was locally available. Does this approach imply 
that an individual is limited by having to appropriate techniques that are available 
locally? Does the local character of the techniques that are appropriated not 
involve a restriction? 
Sartre has, up to this point, attempted to show that one’s consciousness 
of the world is not revealed solely as “brute existents”, that is, as if the meaning 
of what is unveiled could be reduced to the projection of an arbitrary signification. 
Sartre here challenges Heidegger’s approach: to admit that one is “thrown into 
the world” does not amount to admitting that one is thrown into any world. 
Similarly to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, Sartre underscores that it is not any 
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world into which one could find oneself “thrown”, but rather one that can be 
characterized, in Sartre’s examples, as “meridional”, “French” or “working class”. 
Does Sartre imply a certain approach to the local according to which a 
dialect could be an “absolutely concrete reality” (BN, 535)? If one appropriates a 
language by use of a dialect, can one determine “the laws” of language via the 
study of jargon and patois? Rejecting such approaches, Sartre sides with 
psychologists who regard the sentence as the elementary structure of speech 
(ibid.). In granting the primacy of the sense of the sentence over its constituents 
(words), Sartre’s approach is similar to that of Wittgenstein. Outside the sentence, 
a word is either a “mere propositional function” (i.e., a component of a 
proposition accounted for in instrumental terms) or “a pure and simple rubric 
designed to group absolutely disparate meanings” (i.e., a label categorizing 
various uses) (BN, 535). 
For cases where a word may “appear alone” in a discourse, it takes on a 
“holophrastic character” that presupposes its integration into a context, as a 
“secondary form” to a “principal form” (BN, 536). It is within a context that the 
utterance of a single word can mean something that can be rephrased as a 
sentence: “the word thus has only virtual existence outside of the complex and 
active organizations which integrate it” (BN, 535-536). Furthermore, that a single 
word can sometimes convey a meaning that could have been expressed by means 
of a sentence is a point that can be generalized, for considering a word in the light 
of a sentence in which it could have been used suffices to understand “any given 
whatsoever in terms of the situation and to understand the situation in the light 
of the original ends” (BN, 536). 
Sartre thereby proposes considering a sentence as a constructive act in 
which a transcendence exceeds and nihilates a given towards an end. Sartre thus 
rejects conceptions according to which the pre-existence of words, syntax and 
“readymade sentences” would be required to ground the intelligibility of language 
(BN, 536). To flesh out his approach, Sartre underlines how spoken language is 
always deciphered in a given situation with this example: it suffices to have read 
bad news in the newspaper and to see Pierre’s unhappy face to understand why 
he says that “things are not so good”, despite him otherwise looking healthy. One 
can already guess the probable answer when asking “are you fine?” Accordingly, 
listening to someone is “to speak with” them. To listen to someone is to project 
oneself towards the possibilities considered by someone else, acknowledging that 
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it is necessary to consider these possibilities against the background of the world. 
“Readymade sentences” or, more generally, the assumption that “the sentence 
pre-exists the word” (BN, 536) thus refer to the “talker”48 as the concrete ground 
of discourse. 
Understanding a sentence as a constructive act is tantamount to assuming 
that its intelligibility has for its non-thetic counterpart the nihilation of the given 
(or a determinate pre-reflexive consciousness) that one wishes to designate (e.g., 
having seen that Pierre is not so well, I ask him “How are you?”) in light of an aim 
(its designation: e.g., to know how someone is or to engage with Pierre). One uses 
words to mean what one means. However, when neither the given nor the aim 
enable determining what someone means and another sentence is required to 
clarify the given and understand the word, then one’s sentence is understood by 
someone else as “a moment of the free choice of myself” (BN, 536). 
The treatment of such a “free act” as an “aggregation” of words can thus 
be rejected, for this would involve believing that such an act could be reduced to 
the misuse of technical recipes (i.e., pre-determined rules). It should then be 
acknowledged that factual limits could be imposed upon the freedom of the 
speaker, allegedly coming from an “impersonal life” that belongs to language. 
Sartre’s diagnoses approaches which reduce sentences to aggregations of words 
in this way as equivalent to approaching language once it is already dead, that is 
to say, once it has been spoken (BN, 537). 
He also suggests that doing so is a mistake, both for language and for all 
similar techniques, because the counterpart of the assumption that techniques 
could apply by themselves is the reduction of the role of the human to that of a 
pilot (BN, 537). Thus, if our actions are straightforwardly intelligible to others, the 
conception of sentences as agglomerations of words that pre-exist their utterance 
should be rejected. Such rejection is not the same as suppressing “the necessary 
or technical or de facto links which articulate themselves within the sentence” 
(BN, 538). Rather, Sartre purports to show that “freedom is the only possible 
foundation of the laws of language” (BN, 538). 
The import of Sartre’s approach is that it is public and non-contrastive. 
That is to say, granting that freedom is the unique idea that can provide 
                                                          
48
 I translate “parleur” as “talker” literally in order to preserve the idiom of “speaker”, as 
Sartre does in the text, for another role that shall soon be studied.  
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foundations for the laws of language amounts to appealing for acknowledgement 
of the public character of language in a non-prescriptive and non-exclusive way. If 
this approach is not prescriptive, it is because it rejects the view that the meaning 
of a sentence results from its pre-established conformity with a model. 
Accordingly, grammar cannot and need not restrict speech in any sense. Rather, 
“it is by speaking that I make grammar” (BN, 538). 
If this approach is inclusive, it is because it rejects probabilistic approaches 
to meaning, which are confusing inasmuch as they unduly exploit one’s possibility 
of taking on the point of view of another person by considering a sentence as if it 
was written by someone else (BN, 538). Sartre has in mind the approach of Denis 
de Rougemont (1944, p. 22), who assumed the “Devil” could be portrayed as “No-
body”. In this approach, the problem would be that “Nobody himself remains 
Someone”  (Rougemont, 1944, p. 32), which presupposes that “No-body” could 
be identified. That is to say, De Rougemont notably considers violent rulers of the 
time as incarnations of “No-body” and appeals to the constitution of a new 
political body, an international federation that would sanctify the “Person” in 
response. This involves a difficulty that was evoked in section 1.2.3. In Through 
the Looking Glass, the King wishes he had “the eyes” of Alice in order to see 
“Nobody” at a distance  (Carroll, 2009, p. 199). Carroll here suggests a difficulty 
which, under a description, is similar to the one that Sartre addresses. The 
pretence to identify the “Devil’s share” that some individuals would embody, or, 
what amounts to the same, the identification of “No-body” among us 
presupposes that it could and should be granted that someone could see and 
judge an individual from an outer perspective on the world.  
In the context of the Second World War, Sartre purports to provide public 
means for establishing the superfluity and misleading nature of such conceptions. 
He purports to provide public means to confront both the ideologies of the time 
and the criticisms of these ideologies which rely on similar assumptions. In this, I 
suggest, there is both a deep shared concern and a line of agreement between 
Sartre’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches, if we read the latter with Anscombe, 
Cavell and Read. 
Rougemont (1944, p. 80; p. 87) indeed often suggests that we should not 
make exceptions between ourselves as people; that there is a sense in which 
there is no one with whom we have nothing in common. And how could this be 
relevantly rejected, whoever we are talking about? Rougemont, nevertheless, 
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does not make the task easier for us by taking Hitler as his example. He suggests it 
is all too easy to blame an individual characterized as monstrous, to single him out 
alone as the bearer of a responsibility which is collective (Rougemont, 1944, p. 
83). And surely, it cannot and need not be granted that anyone should be given a 
specific treatment for his actions on the bases of an arbitrary characterisation, 
whoever it is. As Cavell (1979, p. 109) writes, “Nothing is more human than the 
wish to deny one’s humanity, or to assert it at the expense of others”. Making an 
exception could amount to acknowledge one’s wish own of denial. 
But can we and do we need to follow Rougemont (1944, p. 27; p. 89) 
when he writes: 
If one says to me: “The Devil is nothing but a myth, thus it does not 
exist” – rationalist formula – I answer: “The Devil is a myth, thus it exists 
and does not cease to act” *…+ 
Look at the Devil which is among us! Cease to believe that he can only 
look like Hitler or his imitators, for it is to yourself that he will manage to 
look the most! It is only in you that you will catch it in the act. And only 
then, you will be in a fit state to detect it in others, and to fight it there 
with success.  
 It can surely be granted that, in virtue of human actions, there are myths, 
and that their reality as such should not be denied altogether. However, according 
to the way in which Rougemont puts it, our criteria could be and would be 
defeated in advance; and they further would require to be revised on private 
bases. This difficulty confronted by Sartre is close to the difficulty confronted by 
Anscombe in Intention. I earlier mentioned that she underscores that in ordinary 
circumstances, a description such as “He is X-ing” suffices to answer a “Why?” 
question bearing on someone’s action and thereby to characterize it as an 
intentional action. This implies that once an answer is given to such “Why?” 
questions, one cannot reply either “Oh, I did not know I was doing that” or refuse 
any sense except a causal one to the questions that are asked without calling into 
question the sense of one’s answers (Anscombe, 2000, p. 39). However, according 
to Rougemont, one could revise the sense of one’s answers to a “Why?” question 
bearing on one’s actions by appealing to an ability to recognize the action of an 
entity whose existence is, under his own terms, to be inferred from a myth.  
 Sartre has already rejected that consciousness and intentionality could be 
accounted for by appealing to the presence or absence of intentional objects in 
one’s mind (BN, 50-51). Consciousness is not a container. Thus, this difficulty 
raised by appeals to a private detection ability cannot be addressed in similar 
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terms. As Sartre suggests, we can, nevertheless, provide means whose standards 
are public and sufficient, in that they do not presuppose that one could be in a 
better situation than the other in order to evaluate the meaning of one’s actions, 
including what one has written. To do so, Sartre analyses the minimal conditions 
under which one could “discover” the “Devil’s share”. He first suggests that what 
he calls the “laws of language” are not apprehended by “the one who talks” 
(someone addressing others by means of speech), but by “the one who listens” 
(someone addressed by someone else during one’s speech). That is to say, the 
one who talks (i.e., “the talker”) “apprehends the order of words only insofar as 
he makes it” (BN, 538). Thus, the sole relations that the one who talks apprehends 
within the complex of words uttered are those taken to have been specifically 
established. Then, against the background of the previously developed conception 
of sentences, if the “Devil’s share” is taken to be discovered and described by 
someone, thereby endorsing the role of “the speaker”. This implies that: (i) words 
have been gathered and presented via a free meaningful connection; (ii) this 
synthesis has been seen as if from the outside, which is to say as if by someone 
else, during a hypothetical deciphering of its possible meanings. 
In such cases, as the alleged discoverer of the “Devil’s share”, the speaker 
treats every word first as a crossroads of meanings referring to other words and 
treats every link between those words as susceptible to multiple interpretations. 
He or she focuses on one sense expressly willed to be “true”, which can 
subordinate or leave obscure other senses, but which nevertheless will not 
suppress them. 
 Thus, the previously mentioned “moment of the free choice of myself” 
(BN, 537) is the obverse of one’s exemption from laws that are taken to be 
specific to the other (BN, 538). Sartre here underlines, as suggested earlier with 
respect to Wittgenstein, that language unavoidably displays our pretences with 
respect to others: “thus we can grasp the clear distinction between the event 
‘sentence’ and a natural event” (BN, 538). Sartre means that unlike a natural 
event which occurs in conformity with a law that it manifests, the composition of 
a sentence manifests the resort to a free project of designation via the personal 
choice of the for-itself that requires interpretation against the background of a 
global situation.  
 Sartre’s conception of what he calls the “laws of language”, grounded in 
freedom, precludes the possibility that anyone’s rights should come at the 
174 
 
exclusion of anyone else’s. There is thus no such thing as a law of speech which 
could precede one’s speaking, no such thing as a legitimate law of silence. In this 
approach, saying is showing; attempts on us by individuals show.  
Thus, the circularity of language and thought is unproblematic and 
characteristic of the concept of situation (BN, 539). There is no such thing as 
getting “out” of this circle or thinking about it from “an other side” (BN, 539). 
Both “imageless and wordless thoughts” and “verbal images” are “pure 
psychological idols”. This approach furthermore stresses that the intelligibility of 
human art and techniques, as possibilities available to humans, requires that they 
manifest themselves through their enactment (BN, 540). This suffices, according 
to Sartre, in order to outline “a solution for the relation between the individual 
and the species” (ibid.). Considered abstractly, the human species is required to 
unify individual choices, without which the assignment of laws would not be 
possible (ibid.). In this respect, anyone’s belonging to the human species is 
presupposed. On the other hand, considered concretely, such an approach does 
not presuppose that the species is a constraining given “within” the individual: 
The for-itself, in order to choose itself as a person effects the existence 
of an internal organization which the for-itself surpasses towards 
[oneself] (lui-même), and this internal technical organization is in it the 
national or the human. (Translation modified, BN, 540) 
As mentioned earlier, Sartre’s approach should be understood in the 
context of the Second World War. He does not reject the idea of human nature 
(cf. BN, 558; 587), but he does question the idea of a human nature that would 
imply its pre-determination, as well as the either restrictive or restricted 
conception of finitude that goes with this. Thereby, he calls into question the 
requirement for and relevance of conceptions of the world which presuppose an 
“unavoidable harmony” between thought and world as the counterpart of the 
“despotic necessity” that links unrelated events and that some individuals imply 
to have discovered.49 On such an approach, some events would have to happen, 
no matter the circumstances. In Sartre’s approach, reflexion on the concepts of 
the national and the human cannot and need not unfold content that would 
provide grounds for a “despotic” conception of necessity. His approach is in this 
respect compatible with both early and late Wittgenstein (see PI, §437). Similarly 
to the Tractatus and to the Investigations, Being and Nothingness was written 
                                                          
49
 As in so-called “plot theories”. On this, see Burgess (2012, p. 71). 
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during war times; at moments where confidence can easily be lost in our criteria, 
our institutions. Read suggests concerning the Investigations: “Wittgenstein offers 
counter-propaganda. To undermine the hold upon us that dangerous propaganda 
can easily attain” (2012, p. 176). The same can be suggested concerning Sartre. In 
his approach, to choose oneself as a person is first to acknowledge the 
commonality of our shared techniques, inasmuch as agreement can be reached in 
language. 
4.1.2. The Subordination of my Language to that of Others 
Sartre then considers the objection according to which my language 
would be restrictively subordinated to that of the other (which could, for 
example, be addressed from the “personalist” perspective advocated by de 
Rougemont): 
Very well, someone will say. But you have dodged the question. For 
these linguistic or technical organizations have not been created by the 
for-itself so that it may find itself; it has got them from others. The rule 
for the agreement of the participles does not exist, I admit, outside of 
the free rapprochement of concrete participles in view of an end of a 
particular designation. But when I employ this rule, I have learned it 
from others; it is because others, in their personal projects cause it to be 
that I make use of it myself. My speech is then subordinated to the 
speech of others and ultimately to the national speech. (BN, 540) 
Could I not, then, acknowledge use of “the rule of the agreement of the 
participles” to be “causally justified” in order to designate some individuals, 
inasmuch as others do so to achieve their personal projects? Is not the 
“designating” use of language be appropriate due to the subordination of my use 
of language to the speech of others and, ultimately, to national speech? 
This objection can be unfolded as follows: by means of a sentence, such as 
“judging from his expression, he has been having a hard time”, one can express a 
judgement which bears on someone else (independently from considering one’s 
reasons for expressing such a judgement). In sentences of this form, the subject of 
the adverbial participle clause differs from the subject of the main clause. This is 
sometimes called a “distancing” use of language. Such use contrasts with 
sentences where the subject of the adverbial clause is identical with the subject of 
the main clause, as in “waiting for Paul at the café, I was reading the newspapers”. 
With such a sentence, one can report that one was reading while waiting for 
someone else called Paul. In this case, one is neither indifferent to the absence of 
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someone else under every description nor indifferent to one’s action under every 
description. If the reported event happened, the sentence is used to report one’s 
past involvement in realizing intentionally an action while expecting someone 
else. Such a report thus involves one’s passivity with respect to the absence of a 
determinate person, as well as one’s involvement in an activity. 
Sartre then considers whether one can “causally justify” the systematic 
employment of the “rule of the agreement of participles” in a way which would 
confuse the two ranges of case distinguished above (e.g., by allegedly denouncing 
our indifference to “No-body”). To grant that the use of language to distance 
oneself from a situation could simply be equated with the use of language to 
report a situation, would imply granting that nothing would distinguish one’s 
involvement in a situation from a confinement, as if a situation could constitute a 
restrictive limit. In other words, in this approach, what would be rendered difficult 
to account for is the intelligibility of the distinction between a situation of 
confinement and other situations. Sartre suggests both the superfluity and the 
misleadingness of such a move:  
We should not think of denying this fact. For that matter our problem is 
not to show that the for-itself is the free foundation of its being; the for-
itself is free but in condition, and it is the relation of this condition to 
freedom that [we seek to render clear under the name of situation]. 
(Translation modified, BN, 540) 
In order to show that one’s confinement to a situation is a pseudo-
problem, Sartre distinguishes his approach from the idea that the for-itself could 
be equated with “the free foundation of its being”. At issue is the intelligibility of 
the conditional “surpassing” of the for-itself towards oneself (lui-même). Were 
the human contained in the for-itself as a pre-determined “given”, one could 
discover in-itself an unconditional freedom (as the opposite of a “despotic 
necessity”). However, the obverse of such an alleged discovery would be an 
unsurmountable alienation or confinement. As an alternative, Sartre suggests that 
the conditionality of situated reasoning can be internalized, inasmuch as one 
could not have been indifferent to nobody anyway. There is no such thing as 
reporting the alleged presence of “nobody” or using language to distance oneself 
from “nobody”. 
The difficulty Sartre considers here is related to the reflexive stance of the 
for-itself with respect to others: “the for-itself arises in a world which is a world 
for other for-itselfs. Such is the given” (BN, 541). Thereby, on the one hand, in the 
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absence of circumstantial acknowledgment of the limits of one’s freedom with 
respect to others, the meaning of the world remains “alien” to the for-itself. On 
the other hand, “the for-itself experiences itself as an object in the Universe 
beneath the Other’s look” (BN, 541). Others are thought as objects which indicate 
the ends the for-itself should follow. Conversely, conducts to follow are 
assimilated to objects one could choose to endorse to fulfil one’s ends exclusively. 
But, inasmuch as the for-itself assumes both that the ends determine the means 
and that the means determine the ends, what the for-itself reaches towards is a 
world “populated with ends” (BN, 542). However, what the for-itself misses is the 
extent to which its freedom is complicated by its own “historicizing” 
(historialisation): 
For to be free is not to choose the historic world in which one arises – 
that which would have no sense – but to choose oneself in the world 
whatever this may be. (BN, 542) 
To address this difficulty Sartre proposes a reflexion on counterfactuals. 
The absurdity of some counterfactuals testify to the irrelevance of the supposition 
that the present state of techniques and language impose restrictions on what 
someone could think or do. For instance, one could say that Duns Scotus was 
ignorant of the use of cars and planes, but that would suppose that Duns Scotus 
could have been ignorant of the existence of cars and planes. Here, the situation 
of someone from the past is evaluated in light of an actual or current point of 
view, but Duns Scotus could not have been ignorant of the existence of 
techniques that did not exist at the time. The idea that Duns Scotus was thus 
deprived of knowledge of their existence (inasmuch as he is qualified to be 
“ignorant” of them) presupposes that one’s past situation is taken to have been 
deprived of the means that we have in our actual situation. 
Conversely, one can also imagine the situation of a for-itself which 
historicizes its existence at the time of Duns Scotus, thereby nihilating its 
existence in that world. Such a for-itself would thereby nihilate its existence in a 
world which was, as ours, “all that it may be”. Sartre presents additional 
counterfactuals to strengthen this point. For example, “the Albigenses lacked 
heavy artillery to use in resisting Simon de Montfort” (BN, 543). Here again, as 
heavy artillery is a military technology that was invented at a later time, it was not 
a possibility available to the Albigenses, so the counterfactual is simply absurd. 
The difficulty thus stems from the misleading assumption that one could 
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somehow situate logical space. A gratuitous negation – “Duns Scotus did not know 
how to use a plane” – is taken for a privation. However, Sartre stresses that “such 
a nothingness can in no way limit the For-itself who is choosing itself; it cannot be 
apprehended as a lack, no matter how we consider it” (BN, 543). 
Sartre further suggests that this point applies not only to material means 
but also to “subtler techniques”: “the fact of existing as a little lord of Languedoc 
at the time of Raymond VI” is not determinative if one is considering the feudal 
world where this lord existed. That is to say, once the circumstances of one’s time 
are taken into account, it no longer appears that one was determined to conduct 
oneself in a particular way. The alleged determination of one’s conduct appears as 
a privation insofar as it is considered in light of another time: “the feudal world 
offered to the vassal lord of Raymond VI infinite possibilities of choice; we do not 
own anymore” (BN, 543). Whenever one supposes that someone else could have 
been deprived of means and possibilities from a later time, one evaluates a 
situation from the past in light of an actual or current point of view.  
Sartre links this confusion to the possibility of the for-itself affirming itself 
before another mind that is taken for an object (l’autre-objet), which coincides 
with the discovery of “techniques” that the for-itself can appropriate or 
interiorize. This interiorization involves two things: the intrumentalization of the 
technique for one’s own ends and the deterioration of the technique that is 
appropriated (BN, 544). Sartre can thus provide the first element of an answer to 
the objection that one’s appropriation of the language of the other should be 
taken as a restriction: 
Feudalism as a technical relation between man and man does not exist; 
it is only a pure abstract, sustained and surpassed by the thousands of 
individual projects of a particular man who is a liege in relation to his 
lord. (ibid.) 
Rejecting the idea that feudalism is reducible “to the sum of the relation 
of relations between vassals and suzerains”, Sartre suggests that it instead 
constitutes “the structure of these relations” or the exact abstract moment that 
must be transcended towards the concrete in order for a human of one’s time to 
realize a project. For although the feudal technique is embodied in any individual 
conduct and can be brought out, it is “there to be overcome” (BN, 543). 
This proposition does not involve rejecting the idea that the existence of 
the other implies a de facto limit to one’s existence (ibid.), for it is through my 
appropriation of the language of the other that certain unchosen but 
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characteristic determinations appear to me. Sartre considers cases of “total 
alienation”, including Jewish persons during the Second World War, but also 
working class people, such as miners, who are deprived of determinate 
possibilities. Sartre grants that these situations pose a real limit to one’s freedom, 
inasmuch as ways of being are imposed upon the for-itself without freedom as 
their foundation. 
Sartre nevertheless criticizes the idea that such limits should be construed 
as limitations, since they do not come from the action of the other. What Sartre 
emphasizes is that it is not obligatory for individuals who are excluded by some 
discourses to interiorize the discourses which exclude them. Nobody could achieve 
a perspective from which a given collective hiearchizing, required for practical 
purposes, could be noted as being identical with a pre-conception about it. He 
starts by considering the limit case of torture: if one cedes to it, one does so freely 
(BN, 545). Similarly, to follow an injunction concerning conduct based on certain 
characteristics involves recognizing its coercive value. Sartre admits that such an 
injunction preserves its character of “emanation from an alien will” and has the 
specific structure “of taking me for an object” (BN, 545). Nevertheless, “the true 
limit” of one’s freedom would lie in apprehending oneself as an object for the 
other (l’autre) within a situation, which thereby becomes interiorized as an 
objective structure. One’s situation has an outside, which thus has a dimension of 
alienation irrespective of one’s actions (and which can neither be removed nor 
modified by one’s actions). This limit derives from the fact of the existence of an 
other mind and can be considered in two manners: either as the objectivation of 
its being-for-self (être-pour-soi) or as the objectivation of being-for-another-mind 
(être-pour-autrui). In the first mode, a consciousness is thetically conscious of how 
it is for-itself; in the second, a consciousness is thetically conscious of how it is for-
another-mind. Together, these limits represent the boundaries of my freedom (BN, 
546). 
The internalization of the distinction between the other (l’autre) and 
another mind (autrui) suffices to resolve the tension implied by this two-limits 
view (BN, 546). Focused on itself, without acknowledging the other, existence-for-
itself appeared as if “solely my freedom could limit my freedom”. Nevertheless, if 
the existence of the other is taken into account, my freedom finds its limits in the 
existence of the freedom of another mind (autrui). At this stage, paralleling 
180 
 
Spinoza’s thesis that only thought can limit thought, Sartre suggests that only 
freedom can limit freedom. 
The alienation of the situation as I live it stands neither for an “inner flaw” 
nor a “given” which would introduce “brute resistance”. It amounts, rather, to the 
exteriority of the situation, that is to say, to how consciousness is thetically 
conscious of how it stands for the other (son être-dehors-pour-l’autre). The 
character of the situation does not act upon its content. But one can put oneself 
in a situation by assuming that it could. The paradox is that of a freedom which 
can will its freedom and, simultaneously, wish such a character. Inasmuch as one 
is free, one can will one’s freedom solely by putting oneself into a situation where 
one’s freedom is compromised (inasmuch as there is nothing in nature which 
could “constrain” it in this way). To will one’s freedom thereby amounts to willing 
the “passion” of one’s freedom, which implies putting oneself in a situation of 
being a “patient” of one’s freedom. 
4.1.3. The Limits of Freedom: Internal and External Finitude 
 In order to resolve this paradox, Sartre underscores that it is superfluous 
to assume such being-for-another-mind. That is to say, inasmuch as what is 
alienated exists solely for the other (l’autre), it is not necessary to assume it. The 
feeling of alienation or affection of the alienated situation involves acknowledging 
a characteristic that does not stem from the other, but rather from the objective 
limits of my being (my being-such-and-such) in order to realize ends I have chosen 
(BN, 547). One can objectivate one’s situation. 
Sartre does not reject the idea that one has characteristics or claim that 
they are unreal. He calls them “unrealizables” and distinguishes them from 
“imaginaries” (BN, 548). “Unrealizables” are “infinite” inasmuch as they stand for 
or represent the opposite of the situation. They are exemplified in the following 
way: at one’s return to a place (e.g., Paris) from which one has been absent for a 
long time, one can feel as if cut off from “a promised land”. Familiar objects stand 
where they are left, yet “I am only an absence, only the pure nothingness which is 
necessary in order that there be a Paris” (BN, 548). This approach accounts for the 
discrepancy which occurs when someone applies a double-standard to judging 
similar actions differently according to their author; for when someone else does 
it, someone else’s action is a given object of moral appreciation. If one rejects 
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applying the same standards to oneself, then, obviously, one does not evaluate 
one’s actions in the same way: 
In short, therefrom, this is the origin of all the anguish of a “bad 
conscience,” that is, the consciousness of bad faith which has for its 
ideal a self-judgement – i.e. taking toward oneself the point of view of 
the Other. (BN, 549) 
 In such cases, the unrealizables are not apprehended as such. It is, as 
suggested previously, in light of a determinate end that they are apprehended as 
“to be realized”. The law of my freedom – that one cannot be without choosing 
oneself – applies. I can attempt to be for me (in the objective mode) what I am for 
the other only by choosing how I appear to the other. But this amounts to an 
elective assumption by which I attempt to choose how I would need to be chosen. 
Yet, attempting to judge oneself from the point of view of the other amounts to 
prejudging oneself (by comparison with learning about oneself from someone 
else). 
 Although I dispose of an infinity of ways to assume my-being-for-another-
mind (mon être-pour-autrui), I cannot conceive that I do not assume it in one 
manner. Sartre expresses this point with an embedded double negation: “I cannot 
not assume it”. This formulation suggests that there is no such thing as not 
assuming how one stands before someone else (BN, 550). Freedom is lived as a 
condemnation to “facticity” inasmuch as refusing is not equivalent to abstaining. 
This approach does not amount to granting that “unrealizables” can thereby cease 
to be limits which are both objective (i.e., inasmuch as they are intelligible to 
oneself) and external (i.e., inasmuch as they belong to one’s situation). Insofar as 
“unrealizables” are unlike tools discovered by the for-itself as something “to-be-
interiorized”, they present an obligatory character. 
 A disjunction is encountered by the for-itself at this stage. Either the limit 
involved by an “unrealizable-to-be-realized” is taken as an a priori limit to one’s 
situation, or one distances oneself from an unrealizable-to-be-realized and takes it 
as an imperative or an order that implies a restriction (what Sartre calls an 
“unrealizable” interiorized in exteriority). The for-itself can assume a limit to one’s 
freedom and thereby interiorize the relevance of a given imperative to conduct 
oneself. Nevertheless, interiorized in exteriority, one can assume that it has been 
ordered to oneself in a way that implies a restriction. In this case, the finitude that 
is assumed is external. That is to say, instead of realizing, one chooses to have “a 
being at a distance, which limits all my choices and constitute their reverse side; 
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that is, I choose that my choice be limited by something other than itself” (BN, 
551). By choosing for my freedom to be limited by the freedom of the other, I 
thereby incorporate limits which are external to the situation from within as 
“unrealizables” or “unrealizables-to-realize”. In such a case, I can become 
confused in the same way that I can become confused with respect to those from 
the past; that is, I can think about my situation as if it was a priori limited, 
irrespective of any intelligible circumstance: 
For class, for race, for body, for the other, for function, etc., there is a 
“being-free-for…”. By it the For-itself projects itself towards one of its 
possibles, which is always its ultimate possible: for the envisaged 
possibility is a possibility of seeing itself; that is, of being another than 
itself to see itself from the outside. (BN, 551) 
Sartre considers the last commitment of conceiving reflexion on the basis 
of the analogy with the visual field: the for-itself can presuppose that it can see 
itself and thereby attempt to judge itself from the perspective of someone else. In 
such case, one unreflexively projects oneself towards an “ultimate” which when 
interiorized becomes a “thematized sense” that is incompatible with any 
hierarchizing of possibilities. 
Insofar as nothing compels someone to hold on to such approach, one can 
assume the free choice of one’s ends among others in the present in ways that 
are compatible with the freedom of others. If one continues attempting to judge 
oneself from the standpoint of the other, one risks putting oneself at the mercy of 
anyone when intending to do a service for or help someone else. Inversely, one 
might also risk doing a disservice to someone else while believing to have done a 
service. One will then live one’s situation within the limits that one imagines to be 
imposed by others to the exact extent that one does not assume the limits of 
one’s freedom. Yet freedom can also be lived as internal finitude, as freedom 
without restriction:  
Freedom is total and infinite, which does not mean that it does not have 
limits, but that it never encounters them. The only limits which freedom 
bumps against at each moment are those which it imposes [on] itself 
and of which we have spoken, concerning the past, with the 
environment, and with techniques. (BN, 552) 
The intelligibility of action implies acknowledgement of conditionality. 
There is no such thing as ineluctable opposition between limited and unlimited 
freedom: there are limits to freedom but they do not imply limitations. It is, on 
the contrary, precisely because there is no such thing as an opposition between 
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an unlimited and a limited freedom that the illusion of being limited by the past, 
surroundings, techniques. 
4.2. The Subject as a Limit of the World 
The counterpart of attempts to discover (see and judge) oneself from the 
standpoint of the other was addressed in part 4.1. However, an objection that can 
now be raised is that one could nevertheless attempt to discover oneself in the 
world. One could attempt to a priori interrogate oneself in a way that would rule 
out the relevance of any advice: can I not attempt to express to myself that I have 
discovered myself in a way that grounds the idea of a metaphysical solitude that 
cannot be dispelled? Can I not attempt to use language in a way that I would have 
inherited from myself? 
In this section, I argue that, on Wittgenstein’s approach, these questions 
cannot be answered because “the subject” could not have appeared in, or have 
been missing from, the register of conceivable discoveries, such that the idea of 
self-inheritance implied by solipsism can be dispensed with. To do so, in section 
4.2.1., I argue that the alternative between a unique universal mind (as implied in 
transcendentalism) and a unique individual mind (as implied in solipsism) are two 
sides of a single difficulty. This difficulty is that of a self-discovery. Then, in section 
4.2.2., I argue that individuality does not result from the observed ownership of 
an instance of a “thinking subject” or “representing subject”, or from private 
acquaintance with “sense-data”. Finally, in section 4.2.3., I argue that it is both 
superfluous and misleading to admit that the existence of the subject could be 
reported in, or absent from, the register of conceivable discoveries. 
4.2.1. From a Unique Universal Mind to the Fictive 
Character which could be “Oneself Alone” 
In chapter 1, I considered Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that one can 
see nothing but “parts” of the world from an exclusive perspective. Each thing 
would then be observed as part of a unique spirit common to the whole world. 
Wittgenstein arguably became familiar with a condensed expression of this view 
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by reading Emerson’s (2000, pp. 113-131) “History”.50 In this essay, Emerson 
proposes a picture of a unique universal mind whose works are recorded by 
history and which contains all the facts which precede and succeed an individual’s 
existence. It is obviously intelligible that for an event to happen as planned or for 
a rule to be implemented, it has to have been foreseen. Some facts are preceded 
by thought. Emerson (2000, p. 113) nevertheless further affirms: “the thought is 
always prior to the fact; all the facts of history preëxist in the mind as laws”. This 
approach presupposes that accounting for the intelligibility of all facts would 
demand their being contained in advance in one unique mind. All events would 
thus result from this unique mind’s application of “his manifold spirit” to “the 
manifold world”. The internal relation of this dual manifoldness in planned events 
can be granted: in a world, mind can order.51 
Such an idea does not involve tension with respect to solipsism, for 
Emerson (2000, p. 113) earlier suggests that “there is one mind common to all 
individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same to all of the same”. However, 
could this be expected from solipsism? And if not, how can solipsism be addressed 
without undue concession? 
This difficulty is linked to the implicit obliteration of the distinction 
between theatricality and knowledge in solipsism, as mentioned at the end of the 
first chapter. To provide further clarification, I will consider Emerson’s (2000, p. 
115) remark concerning his approach to theatre: “All that Shakespeare says of the 
king, yonder slip of a boy that reads in the corner feels to be true of himself”. 
Emerson suggests that how Shakespeare pictures the king, and thereby feudalism, 
suggests as much about Shakespeare as about feudalism. This connects to the 
issue of solipsism inasmuch as Shakespeare presents it in a way that incorporates 
the aspects differentiated in chapter 3:52 
I, that have neither pity, love, nor fear. *…+ 
I have no brother, I am like no brother; 
And this word “love”, which greybeards call divine, 
Be resident in men like one another, 
And not in me! I am myself alone.  
(Shakespeare, 2012, Henry the Sixth, Third Part, Act 5, Scene 6) 
                                                          
50
 I thank Jonathan Gombin for informing me of Wittgenstein’s knowledge of Emerson’s 
essay. See Wittgenstein: A Life  (McGuinness, 1988, p. 224). 
51
 This last point does not, I suggest, depend on transcendentalism. On this, see Mind and 
the World-Order (Lewis, 1929). 
52
 I thank Rupert Read for having shown me this text. 
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The character imagined by Shakespeare confuses solitude and unicity (i.e., 
the property of an object of which there is one and only one exemplary under a 
description). Solitude is presented as a state in which “to be oneself” would be 
rendered possible by using words in a way that implies their assimilation to an 
essential and private property of a unique individual. Following Sartre’s 
suggestion, one could say that “the quest for being” provides an implicit motive 
for the actions of this character. Language could be appropriated by this fictive 
character exclusively, for he could and would need to inherit his authority from 
himself in order to ascribe solitude to oneself as an essential property.  
This is the difficulty I addressed in the third chapter, which examined how 
this confusion is dispelled by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and the Tractatus. In 
part 1.2.1., I addressed the implicit assimilation of one’s visual field to a 
perspective in solipsism. In part 1.2.3., I further explained that rejecting the 
alleged schema of the visual field presents an ethical dimension, in that it invites 
distinguishing between knowledge and fiction. Finally, in chapter 3, I tried to 
explicate how Wittgenstein provides a means to settle the issue of solipsism by 
dissolving the tension between the impersonal representation of the world and 
individuals. I rely on Read (2001, p. 466) at this stage to suggest that providing an 
interpretation that presupposes that solipsism is coherent is not required and is 
misleading. Doing so would presuppose the conceivability of distinguishing “sorts” 
of non-sense  (Read, 2001, p. 467). I will simply attempt to formulate a tension 
internal to transcendental idealism in its relation to theatricality in order to 
address what I assume is the central difficulty implied by solipsism: the 
conceivability of self-discovery. 
The tension between transcendental idealism (as presented in “History”) 
and solipsism can be phrased as follows: in the idealist approach, it would be 
necessary to presuppose a unique universal mind in order to account for the 
intelligibility of history. The public character of language would accordingly enable 
all of us to take an exclusive perspective on the world. Meanwhile, according to 
solipsism (in the theatrical approach), only a unique individual mind could take an 
exclusive perspective on the world. One’s character would be exclusive to one’s 
constitution. As suggested in section 1.1., the difficulty here is that the 
presupposition of an exclusive perspective from where we could identify 
ourselves a priori seems to provide the ground for solipsism to affirm one’s ability 
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to identify oneself exclusively. However, with respect to the impersonal 
representation of the world by means of completely generalized propositions, 
nothing compels us to presuppose that nobody could be identified if we could not 
instantiate or derive individual minds from a universal mind, and thereby that 
“universal” would need to be contained in “mind” as an essential property. What 
can be called into question is the requisite of the existence (or pre-existence) of a 
unique entity from which (necessarily distinct and unique) individuals would need 
to be derived or instantiated. If such a requirement is admitted, then an 
impersonal representation, embedded in ordinary language, of the world by 
means of completely generalized propositions would require the existence of a 
unique individual (as if there could be non-unique ones to be ruled out). Our 
impersonal representation of the world, designed by humans for humans and for 
specific purposes, would then be dependent on the existence of a single 
individual. And then there would be the genius and “the ordinary person, a 
factory product of nature that is made each day by the thousand”  
(Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 210). 
In the Tractatus, the dissolution of the tension between the impersonal 
representation of the world by means of completely generalized propositions and 
individuals implies a criticism of the concept of the subject, which is central to 
philosophies that assimilate the a priori with an exclusive perspective from which 
knowledge could be obtained. The opposite possibility of presupposing an 
exclusively empirical perspective, from which grammatical subjects of verbs of 
sentences could be equated with objects to which a proposition would be 
externally related, would be equally misleading, for it would implicitly assimilate 
other minds to objects. In order to argue that Wittgenstein provides means to 
avoid these difficulties, I will now turn to his criticism of the subject. 
4.2.2. The Criticism of the Subject in the Tractatus 
In the section on solipsism, Wittgenstein affirms the superfluity of 
requiring the existence of “the subject” as presupposed by earlier philosophies: 
5.631 – The thinking, representing subject – there is no such thing.  
(Translation by Sullivan, 1996, p. 202) 
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that there could be a “thinking subject” as a 
“thinking thing” (Descartes, 1998, p. 51) or a “representing subject” that must be 
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presupposed on the basis that “the I think must be able to accompany all my 
representations” (Kant, 1998, p. 246; B131). In the same move, Wittgenstein 
draws the reader’s attention to the use of participles as predicates ― as if 
impinged upon a unique entity called “the subject” ― in “thinking subject” and 
“representing subject”. With respect to language, the criticized approaches 
presuppose that the verbs of our sentences require reference to a unique entity 
that could be instantiated by anyone and implied by one’s thought or 
representations (“the subject”). With respect to the world, the criticized 
approaches presuppose the requirement of assuring that an individual’s thought 
has a grasp on the world. 
If Wittgenstein’s proposal that “I am my world” in 5.63 is bracketed, then 
5.631 can be read as contrasting what can with what cannot be referred to. In this 
approach, rejecting the requirement of an existing “thinking” or “representing” 
subject amounts to pretending to rule out its possibility from an a priori 
perspective. However, if it is granted that such an a priori contrast is criticized by 
Wittgenstein, then 5.631 can instead be read as a continuation of an effort to 
dispel undue requirements. It is unclear that it is necessary to admit that one 
could informatively “remark upon” or “notice” one’s own existence from an 
exclusive perspective. 
The disjunction noted by Sartre, previously considered in chapter 2 
(2.2.2.), is helpful here: either one observes or one imagines. It can further 
happen that one imagined having observed (e.g., one can imagine having seen 
something while there was nothing, or one can imagine having seen someone 
while there was no one). But it is not necessary to admit the opposite, that is, that 
someone can observe that which one imagines. Nevertheless, nor is it necessary 
to exclude that someone can observe that which one imagines, as to do so would 
imply granting that someone could observe that which one imagined. However, 
implying that someone could observe that which has been imagined would imply 
a difficulty, for no one else could observe that which they claimed to have 
observed. In case of confusion, Sartre has a reminder: “nothingness is not, 
nothingness is-been” (translation mine, BN, 46). A reflexion on the basis of the 
unreality of the past is superfluous and misleading. In the approach I propose, 
what Wittgenstein confronts in 5.631 are past attempts to exclude the possibility 
of this difficulty. The rejection of the requirement of the existence of the subject 
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can be understood as the rejection of an entity whose private ownership would 
be implied by thought in order to assure its grasp on the world. 
That Wittgenstein criticizes the ascription of a grounding role to such a 
relation of ownership is implicit in his earlier criticism of the epistemologies of 
Russell and Moore in the Tractatus (TLP, 5.541-5.542). In propositional forms such 
as “A thinks that p is the case”, “A thinks p” and “A says p”, it looks as if “p” (which 
could be substituted with a proposition) is related to the object A (which could be 
substituted with someone’s name). Wittgenstein rejects such conceptions, which 
imply that propositional forms relate an object to a fact. The propositional forms 
mentioned are superficially distinct, yet, according to Wittgenstein, they all are of 
the form “p’ says p”. This means that, given a proposition “p”, writing that 
someone thinks or says p is writing a distinct proposition (p’). Nevertheless, this 
proposition cannot conceivably show that someone is related to it. For example, 
(1) “Paul thinks that War and Peace is on the shelf in the living room” does not 
show that “Paul” is related to (2) “War and Peace is on the shelf in the living 
room”. For instance, Paul might think that War and Peace is not on the shelf in the 
living room, or perhaps Paul has not thought that War and Peace is on the shelf in 
the living room. Conversely what would render (1) true if Paul indeed thinks (2), is 
what would render (2) true, that is, that War and Peace is on the shelf of the 
living-room. Who Paul is does not depend on his relation to his beliefs (true or 
false) or the ideas that could be ascribed to him. Another mind is not reducible to 
a set of correct facts, thoughts or beliefs. 
Wittgenstein indeed suggests that that a “composite soul would not be a 
soul any longer” (TLP, 5.5421). In this approach, it is not necessary to admit that a 
soul could be divided and that its existence would need to be supposed to assure 
the unity of its components. Furthermore, supposing that the unity of a soul could 
be restored by stipulation of an entity or relation is not necessary and is 
misleading. For example, consider Russell’s (2009, p. 193) ideas after rejecting the 
position that self-consciousness is consciousness of “our self”, wherein he 
purports to account for self-consciousness in terms of self-acquaintance: 
When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some 
particular thought or feeling, and not upon the “I” which has the thought 
or feeling. Nonetheless that there are some reasons for thinking that we 
are acquainted with the “I”, though the acquaintance is hard to 
disentangle from other things *…+ When a case of acquaintance is one 
with which I can be acquainted (as I am acquainted with my 
acquaintance with the sense-datum representing the sun), it is plain that 
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the person acquainted is myself. Thus when I am acquainted with my 
seeing the sun, the whole fact with which I am acquainted is “self-
acquainted-with-sense-datum”. 
The central difficulty in treating “acquaintance with ourselves” as a 
requirement is that it leads to uncertainty. In Russell’s (2009, p. 194) own terms: 
“although acquaintance with ourselves seems probably to occur, it is not wise to 
assert that it undoubtedly does occur”. This implies that there is no such thing as 
certainty of acquaintance with the “I” or “myself”. The reliance on the idiom of 
acquaintance to characterize one’s reflexive considerations seems to introduce 
the possibility that one could encounter “one’s self” and thereby seems to 
introduce the irremediable possibility of missing such an encounter. If this is the 
case, what I can learn concerning myself could always be reduced to the 
immediate result of so-called knowledge by acquaintance with “myself”. But 
inasmuch as it is uncertain that such an encounter with “myself” could happen, 
and insofar as I could obtain different sense data by perceiving different entities, 
then it seems that my reflexive considerations would depend on a form of 
introspective (and thereby private) acquaintance, the object of which would be 
“self-acquainted-with-sense-datum”. Sense data would make it plain that it is 
“myself” who is acquainted with entities insofar as they cannot be shared, except 
by means of description.53 To this extent, Russell’s account depends upon a 
private relation of ownership to anchor thought to world. 
In order to avoid the collapse of the question of the existence of the 
external world into the question of the existence of other minds, the 
independence of the objects which delimit empirical reality can simply be granted 
(TLP, 5.5561). This ensures the independence of the knowledge acquired 
regarding objects by applying determinate ways of studying them. This Kantian 
line of thought is, I suggest, assumed in the Tractatus. Nevertheless, as previously 
considered, inasmuch as attempting to fix elementary propositions a priori leads 
to non-sense (TLP, 5.5571), it is not necessary to grant the a priori limitation of 
our thought and expression by the “object-centred view” . That is to say, it can be 
granted to such an approach that new objects can be discovered or produced, 
                                                          
53
 This explains partially Wittgenstein’s diagnosis, according to which Russell’s 
theory cannot provide a correct explanation of propositions of the form “A judges 
that p”, as it would allow that a judgement could be passed on a non-sensical 
proposition (TLP, 5.5422). On Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s conception of 
acquaintance in relation to the issue of solipsism, see “Does Bismarck have a 
beetle in his box?” (Diamond, 2005) and McGinn’s (2006, pp. 258-264) response. 
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which can in turn determine anew how we communicate via propositions. 
However, it is not necessary to admit that only objects would be available to us as 
“end-terms” for our thoughts, which is the core assumption of the “object-
centred view”. Our thoughts do not require the ownership of a self. 
4.2.3. “The World as I found it” 
In the introduction of this dissertation, I suggested that the modern 
problem of the existence of other minds stems from the manner in which the 
problem of the reality of the external world has been treated. Interrogating the a 
priori conditions bearing on representational activity has been taken to assure the 
possibility of acquiring objective knowledge from the external world. But the 
privilege granted to the task of grounding knowledge of phenomena has had, for 
its counterpart, accrediting that the generalized absence of others could remain 
conceivable a posteriori. Wittgenstein’s reflexion on a fictive book entitled “The 
World as I found it”, I suggest, calls into question this conflation and thereby this 
privilege: 
5.631 – If I wrote a book “The World as I found it”, I should also have 
therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and 
which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject 
or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that 
is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made. 
Here, Wittgenstein invites reflexion on the requirements that would bear 
on the writing of a book entitled “The World as I found it”. Were this book written 
to conform to the content of its title, it would need to contain the register of the 
discoveries made by its author. Approached from the “object-centred view”, such 
a book would need to be exhaustive, since it is the world that is at issue, 
considered as an empirical totality or as the abstract unity of a collection. Notably, 
a discovery presupposes that it can be achieved, that is to say, that it can be 
described as an event that occurred in the past if it happened (similar to what is 
shown by “I found War and Peace on a bookshelf”). Wittgenstein approaches the 
difficulty implied by admitting the existence of “the subject” from within, without 
explicitly considering whether and how “The World as I found it” could end, 
focusing instead on the requirements that would bear on its content. Such a book 
should contain a report on the body of his author according to the “obedience” of 
the members of his body to his will. Nevertheless, however detailed the inventory 
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of discoveries, Wittgenstein suggests that it would effectively show that there is 
no subject. In short, that the existence of the subject could not have been 
reported in the register of conceivable discoveries. 
Taking this reflexive engagement with a fictive book to attest that its 
author, implicitly assimilating himself to an instance of the subject (from an 
impersonal and exclusive perspective), could notice his absence from the register 
of conceivable discoveries would miss the point. Were the absence of the 
mention of the subject in the book treated as a negative fact, then it would still be 
granted that mention of “the subject” could have been made in a way that could 
have satisfy the inchoate expectation of its author. That is to say, it would still be 
presupposed that the author of the book could have been the object of his own 
discovery. The difficulty is that, unlike the verb “heal”, the verbs “discover” and 
“find” do not have an ordinary reflexive and non-metaphorical use. Notably, Kant 
(2002, p. 96; §73) characterizes solipsism in the Second Critique as “self-seeking” 
(selbstsucht). Kant had the insight that one can indefinitely assume to be “seeking 
oneself”, just like the “detotalized totality” aimed at coinciding with itself 
considered by Sartre. Kant suggests the vacuity of such a quest, while Sartre and 
Wittgenstein suggest that we can realize that it can be dispensed with. 
On the reading I propose, Wittgenstein suggests that it is as misleading to 
expect to appear in the register of conceivable discoveries as it is to be surprised 
by not appearing in it. That is to say, noting that there is no such thing as self-
discovery which would enable self-inheritance is tantamount to acknowledging 
the misleading nature of the inchoate expectations which are arbitrarily 
presupposed with respect to logical space. To see someone as an instance of “the 
ordinary person, a factory product of nature that is made each day by the 
thousand”  (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 210), one would need to have inherited from 
oneself the ability to refer to oneself as an instance of “the cognizing subject”, 
which would allow one to count oneself as a “genius”. But if self-discovery never 
happened, then self-inheritance never happened either. 
On this approach, it is not necessary to presuppose that “the subject”, “I” 
or “self” need to refer. Pace Russell, an acquaintance with “a self” is not required. 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s proposal to dispense with the requirement of the 
existence of “the subject” does not amount to making a concession to the 
“object-centred view”: 
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5.632 - The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit (Grenze) 
of the world. 
 Wittgenstein rejects the view that “the subject” could belong to the 
world, for this presupposes that individuals indiscriminately labelled as instances 
of “the subject” could be assimilated to “parts” of the world thought as objects. 
On such an approach, it could then equally be admitted that “the subject” could 
be name of any candidate “part” of the world in the visual field (definable 
ostensively). This directly concerns the collective difficulty considered by Sartre, 
for this view is at best indifferent with respect to a “despotic” view of necessity 
according to which events must happen unconditionally. A single individual could 
and would have to decide which instances of “the subject” qualify for inclusion in 
the world and which do not. Is it necessary to grant this at all? 
Wittgenstein suggests that this view is a limit of the world. He invites us to 
appropriate a non-contrastive limit in the use of language, one which does not 
admit that the evaluation of other minds on the model of labelled objects (or by 
means of a designating use of language, in the terms of Sartre) is required. If “I am 
my world” (TLP, 5.63), saying “I see nobody on the road” would not amount to 
saying that someone called “Nobody” has been seen on the road. “Nobody” is not 
the name of someone. In the impersonal representation of the world by means of 
completely generalized propositions, no one could have been nobody. There is no 
such thing as an individual that could not be one. For “logical constants” are not 
representatives (TLP, 4.312). Uses of “nobody” can be accounted for in terms of 
quantificational generality.54 However, this does not imply that Wittgenstein ever 
suggests that the impersonal representation of the world by means of completely 
generalized propositions means that quantificational generality could suffice to 
account for language.  
Indeed, it is unclear in what sense an impersonal representation of the 
world designed by humans could be said to precede language. As mentioned 
earlier, Wittgenstein (1998, p. 69) asks us to: “Imagine a language in which, 
instead of ‘I found nobody in the room’, one said ‘I found Mr. Nobody in the 
room’. Imagine the philosophical problems which would arise out of such a 
convention”. We see similar problems when we consider the approach of Denis 
de Rougemont. However, it is not necessary to admit the superfluous and 
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 For such an approach, see Logic: A very short introduction  (Priest, 2000, pp. 17-23). 
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misleading view that one could identify the “intentions” of an individual from an 
impersonal private and exclusive perspective. We quantify for specific purposes; 
however, quantification does not suffice for every specific purpose. Ethics, 
aesthetics and logic are transcendental (TLP, 6.13; 6.421). The oscillation 
between, on the one hand, the fiction of an impersonal perspective that would 
allows us to overcome would-be limitations and, on the other hand, the fiction of 
a personal perspective that belongs exclusively to one’s constitution and limits 
one’s thought and expressions can be dispensed with. It is unclear whether there 
is a choice between these alternatives, as both presuppose the conceivability of 
an exclusive perspective on the whole, either under the form of a unique 
universal mind (as in transcendental idealism) or as a unique individual mind or 
constitution (as in solipsism). 
The rejection of the “metaphysical subject” whose presence could be 
noted somewhere in the world in 5.633 and the rejection of the alleged form of 
the visual field in 5.6331 can thus be considered anew. According to conceptions 
which treat “the subject” as a name of a visible “part” of the world,55 one would 
have to admit that the existence of other minds depends on observation. 
However, as we saw with Sartre (cf. section 2.2.2.), certainty of the existence of 
other minds does not depend on the presence of someone in one’s visual field. 
Furthermore, if there is no such thing as learning that “the subject” exists by 
means of observation, then it is superfluous and misleading to conceive the 
existence of the world and other minds as grounded by a reasoning. 
The difficulty arising from admitting that one’s existence is grounded in 
one’s reasoning is that it leads to confusing doubt with respect to a fiction (i.e., 
that one can be vaguely uncertain before posing the question of whether the 
world and others minds exist to oneself) with the fiction of a doubt (i.e., the 
would-be doubt of the existence of the world and other minds). Once one realizes 
that such doubts are nothing but fictions, one can retrospectively realize that 
there was no conceivable doubt in this respect. Wittgenstein’s approach to the 
contingency involved in existence from a first-person perspective recalls Sartre’s 
pre-reflexive cogito. If it is only rhetorically that I can ask myself whether or not I 
exist, it is certain that there is the world with others before I posed this question. 
As with Wittgenstein, this approach does not involve that the pre-reflexive 
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 Kant  (2004, p. 108) proposes such an approach in the Prolegomena. 
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certainty of one’s existence is immune to doubt, as if such certainty would be 
required to resist the corrosive effect of a would-be ineluctable doubt. Rather, it 
underscores that there is no such thing as a conceivable doubt in this respect. 
Admitting that one would need to rely on experience to establish that 
“the subject” exists, as a label imposed upon individuals from nowhere, 
presupposes that the existence of other minds could be conjectural or merely 
probable. However, admitting the conceivability of the a priori discovery of 
essential solitude implies admitting being able to informatively remark to oneself 
that one exists (as if such information could have been missing until it was noted).  
 Wittgenstein’s suggested connection between the rejection of the visual 
field schema and the criticism of there being an a priori order of things (TLP, 
5.634) can be considered anew. Wittgenstein indeed rejects the requirement of 
the assurance that traditional idealism assumed was necessary with respect to the 
relation between thought and world. To the extent that the subject is assimilated 
to an entity to which thought would need to refer, a harmony between thought 
and world would need to be assured, as with Schopenhauer’s (2010, pp. 109-110) 
approach to the relation of the “cognizing subject” with the world. In such an 
approach, any “part” of experience must have an a priori counterpart 
independent from experience, available to thought only. This is precisely the 
requirement that Wittgenstein rejects. As Sullivan (1996, p. 203) suggests: 
An a priori order would be an assurance of the harmony through which 
thinking genuinely engages with the world. But if the very notions of 
what it is for there to be a world – for logical space to be determined in 
such and such a way – and of what it is to think – to present a 
determination of logical space through its coordinates – are already 
intrinsically tied, then the need for any such assurance falls away.  
 According to this approach, in its opposition to traditional conceptions of 
the a priori, solipsism could hardly be misled. Transcendental idealism, 
characterized in chapter 1 as the attitude according to which reality could be 
evaluated only according to an idea, grants a priori that we could lack access to 
reality “as it is” (or in-itself). Everything happens as if the world were out of reach 
and that we could only rely on representations. Contrary to such idealism, 
solipsism insists that there is no such thing as an assurance that we share the 
ideas according to which we evaluate facts or performances. Wittgenstein 
suggests that the contingency of what is seen and what can be described can and 
ought to be granted to solipsism. 
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 However, what solipsism misses is the difference in the direction of 
evaluation. Reality can be evaluated according to an idea, but an idea can also be 
evaluated according to reality. For example, one can calibrate a project according 
to available means without thereby renouncing the idea that the project 
embodies. By contrast, pure realism, which Wittgenstein suggests coincides with 
solipsism, involves a supplementary clause: that ideas could be evaluated only 
according to reality. That is to say, whatever the idea, reality would be as it is a 
priori, which would mean that expressing an idea would be intrinsically 
misleading. Any evaluation or measurement would require starting, as it were, 
from a reality that could not have been independent of thought. The difficulty 
implied by this view, whether conceived as solipsism or pure realism, is that it 
implies that experience could be intelligible without valuation. However, 
considered in its opposition to transcendental idealism, solipsism recalls that 
using “I” does not require reliance on an identifying conception (conceptions 
implying that an individual would have to be identified a priori from an 
impersonal perspective). As put by Sullivan  (1996, p. 212) : “the subject is a 
personification of the distance between language and world imposed in the 
attempt to say that they are not distanced”. 
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Conclusion 
The question addressed by this thesis was: could one ever discover that 
one was essentially alone in the world? Against this background, the words “I am 
alone in the world” or “I alone exist” could seem to express a metaphysical 
discovery. Yet this question is at odds with the possibility of situating oneself in 
light of particular circumstances. To this extent, the question can both express 
and nourish a discrepancy between a feeling of solitude (which can equally obtain 
when among others) and a situation of solitude (which cannot happen among 
others). In order to show that the tension between the apparent meaningfulness 
of the question of non-situated solitude and its possible answers can be resolved, 
I compared the approaches of Sartre and Wittgenstein. Both authors criticize the 
conflation of the question of the existence of the external world with the question 
of the existence of others minds. Although solipsism, as a preliminary procedure, 
enabled assuring our knowledge of objects, inasmuch as it presupposed the 
requirement for representational mediation with reality, it leads to assuming the 
requirement for private representational mediation between individuals. My 
hypothesis was that the approaches of Sartre and Wittgenstein converge in their 
attempt to show, from the inside, that admitting a private representational 
mediation between individuals is tantamount to admitting that the thinkable 
could be restricted and, thereby, to accrediting the relevance of the illusion of 
undetectable confinement. 
The first chapter was dedicated to explicating the common background 
against which Sartre and Wittgenstein address the issue of solipsism. For both 
Sartre and Wittgenstein, solipsism is a difficulty that appears at the intersection of 
two doctrines: transcendental idealism and metaphysical, or pure, realism. The 
difficulty raised by these doctrines is that they each presuppose that the thinkable 
could be restricted. Thereby, these doctrines imply that the illusion of 
undetectable confinement can and should be accredited. What distinguishes 
solipsism from these doctrines is its pretence to dispense with others in order to 
impose arbitrary strictures on the thinkable. The rejection of the alleged schema 
of “the form of the visual field” and the alleged problem of “inverted vision”, 
which would require taking up an exclusive perspective from which individuals 
could be seen as “parts” of the world, thus presents an ethical dimension: it 
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amounts to a rejection of the gesture of arbitrarily imposing a limit on the 
thinkable, which cannot but lead to confusion. The similar criticisms of such a 
gesture made by Sartre and Wittgenstein is thus decisive. In both cases, the 
author invites us to internalize (i.e., to make our own) how the rejection of such a 
gesture presents an ethical dimension. At stake is the relevance of the 
counterfactual scenario of a generalized absence of others, which can be 
imagined a posteriori, but whose a priori assumption leads to confusion inasmuch 
as it amounts, at best, to gratuitously privileging worst conceivable scenarios in 
order to ground our expressions and actions. 
In order to address this issue, in chapter 2 I explored how Sartre resolves 
the theoretical problem of the existence of others. His answer requires 
confronting and dispelling the conjectural conception of other minds (such as 
found in the phenomenologies of his time and in behaviourism), according to 
which their existence is only probable. This approach is the counterpart of 
privileging the question of the grounding of our knowledge of objects. The core of 
Sartre’s response is the “Cogito a little expanded”, a conceptual means to dispel 
the relevance of doubt about the existence of other minds. This “Cogito a little 
expanded” is not a proof of the existence of other minds, as it does not imply 
admitting the relevance of a generalized absence of other minds. To this extent, 
Sartre provides conceptual means for establishing that solipsism is philosophically 
a pseudo-problem. Even from a theoretical perspective, there is no such thing as a 
reason to presuppose that other minds could inevitably be missing. This, in turn, 
establishes that the “metaphysical interrogation” of the existence of others (“why 
are there others?”) admits a de facto or necessarily a posteriori answer once the 
unrestricted contingency of consciousness is acknowledged. The answer is “this is 
so”, which is equivalent to saying that there is no answer, or that it is a 
superfluous answer to a question raised from nowhere: “there is no conceivable 
point of view on the whole: the whole has no ‘outside’ and the very question of 
the meaning of its ‘flipside’ is meaningless” (BN, 325). Nevertheless, the 
dissolution of the theoretical issue of solipsism does not suffice to address what 
Sartre calls “a sort of de facto solipsism”, which raises concrete difficulties: 
namely, indifference with respect to others or, metaphorically, blindness with 
respect to others. The difficulty addressed by Sartre has to do with the 
endorsement of indifference as a concrete way of acting with respect to others. 
198 
 
As a possibly primitive reaction to others, it leads to a desperate and meaningless 
quest to appropriate the freedom of others. This concerns the core difficulty of 
solipsism, which is the dissociation of the feeling of solitude from a situation of 
solitude: inasmuch as the counterpart of the endorsement of indifference is the 
implicit reduction of others to a means for satisfying one’s desires, the connection 
between the feeling of solitude among others and the lack of such a feeling in 
situations of solitude is missed. However, Sartre suggests that this is nobody’s 
character, that is to say, that no one could wish this. This leads to reconsidering 
the linguistic expression of solipsism in philosophy and the sciences, the pretence 
to draw a restrictive limit to the thinkable. 
The third chapter was dedicated to Wittgenstein’s dissolution of this 
theoretical problem by providing a way to settle the issue of solipsism. What 
needs to be called into question is not only the a posteriori possibility of ratifying 
the conceivability of our confinement to representations, but also the assimilation 
of the a priori to an exclusive perspective from which a decree could imply or 
preclude our eventual confinement to representations. The appeal to a restrictive 
limit upon the thinkable presupposed by the claim to occupy such a perspective is 
questioned from the beginning of the Tractatus, particularly in the section on 
solipsism. Wittgenstein’s answer criticizes the conceivability of legislating on 
sense, that is, of attempting to impose arbitrary strictures on the expression of 
our thoughts. In comparison to discounting the relevance of a possibility in a given 
situation during an empirical investigation, the pretence of contrasting what we 
can refer to with what we cannot refer to, independently from any conceivable 
situation, presupposes that one could see the world from an outer perspective on 
the world. However, Wittgenstein suggests that logic could not conceivably be 
affected by a mistake made by someone. To this extent, appealing to logic (as 
Frege did) in order to implement procedures of arbitration for conflicts of opinion 
mirrors the difficulty raised by solipsism.  
In order to address this issue without questioning the intelligibility of 
ordinary language and logic, Wittgenstein suggests that the question “to what 
extent solipsism is a truth?” can be settled. Furthermore, this can be done 
without appealing to a law of excluded middle or appointing an arbiter. 
Addressing this question requires dispelling two alleged options implied by 
reliance on an analogy with the visual field to account for thinking. The first 
199 
 
alleged option is that of an unavoidable mismatch between thought and reality. 
Holding on to such a scenario can lead one to assume that one’s thought could 
have been hostage to facts; that it could always be relevantly possible that one’s 
representations could be false. This would involve granting that truth could admit 
gradations. The second alleged option is that of a necessary harmony between 
thought and reality. Holding on to such a scenario assumes that one’s thought 
might be unfair to facts; that it could always be relevantly possible that one’s 
representations could be true. This would involve granting that facts could admit 
gradations. Wittgenstein’s conception of the proposition as a model of reality 
enables dispelling these two alleged options. Inasmuch as one can imagine the 
holding of a determinate fact, one can represent any fact to oneself. And 
inasmuch as one can express the holding of a fact to others, one cannot be 
without means to express any fact to others. 
Thus, the appeal to settle the issue of solipsism cannot be tied to an 
ability that one could claim exclusively. Wittgenstein invites the reader to 
consider this by means of a fictive “language which alone I understand”. He 
thereby provides means to evaluate whether one should accept a discrepancy 
between what one does not understand and what one means to get shown in 
one’s expressions, which testifies to the ways in which one appropriates language. 
The detachment of one’s feeling of solitude (which can equally obtain among 
others) and one’s effective solitude (which cannot happen among others) could 
not therefore fail to get shown by one’s expressions. It is inasmuch as we cannot 
and do not need to arbitrate on sense that it is intelligible that what solipsism 
means “shows itself”. In reflexion, the inconceivability of proving the existence of 
other minds mirrors the inconceivability of disproving the non-existence of other 
minds. Thus, these alleged possibilities are not relevant. The theoretical issue 
raised by solipsism can therefore be dissolved without any conceivable proof of 
the existence of other minds. The central confusion of solipsism, namely, the 
conflation of solitude with unicity, is grounded in the assumption that the public 
character of language is an obstacle. On reflexion, this confusion can be dispelled 
by realizing that solitude does not amount to a specific unicity, but rather the 
contrary. That is to say, to think of being alone need not amount to thinking about 
the property of a unique object, for what could distinguish us with respect to 
uniqueness (i.e., the property of each and every individual) and the ordinary 
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possibility of solitude? The pretence implied by wishing to dispense with anyone 
else in an attempt to legislate on the thinkable can simply be discarded without 
renouncing or submitting to anything. “My world” is perfectly adequate for 
individuation. 
The fourth chapter was dedicated to showing that Sartre and Wittgenstein 
establish both the superfluity and the misleading nature of the ideas of self-
discovery and self-inheritance implied by solipsism. If the solipsist could discover 
that he is the only one there is, then no one but him could make such a discovery. 
And if the solipsist could report such discovery, then no one but him could inherit 
the language to report such discovery from himself. Thus the ideas of both self-
inheritance and self-discovery that solipsism implies would be essentially private, 
or properties essential to a unique individual. Two objections were addressed in 
this chapter in order to dismiss both the requirement for and the relevance of the 
inchoate attempt to narrate the alleged discovery of a fiction of solitude from a 
non-situated perspective. The first objection was that appropriating the language 
of the other presupposes the subordination of my language to that of the other. 
However, such subordination cannot be restrictive, as this would imply that the 
other, and by extension everyone, is restrictively limited by the commonality of 
language. However, common meanings discovered in the world of which one is 
not the author are confused with restrictive limits only if one attempts to judge 
oneself from the standpoint of the other, thereby presupposing one’s ability to 
discover (see and judge) oneself from an outer perspective on the world. To grant 
that one cannot attempt to judge oneself without prejudging of oneself suffices to 
live freedom as internal finitude, or as freedom without limitations.  
The second objection regards self-discovery as the ground of self-
inheritance, which would enable the exclusive appropriation of language in 
solipsism. However, such self-discovery would presuppose that one could notice 
one’s existence independently from one’s world, exactly as when one discovers an 
object somewhere. To this extent, admitting the possibility of self-discovery is not 
necessary, for the flipside of the illusion of an a priori discovery of solitude (as if 
one could a priori discover the contrary) is the illusion of remarking informatively 
that one exists (as if one could lack this information a posteriori without making 
such a remark). It would be just as misleading to expect to appear as to be 
surprised by not appearing in the register of conceivable discoveries. The subject 
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cannot be understood as a part of the world, but is a limit of the world. That is to 
say, it is not necessary to admit the existence of “the subject”. 
If it seems that “I am essentially alone in the world”, that “I am the only 
one” or that “there is only me” could express a discovery, it is because one takes 
“am I essentially alone in the world?”, “am I the only soul?”, or “are there 
others?” for questions to which one could and should answer. But we can 
distinguish a doubt that one might have about a fiction (with respect to an 
undetectable confinement to representations) from the fiction of a doubt that 
could not be levied in principle (the eventuality of an undetectable confinement). 
Even considering the fiction of an undetectable confinement implies having 
appropriated language. Even the counterfactual scenario that seems closest to 
solipsism, according to which one could be the only person remaining after a 
catastrophe, implies that the generalized absence of others is considered a 
posteriori. Admitting the a priori eventuality of the generalized absence of others 
is superfluous and necessarily misleading. It implies admitting that one could 
evaluate one’s situation from nowhere, and thereby implies dispensing with the 
conditionality implied by our situated thoughts. If one feels alone among others, 
one can interrogate oneself and eventually find reasons for such a feeling. This 
manifests our implicit awareness of having a grip on what we are doing. 
To conclude, the independence of will from the world cannot conceivably 
give rise to an obstacle, but is rather a condition of the intelligibility of action and 
expression. It is insofar as one can foresee that a projected action could fail that 
one can eventually provide oneself with the determinate means to realize it. One 
could not be a priori restrained, confined or constrained with respect to what one 
can think or be conscious of. In yielding to the temptation to impute to one’s 
medium of expression – language – a deficiency (Wittgenstein), or to ascribe an 
impersonal life to it (Sartre), one risks nothing less than rendering oneself as 
unintelligible to oneself as to others. 
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